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This dissertation combines micro-level empirical analyses and general equilibrium
models to study the issues of output price, price-cost markup, and business cycle dynam-
ics. In the first chapter, I study how a credit crunch affects output price dynamics. I build
a unique micro-level dataset that combines scanner-level prices and quantities with pro-
ducer information, including the producer’s banking relationships, inventory, and cash
holdings. I exploit the Lehman Brothers’ failure as a quasi-experiment and find that firms
facing a negative credit supply shock decrease their output prices approximately 15% rel-
ative to their unaffected counterparts. I hypothesize that such firms reduce prices to
liquidate inventory and to generate additional cash flow from the product market. I find
strong empirical support for this hypothesis: (i) firms facing a negative bank shock tem-
porarily decrease their prices and inventory and increase their market share and cash
holdings relative to their counterparts, and (ii) this effect is stronger for firms and sectors
with high initial inventory or small initial cash holdings. To discuss the aggregate impli-
cations of these findings, I integrate this micro-level study into a business cycle model by
explicitly allowing for two identical groups of producers facing different degrees of credit
supply shock. The model predicts that a negative credit supply shock leads to a large tem-
porary drop in aggregate inflation—as a result of the aggressive liquidation of inventory—
followed by an increase in inflation as producers eventually run out of inventory. This
prediction for inflation and inventory dynamics is fully consistent with observations for
the 2007-09 recession. In the second chapter, I study price-cost markup cyclicality. Exist-
ing empirical evidence on price-cost markup cyclicality is mixed. I find that markups are
procyclical unconditionally, and procyclical conditional on demand shock using a flexible
production function. The estimated production function features a larger input comple-
mentarity than that in a tightly parametrized production function (Cobb-Douglas and
CES), producing both greater efficiency and higher markups during an expansion. These
results have two striking implications: (i) much of the cyclicality in markups arises from
input complementarity, rather than nominal rigidity, and (ii) the U.S. economy behaves
as if it has increasing returns to scale. The third chapter studies the business cycle with
a Translog production function. We empirically identify a complementarity between la-
bor and energy that leads to procyclical returns to scale, which is not compatible with
the tightly parameterized production function commonly used in the literature (Cobb-
Douglas and CES). We therefore propose a flexible Translog production function that
not only features complementarity-induced procyclical returns to scale but is also con-
sistent with a balanced growth path. A simple calibrated business cycle model with the
proposed production function generates strikingly data-consistent dynamics following
demand shock without relying on either nominal rigidities or countercyclical markups.
Our model also produces a stronger amplification effect than the model without comple-
mentarity. We then incorporate our production function into a benchmark medium-scale
New Keynesian model (Smets and Wouters 2007) and repeat the business cycle account-
ing exercise. We find that input complementarity leads to a more dramatic decrease in
the role of ”suspicious shocks” than of ”structural shocks.”
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Chapter 1
The Effect of the Credit Crunch on Output Price Dynamics:
The Corporate Inventory and Liquidity Management Channel
1.1 Introduction
The questions of how and to what extent credit market disruptions affect the economy
as a whole have been of vital interest in the macroeconomics and finance literature, par-
ticularly after the 2007-09 financial crisis. This period was characterized not only by a
significant drop in total output and employment but also by a dysfunctional credit mar-
ket. At the peak of credit market stress following the September 2008 failure of Lehman
Brothers, new loans to large borrowers dropped 79% relative to the credit boom period
(Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010). The TED spread, an indicator of perceived credit risk,
surpassed 300 basis points after the Lehman failure, breaking the previous record set af-
ter the 1987 Black Monday crash.
During these credit market disruptions, the producer price index plummeted approx-
imately 15% in three months (Figure 1.1b).¹ Given this aggregate correlation, this article
¹Note that the core CPI (consumer price index excluding energy and food) did not fall as much during
this period; thus, because of this stable core CPI, one might believe that a large fall in oil and commodity
prices in this period entirely explains the decrease in the aggregate producer price index. However, a closer
look at more disaggregated industry-level price data reveals a different picture. Like the aggregate price
index, the manufacturing price index fell dramatically in this period, which is difficult to explain by a fall
in oil prices and in the commodity price index. The price index for the service sector, which is notoriously
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(d) Inventory and cash holding
Note. (a) plots the BLS aggregate consumer price index, while (b) plots the BLS
aggregate producer price index and the producer price index for manufacturing sectors
only. (c) shows the differential change in the price index between credit-constrained
firms and their unaffected counterparts. (d) shows the total business inventory and
corporate cash holdings. Details on variable measurement are given in Appendix B.
seeks to answer the following questions: Do firms that face a negative credit supply shock
decrease their output prices? If so, why? What are the aggregate implications?
Identification poses the biggest challenge in answering these questions. Although
difficult to measure, had been stable in this period, and this stability is the main reason for the core CPI’s
stability.
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there is a clear positive correlation between inflation and credit market conditions in Fig-
ures 1.1a and 1.1b, it is difficult to identify the relationship between these series from the
aggregate data. The aggregate correlation is based on the Great Recession, and conven-
tional macroeconomic models can easily explain a decrease in inflation during the reces-
sion without relying on credit market conditions. Even worse, many influential events
occurred at the same time, such as a fall in housing prices (Mian, Rao, and Sufi 2013), a
drop in oil prices (Hamilton 2009), and a decrease in international trade (Eaton et al. 2016),
making aggregate time-series comparisons nearly impossible.
To overcome this identification challenge, I build a novel micro-level dataset that com-
bines producers’ prices and sales at the barcode level from the Nielsen Homescan Panel
database with producers’ balance sheet information from the Orbis database, and their
loan market access from the Dealscan database. The merged dataset contains detailed in-
formation on prices and quantities sold by public and private firms and producers’ bank-
ing relationships from 2004 to 2011. For example, if a household purchases Coke at a
store, I observe the price and quantity of Coke purchased, Coca-Cola’s balance sheet,
and which bank Coca-Cola deals with. Because many papers discuss the importance of
product entry and exit and changes in product quality for explaining changes in output
prices (Nakamura and Steinsson 2012, Hottman, Redding, andWeinstein 2016), I adapt the
nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES) demand system to incorporate the effects
of variety and quality change and thereby construct the price index for the main empirical
analysis. To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first to combine information on
producers’ price and quantity with information on their banking relationships.
Armed with detailed micro-level data, I exploit the “bank shock” at the time of the
3
Lehman failure and find that firms facing a negative credit supply shock decrease their out-
put prices approximately 15% more than their unaffected counterparts do. While these
micro-level data provide rich cross-sectional variation in addition to time-series varia-
tion, they do not automatically solve the identification problem because of the difficulty
in identifying credit-constrained firms in the data. Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist, 2016 test
conventional micro-level financial constraint measures such as Kaplan-Zingales (Kaplan
and Zingales 1997) and Whited-Wu (Whited and Wu 2006) and conclude that they do not
accurately identify financially constrained firms because they are constructed using firm-
level balance sheet variables that likely reflect company characteristics other than their
level of financial constraint. Thus, instead of relying on firm-level balance sheet variables,
I utilize a change in bank health at the time of the Lehman failure to generate plausi-
bly exogenous variation in firm-level credit supply conditions. In addition to my main
measure of change in bank health based on banks’ loan issuance, I use three bank shock
measures from Chodorow-Reich, 2014 that are not highly correlated but give consistent
results: banks’ exposure to the Lehman failure, banks’ exposure to toxic asset-backed se-
curities, and bank balance sheet items, such as bank deposits and net trading revenues,
which are unlikely to be correlated with borrowers’ characteristics. These three measures
affect firms’ credit supply conditions for reasons that are plausibly orthogonal to their
characteristics related to pricing decisions. Figure 1.1c illustrates the empirical results.
I hypothesize that firms facing a negative credit supply shock decrease their output
prices by liquidating inventory and dumping their products in order to generate extra cash
flow from the product market, and I provide strong empirical support for this hypothesis.
I first show that at the time of the Lehman bankruptcy, there was an enormous decline
4
in aggregate inventory and an increase in corporate cash holdings (Figure 1.1d). Then,
using the micro-level data and the corresponding identification strategy, I find that firms
facing negative bank shocks decrease their inventory relative to their counterparts. These
firms decrease their output prices only temporarily and then increase output prices after
about a year, which indicates that firms temporarily liquidate their inventory because of
a negative credit supply shock but cannot sell their inventory forever; thus, they must
increase prices in the medium run. Additionally, these firms increase their market share
and cash holdings, illustrating that they increase their cash flow by selling more to the
product market as a result of lowering their output prices. Moreover, the effect on output
prices is stronger for firms or sectors that had larger inventories or smaller cash hold-
ings before the Lehman failure, confirming my hypothesis. From a corporate inventory
and liquidity management perspective, this hypothesis can be interpreted to imply that
companies convert illiquid assets (inventory) to liquid assets (cash) when their insurers
(banks) cannot lend to them and decrease their output prices in this conversion process.
Additionally, I estimate heterogeneous treatment effects across firms and sectors and
implement numerous robustness tests to gain additional insights from the data and to
confirm the validity of the bank shock measures. I find that firms facing negative bank
shocks decrease their output prices more if (i) they face high product demand elasticity, (ii)
they rely more heavily on the loan market, (iii) they did not issue a bond before the credit
supply shock was realized, (iv) they had to pay out loans immediately after the Lehman
failure, (v) they dealt with a small number of lead-lenders in the pre-Lehman period, or
(vi) they are small in terms of employment or total assets. Firms that face high demand
elasticity are more likely to decrease their output prices when they face a negative credit
5
supply shock because they can sell more products while experiencing a smaller decrease
in output prices.² If demand elasticity is very low—such that products complement other
products—firms would not be able to cut output prices to increase revenue. Other results
are also intuitive and consistent with the literature since the effect of a credit supply shock
is likely to be larger for firms that do not have bond access (Becker and Ivashina 2014),
that had to pay out loans after the Lehman failure (Almeida et al. 2012), or that are small
(Gertler and Gilchrist 1994). Moreover, I undertake various additional empirical analyses
to address potential concerns relating to retailer decisions and purchaser characteristics,
as well as variety-quality changes, external validity, changes in local conditions, foreign
exposure, other price indexes, pre-trends, and sample weights.
I integrate the micro-level study into the business cycle model to formalize the un-
derlying mechanisms in the empirical analysis and to analyze the aggregate inflation dy-
namics. Although the reduced-form micro-level regression framework with bank shocks
is useful for identifying the credit supply shock with a minimal number of assumptions,
these results can speak only to a relative change in interested variable dynamics because
of the framework’s reliance on cross-sectional variation in the data. To analyze aggre-
gate dynamics, I include in the model two identical groups of producers facing different
degrees of credit supply shock. This formulation allows me to take advantage of micro-
level empirical evidence to calibrate parameters in the model, and through the lens of the
²Of course, firms facing high demand elasticitymight have a lower incentive to lower their prices if their
goal is to generate a certain amount of revenue. Such companies would be able to make enough revenue by
decreasing their prices a little bit, whereas their counterparts must lower their prices more to earn the same
amount of revenue. There are two opposing forces, and the empirical question of which effects dominate
remains.
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model, I address aggregate variable dynamics.³ In particular, my model captures the rela-
tive changes in output price, inventory, market share, and employment due to the credit
supply shock observed in the micro-level data.
I find that a “fire sale” inventory channel can explain the large drop in aggregate infla-
tion and inventory that occurred at the peak of the financial panic, which was followed
by surprisingly stable inflation. An exogenous decrease in the borrowing capability of
one group of entrepreneurs led inflation to fall in the short run as these entrepreneurs
aggressively liquidated their inventory. However, in the medium and long run, inflation
increases in the model because firms cannot sell their inventory forever. This behavior
in price dynamics is fully consistent with not only micro-level empirical evidence but
also aggregate inflation dynamics amid a financial panic. There was a drop of more than
10% in the producer price index in the short run and surprisingly stable inflation in the
medium run, despite a large increase in unemployment—the so-called missing disinflation
puzzle discussed in the literature⁴—and the model generates both short- and medium-run
inflation dynamics under a realistic calibration of parameters. Themagnitude of the shock
calibrated tomatch themicro-level data can explain almost all of the decrease in aggregate
inflation during this period.
This paper highlights the importance of inventory dynamics—a topic that has largely
³This framework is similar to that of Nakamura and Steinsson, 2014, who also exploit the cross-sectional
variation to estimate the key parameter and relate it to the aggregate variable (multiplier) by using the
business cycle model.
⁴The literature discusses the missing disinflation puzzle in this period; the fact that inflation did not
fall as much as predicted by the New Keynesian Phillips curve. Previous studies usually treat the short-run
period as an outlier (2008:Q4 and 2009:Q1) and focus on the post-crisis period with jobless recovery or on
the core CPI that reflects the service sector price index and hence abstracts away from a decrease in inflation
during this period. The model in this paper is consistent with this literature, because the model generates
an increase in inflation in the medium run.
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been neglected in the literature—in explaining the aggregate inflation dynamics during
the banking crisis. Standard business cycle models with financial friction emphasize the
cost-push channel—in which an increase in output prices is due to an increase in finan-
cial cost—or other channels that lead companies to increase their prices due to financial
friction. However, this increase in output price will be inconsistent with the micro-level
empirical evidence in this article as well as with the aggregate inflation dynamics during
this period if we believe companies’ credit supply condition is an important determinant
of the aggregate variables. The model that incorporates the inventory mechanism and the
traditional effect will capture the large decrease in the price growth rate in the short run,
which was followed by stable inflation despite the large increase in the unemployment
rate during the banking crisis.
My findings are surprising because they seemingly conflict with the influential work
of Gilchrist et al., 2017, who, using liquidity as a measure of financial constraint, find
that financially-constrained firms raise their output prices. The underlying reason for
this difference is the difference in the measure of financial constraint, which is the “weak
liquidity position” in Gilchrist et al., 2017. The term “weak liquidity position” is used in
their paper and refers to firms with a small amount of liquidity. I replicate their findings
in my sample by using their measure of financial constraint—liquidity—to confirm that
the different results arise from the difference in the measure, not the sample or regression
specification. The results are presented in section 3.6.1. I use the liquidity positions in
both 2008 (contemporaneous position) and 2006 (initial position) to study output price
dynamics during the financial panic, consistent with Gilchrist et al., 2017.
A natural question is why different measures of financial constraint cause different
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results. Previous studies in the corporate finance literature raise a concern about using
liquidity as a measure of financial constraint. In their study on liquidity position, Kahle
and Stulz, 2013 find that firms facing a negative bank shock raised—rather than lowered—
their liquidity in 2008.⁵ This result is consistent with my findings and with my hypothesis
that such firms convert inventory to cash or illiquid assets to liquid assets. Those firms
that suffer from a negative bank shock would therfore be classified as firms in the “strong
liquidity position” not the “weak liquidity position.” Regarding the initial (2006) liquidity
position, a seminal paper by Bates, Kahle, and Stulz, 2009 identifies more than ten factors
that lead firms to hold more liquid assets. In particular, they find that the “weak liquidity
position” is associatedwithmore investment, borrowing, and acquisitions, and stable cash
flow—characteristics that likely reflect unconstrained companies rather than constrained
companies. I confirm the findings of Bates, Kahle, and Stulz, 2009 by using liquidity in
the year 2006 only. More generally, vast body of literature in corporate finance asks why
companies hold liquidity. Almeida et al., 2014 survey this literature and conclude that
firms hold more liquidity because they are more likely to be financially constrained. This
argument dates back to Keynes, 1936, who discusses that there is a fundamental rela-
tionship between corporate liquidity management and financial friction and emphasizes
the precautionary saving motive to explain the variation in corporate liquidity position.
Because of these concerns about using liquidity as a measure of financial constraint, I in-
stead use bank shocks—which are not subject to this criticism—as proposed by Ivashina
and Scharfstein, 2010 and Chodorow-Reich, 2014.
More broadly, this article is related to various papers that study financially constrained
⁵See Garcia-Macia and Villacorta, 2016 for a theoretical formulation of such behavior.
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companies’ pricing decisions. The so-called missing disinflation puzzle indicates that in-
flation did not fall as much in this period as predicted by the New Keynesian Phillips
Curve (Ball and Mazumder 2011, Hall 2011, Coibion and Gorodnichenko 2015). A promi-
nent hypothesis that explains this stable inflation is financial friction. Papers such as Del
Negro, Giannoni, and Schorfheide, 2015, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Trabandt, 2015,
and Gilchrist et al., 2017 incorporate financial friction into a business cycle model to ex-
plain inflation dynamics during the Great Recession. These papers rely on the cost-push
channel or other effects of financial friction to explain the inflation dynamics, and the the-
oretical predictions in this article are consistent with their results if I do not incorporate
the effect of inventory liquidation into the model. I seek to expand these previous stud-
ies by incorporating a fire sale inventory mechanism, which maintains consistency with
the micro-level empirical evidence I find and with a sudden, dramatic, and temporary fall
in inflation in this period. Papers on industrial organization and corporate finance also
study this topic, but they are inconclusive regarding how financial distress affects output
price, particularly at the aggregate level. Several papers on the airline industry find that
financial distress leads to a decrease in output prices (Borenstein and Rose 1995, Phillips
and Sertsios 2013), while others find the opposite result for retail industries (Chevalier
1995a, Chevalier 1995b, Chevalier and Scharfstein 1995, Chevalier and Scharfstein 1996).
I complement this line of research by exploiting a new data-set with bank shocks that
generates plausibly exogenous variations in companies’ credit supply conditions.
This work highlights the importance of inventory in the business cycle model and is
closely related to previous studies on inventory dynamics. Inventory is known to contain
valuable information for business cycle research because of its volatility and pro-cyclical
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behavior (Ramey and West 1999). Previous studies examine inventory dynamics and the
sources of cyclical fluctuation (West 1990), the slope of marginal cost (Ramey 1991), price-
cost markup cyclicality (Bils and Kahn 2000, Kryvtsov and Midrigan 2013), international
trade (Alessandria, Kaboski, andMidrigan 2010, Alessandria, Kaboski, andMidrigan 2011),
international business cycles (Alessandria, Kaboski, and Midrigan 2013), and news shock
(Crouzet and Oh 2016). Papers such as Khan andThomas, 2007 and Fisher and Hornstein,
2000 incorporate inventory into the business cycle model to explain the salient feature
of the data. Extending these studies, I integrate inventory into the business cycle model
to explain short-run and medium-run inflation dynamics. In particular, I show that bank
shock, which has rarely been addressed in this literature, can generate pro-cyclical infla-
tion and inventory dynamics.⁶ In doing so, I integrate the stock-out avoidance motive
of inventory holding developed by Wen, 2011 into a parsimonious business cycle model.
The main components of my model are based on Iacoviello, 2005 and include two groups
of identical producers to explicitly reflect the micro-level empirical evidence.
The mechanism in this paper emphasizes that inflation dynamics can be explained by
corporate inventory and liquidity management, which have been a prominent research
area (Almeida et al. 2014). The most closely related papers to this study are the seminal
work by Kashyap, Lamont, and Stein, 1994 and Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994, who provide
evidence that liquidity-constrained firms liquidate their inventories. Other papers, such
as Carpenter, Fazzari, and Petersen, 1994; Carpenter, Fazzari, and Petersen, 1998 and Bates,
Kahle, and Stulz, 2009, also suggest a close link between corporate inventory investment
⁶Kashyap, Lamont, and Stein, 1994 andGertler and Gilchrist, 1994 study inventory dynamics in a similar
context: monetary policy shock.
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and internal finance or corporate cash position. My findings also complement studies
that examine how firms substitute between external financing and internal financing or
between banks and cash (e.g., Campello et al. 2011, Lins, Servaes, and Tufano 2010, Sufi
2009). Studying liquidity management during the Great Recession, Kahle and Stulz, 2013
find that bank-dependent firms that were likely to be more affected by a credit shortage
accumulated more cash. While this paper is consistent with Kahle and Stulz, 2013, it
appears to conflict with Campello, Graham, and Harvey, 2010, who find that constrained
firms burned through more cash. However, a definition of “constrained” in Campello,
Graham, and Harvey, 2010 is based on a survey of chief financial officers (CFOs) and is
likely different from bank shock. For companies to hold more cash because of a negative
credit supply shock, the shock must be persistent such that companies expect to be more
financially constrained in the next period and hence have a strong precautionary motive
to hold more cash. A bank shock is likely to meet this requirement because it is not the
current debt position of companies but rather that of their insurers, who ensure liquidity
in future periods. Overall, the inventory and liquidity management channel I propose is
generally consistent with the literature, and I adapt this framework to understand output
price dynamics.
For the empirical analysis, this paper draws on the methodologies in Chodorow-Reich,
2014 and Hottman, Redding, and Weinstein, 2016. To overcome the identification chal-
lenge, I use bank shock. Previous studies document that firms that cannot borrow from
banks are likely to default (Khwaja and Mian 2008) and decrease their investment (Peek
and Rosengren 1997, Peek and Rosengren 2000, Amiti and Weinstein forthcoming), em-
ployment (Greenstone, Mas, and Nguyen 2015), and exports (Amiti and Weinstein 2011,
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Paravisini et al. 2015). I use the identification strategy in Chodorow-Reich, 2014 and
Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010 but answer a different question with different data. To
the best of my knowledge, this article is the first to look at the effect of a bank shock on
output price behavior, especially through the inventory and cash management channel.
In constructing a firm-group-level price index from scanner-level data, I adopt the nested
CES demand system in Hottman, Redding, and Weinstein, 2016 to adjust for the variety
and quality effect. This system allows for a more flexible structure than the CES demand
system (Atkeson and Burstein 2008, Edmond, Midrigan, and Xu 2015). The major advan-
tage of this framework is its explicit adjustment of product quality and variety. In other
studies, a similar adjustment has been made not only to measure the coherent price index
and consumer welfare (Broda and Weinstein 2010, Atkin, Faber, and Gonzalez-Navarro
forthcoming) but also to study the pattern of international trade (Feenstra and Romalis
2014), exchange rates (Nakamura and Steinsson 2012), business cycles (Jaimovich, Rebelo,
and Wong 2017), and monetary policy (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe 2012). This study draws
on this important contribution to the literature to study output price dynamics during the
banking crisis.
1.2 Data Description
A major novelty of this paper is that it constructs a micro-level dataset that integrates
producers’ output prices and quantities, their inventories and cash holdings, and their
relationships with banks.
Price and quantity data originate from the ACNielsen Homescan Panel, which was
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made available by the Kilts Marketing Data Center at the University of Chicago Booth
School of Business.⁷ The data contain approximately 1.7 million barcode-level product
prices and quantities recorded daily from 55,000 households per year on average. A bar-
code is a unique universal product code (UPC) assigned to each product and is used to
scan and store product information. The data begin in 2004 and end in 2011, covering the
period before, during, and after the financial panic of 2008. All households sampled by
Nielsen are provided with in-home scanners to record their purchases of products with
barcodes. Nielsen assigns a sample weight—or a projection factor—to each household
based on 10 demographic variables to make the sample nationally representative.⁸ Ac-
cording to Nielsen, the Homescan Panel covers approximately 30 percent of all household
expenditures on goods in the consumer price index (CPI) basket.
There are many advantages of using the ACNielsen database to identify the effect of
credit supply shocks on output price dynamics. First, the database records product prices
at the barcode level, which is likely to be the most granular way to define the product.
This feature not only helps uncover the effects of the introduction and destruction of
products on prices but also allows the comparison of similar products produced by firms
facing different degrees of credit supply shock. Second, the dataset provides product sales
information, which is useful to separate the quality component of product prices and to
⁷Copyright © 2018 The Nielsen Company (US), LLC. All Rights Reserved. All results are calculated
based on data fromThe Nielsen Company (US), LLC and marketing databases provided by the Kilts Center
for Marketing Data Center at The University of Chicago Booth School of Business. The conclusions drawn
from the Nielsen data are those of the researchers and do not reflect the views of Nielsen. Nielsen is not
responsible for, had no role in, and was not involved in analyzing and preparing the results reported herein.
⁸The 10 demographic variables are household size, household income, head of household age, race,
Hispanic origin, male head education, female head education, head of household occupation, the presence
of children, and Nielsen county size
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confirm that the effect is not driven by the change in product demand. Finally, these data
record detailed characteristics of purchasers, such as income and employment, the loca-
tion and retail store where products were purchased, and product-level information such
as product unit and size. This information is valuable to address other potential identifi-
cation concerns related to the change in purchasers’ income and employment, housing
price, local conditions, and retailers’ behavior.
I integrate the prices and quantities of each product with its producer’s information
using the GS1 US Data Hub, Orbis, and Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD). GS1 is
the company that issues barcodes to producers.⁹ Their data record the company name
and address for each barcode-level product, providing a way to link barcode-level prod-
uct information with its producer information. Orbis is the firm-level dataset compiled
by Bureau van Dijk (BvD) and has detailed administrative, financial, production and own-
ership information for both public and private firms. The dataset records firms’ inventory
and cash holdings, which are particularly helpful in testing the fire sale of inventory hy-
pothesis. It also has information on detailed four-digit NAICS industry codes, the number
of foreign subsidiaries and branches, total assets, and the number of employees, which al-
low me to conduct additional empirical analyses and robustness checks. Like the Nielsen
dataset, the data cover 2004 to 2011. This dataset was downloaded from the BvD propri-
etary online browser for Orbis data.¹⁰ The online platform of the Orbis database provides
⁹GS1 provides a business with up to 10 barcodes for a $250 initial membership fee and a $50 annual fee.
There are significant discounts in the cost per barcode for firms purchasing larger quantities of barcodes
(see http://www.gs1us.org/get-started/im-new-to-gs1-us).
¹⁰The Orbis data used in the main analysis were downloaded in 2014. Downloading at this time maxi-
mizes the number of years that can be used alongside the Nielsen dataset because of how BvD manages the
Orbis database. First, only the most recent 10 years of the sample are available on the online platform. If I
had downloaded data in 2015, I would have missed the firm-level information for 2004. Second, there is a
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software that automatically matches firms based on their name, address, industry code,
and other information available in both Orbis data and other data. I exploit this feature to
merge GS1 data and the corresponding barcode-level information with all other firm-level
and bank-level information, including the FISD.¹¹ The FISD records historical corporate
bond issuance and ratings and is used to extract information on producers’ bond market
access.
Finally, I combine the Dealscan database to extract information on bank lending to
each producer. The Dealscan database contains comprehensive historical information on
loan pricing and contracts’ details, terms, and conditions. It includes mainly information
on the syndicated loan market, in which more than one bank arranges a loan to a firm.
The process usually begins with one or more lead arrangers signing a preliminary loan
contract called a “mandate,” and these arrangers retain part of the loans and raise the rest
of the funds from the participants. For each loan (or facility/package), the data include
information on its purpose (e.g., corporate purposes or debt repayment), type (e.g., term
loan or revolving line of credit), amount, interest spread, maturity, and lender information,
identifying the lead arranger and the lender’s contribution to each loan. In constructing
the credit supply shock, I used loans identified as serving a corporate purpose or serving
as working capital. The data record between one-half and three-fourths of the volume
of outstanding commercial and industrial loans in the United States (Carey and Hrycay
1999).
I supplement the combined data with Zillow housing price data and Current Popula-
reporting lag of two years in the database (Kalemli-Ozcan et al. 2015). If I had downloaded data in 2013, the
coverage of 2011 (and 2012) would likely be incomplete.
¹¹I also hand-checked the validity of the merged sample.
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tion Survey (CPS) data on home ownership to specifically address the drop in housing
prices and home ownership during this period. Additionally, I merged several bank-level
variables used by Chodorow-Reich, 2014 that reflect a change in bank health at the time
of Lehman failure, demand elasticities from Hottman, Redding, and Weinstein, 2016, and
industry-level inventory information from the NBER-CES database (Bartelsman, Becker,
and Gray 2000).
Table 1.1 reports the summary statistics of the combined sample. The merged dataset
includes approximately 200 firms identified from the Orbis firm classification (BvD identi-
fication number) that were active in the syndicated loan market and that sold their prod-
ucts. I dropped all firms that entered or exited after the Lehman failure to abstract away
from firm dynamics. The median firm in the sample sells 30 products (UPCs) in about
three product groups, such as pet food or school supplies. These 200 firms are relatively
large compared to other firms in the consumer packaged goods market, where most firms
are extremely small.¹² While this discrepancy raises concerns about the representative-
ness of the sample, the effect is likely to be at most underestimated, given that small firms
are more sensitive than large firms to credit supply shock. In addition, there remains large
heterogeneity across firms and groups in the sample. The largest firm-group pair sells 130
times more UPCs than the median firm-group pair in the sample, and only approximately
one-third of the firms in the sample are publicly listed or issued bonds before the Lehman
¹²My sample considers more than one-fourth of sales and about one-third of the total number of pur-
chases in the Nielsen data. Originally, there were slightly less than 20,000 firms in the Orbis database
integrated with the ACNielsen Homescan Panel, and most of these firms are dropped when I require that
firms in the sample be active in the syndicated loan market before and after the Lehman failure. Most of
these dropped samples do not have valid firm-level information, such as employment or total assets, in the
Orbis data. It is likely that Orbis could not record balance-sheet information for these exceptionally small
firms.
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics for the Pre-Lehman Period (2005Q4-2006Q2;
2006Q4-2007Q2)
variable N mean sd p10 p50 p90
Panel A: Firm-group variables
Pfg 2055 2.89 5.09 0.67 1.58 5.48
Sales (in million $) 2055 28.51 110.34 0.04 1.36 56.08
Number of UPC 2055 94.00 228.15 3 30 217
Number of buyers (in million) 2055 7.00 27.34 0.01 0.34 14.29
Panel B: Firm variables
Lf 200 0.47 0.18 0.26 0.45 0.69
Lehman exposure 198 0.84 0.36 0.50 0.74 1.28
ABX exposure 198 1.06 0.28 0.81 1.01 1.34
Bank items 198 44.90 12.99 28.17 46.63 58.46
Bond issuance (binary) 200 0.28 0.45 0 0 1
Listed status (binary) 200 0.36 0.48 0 0 1
Firm age 198 47.82 35.87 13 35 97
Median spread (bp) 187 150.77 106.34 25 150 300
Average maturity (month) 197 53.65 15.21 32.5 60.0 61.0
Number of groups 200 10.28 19.28 1 3 26
Panel C: Group variables
Demand elasticities across UPCs 100 8.13 4.25 5.02 6.93 14.06
Demand elasticities across firms 100 4.45 2.04 2.62 3.92 7.33
Number of firms 100 20.55 7.74 10.5 20.5 31.0
Note. The sample includes U.S. producers that sold products to households and obtained
loans classified as for a corporate purpose or as working capital from banks before and
after the Lehman failure. All the summary statistics are based on the pre-Lehman period,
2005:Q4 to 2006:Q2 and 2006:Q4 to 2007:Q2. The variables Pfg (firm-group-specific price
index) and demand elasticities are defined based on the nested CES demand system
discussed in section 3.2. Lf is the main measure of bank shock constructed from the
change in loans issued by the bank. Lehman exposure is the percentage of the bank’s
syndication portfolio in which Lehman Brothers had a lead role in the loan deal. The
ABX exposure variable equals the loading of the banks’ stock return on the ABX AAA
2006-H1 index between October 2007 and December 2007. The Bank items variable is
the sum of bank deposits and net trading revenue divided by total assets. All three
measures are defined and discussed in section 3.1.
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failure. I exploit this variation to confirm that the effect of credit supply shocks is larger
for small firms. Additionally, I confirm my findings by using various sample weights in
the regression analysis and by conducting an external validity check with more represen-
tative data.
1.3 Empirical Analyses
Using the micro-level data discussed in the previous section, this section analyzes the ef-
fect of credit market stress on output prices and inventory dynamics. I first discuss the
construction of main firm-group-specific variables, the regression specification, key iden-
tification assumptions, and the empirical results. Then, I propose an explanation for why
firms facing a negative credit supply shock lower their prices, and I provide strong em-
pirical support for the proposed mechanism. Additionally, I estimate the heterogeneous
treatment effects and conduct numerous robustness checks to confirm the findings and
obtain additional insights from the data.
Credit Supply Shock (Lf )
I follow Chodorow-Reich, 2014 to construct theLf , credit supply shock measure, which
simply and coherently extracts information on changes in firms’ access to credit as a
consequence of a change in bank health.
I choose two periods, pre- and post-Lehman, to measure the credit supply shock to ex-
ploit the Lehman failure, which is known to be surprising and dramatic. The post-Lehman
period is the three quarters immediately after the Lehman failure: 2008:Q4 to 2009:Q2.
19
During this time, the TED spread, the measure of perceived credit risk, increased dramati-
cally (Figure 1.2a). At the same time, the number and amount of loans issued plummeted,
and the interest spread spiked (Figure 1.2b, 1.2c). The pre-Lehman period corresponds to
the same quarters in earlier years, at the time of the credit market expansion: 2005:Q4
to 2006:Q2 and 2006:Q4 to 2007:Q2. These quarters were chosen to minimize seasonality
concerns. To compare the extreme periods, I did not use the period immediately before
the Lehman failure (2007:Q4 to 2008:Q2) for my main regression analysis.¹³ However, ad-
ditionally defining this period as a pre-Lehman period does not alter the result, as shown
in section 3.7.1. In fact, this period provides a useful placebo setup to check the validity
of the measure of Lehman exposure, given the modest degree of financial market stress.
In section 3.7.1, I show that the Lehman shock did not affect prices during this period.
Based on this timing, I construct the measure of bank shock as follows. Given the
change in bank health measures, I take a weighted average of bank health for each firm





where (Bank Health) f;b is a measure of the firm-bank-specific change in bank health
defined below (equation 1.3.2), and weight fb;last is the bank b’s share of the total amount
of the last syndicated loan it made to firm f before the Lehman failure.¹⁴ Sf is the set of
¹³Total commercial and industrial (C&I) loans also did not fall in this period. However, this is because
of an increase in credit drawdowns by corporate borrowers on existing credit lines, not the issuance of new
loans (Ivashina and Scharfstein 2010).
¹⁴The weight reflects the fact that multiple banks arrange a loan to a firm and different banks lend
different amounts for a particular loan. The Dealscan database reports only approximately one-third of
jbt among total loans. I impute missing jbt using the method in Chodorow-Reich, 2014.
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(c) Amount of Loans and Interest Spread
Note. (a) plots the TED spread, (b) plots the total number of loans and the average
interest spread, and (c) plots the total amount of loans and the average interest spread.
The pre-Lehman period includes the following six quarters: 2005:Q4 to 2006:Q2 and
2006:Q4 to 2007:Q2. The post-Lehman period includes the following three-quarters:
2008:Q4 to 2009:Q2. The TED spread, which measures the perceived credit risk, is
defined as the difference between the three-month T-bill and the interbank borrowing
rate. The number (amount) of loans is the total number (amount) of loans issued
according to the Dealscan database, and the interest spread is the amount the borrower
pays in basis points over LIBOR for each dollar drawn down and averaged across loans
within each quarter. The Lehman failure occurred in September 2008, at the end of
2008:Q3.
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banks that lend to firm f for the last syndicated loan firm f borrowed before the Lehman
failure. For example, consider the J.M. Smucker Company, which is famous for its fruit
spreads and peanut butter. Suppose that it borrowed from two banks—Chase Bank and
Citibank—for its last loans before the Lehman failure with 80% of its loans borrowed from
Chase Bank and 20% from Citibank. Then, I used 0.8 and 0.2 as the weights to take a
weighted average of changes in bank health for Chase Bank and Citibank to measure the
credit supply shock faced by Smucker’s. While I used the last loan share as a weight to
maximize the effect of the bank shock on firms, using the average loan share of the whole
pre-Lehman period does not alter the results, as shown in Appendix C.6. This finding is
likely attributable to the stable firm-bank relationship.
The (Bank Health) f;b is given by the following expression:
(Bank Health) f;b =
P




j 6=f jb;pre  1(b lent to j in pre-Lehman)
(1.3.2)
where 1() is an indicator variable equal to 1 if what is in parentheses is true and 0 other-
wise, and jbt denotes bank b’s share of the total amount of the loan for each syndicated
loan it made to firm j in period t. I divide the denominator by 2 to balance the periods as
the pre-Lehman period consists of six quarters whereas the post-Lehman period consists
of three quarters.
Roughly, equation (1.3.2) is a change in the number of loans issued by banks: the
number of loans made by bank b in the post-Lehman period over the number of loans
made by bank b in the pre-Lehman period. There are two additional complications. First,
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to reflect the importance of each loan issued by bank b, I multiply the weight jbt for each
loan made by bank b to firm j. Second, I intentionally omit firm f from the summation to
generate the firm-f -bank-b-specific change in bank health. This “leave one out” method
partially eases concerns related to the credit demand channel. For example, consider
again the example of Chase Bank which lends to Smucker’s and to other companies. If
I use Chase Bank’s loan to Smucker’s to measure Chase’s change in bank health, this
measuremight reflect the change in credit demand arising from Smucker’s productmarket
decisions or financing policies, rather than the change in Chase’s willingness to supply
credit to Smucker’s. To address this concern, in constructing Smucker’s credit supply
shock, I examine Chase’s lending to all firms, excluding Smucker’s, for both pre- and
post-Lehman periods. I do the same to measure the change in Citibank’s bank health, and
then take a weighted average across Chase and Citibank to construct Smucker’s credit
supply shock, as shown in equation (1.3.1).¹⁵
To assess the validity of the credit supply shock measure, I check the sample balance
and find no significant difference in firm characteristics across the credit supply shock. I
first regress the pre-Lehman firm-level characteristics on the credit supply shock I con-
structed. As shown in Table 1.2, the credit supply shock is not correlated with purchasers’
characteristics or with firms’ access to the loan market, listed status, bond market access,
age, size, or loan characteristics. These results suggest that the measure of credit supply
shock constructed for this period reflects the change in bank health rather than borrower
¹⁵Note that I used a number of loans instead of an amount of loans. I do this to minimize measurement
error due to the imputation of fbt. Using an amount of loans does not change the results, however, as
reported in Appendix C.6. These results are likely because the drop in loans during this period is driven
largely by a change in the number of loans rather than the amount of loans. Loan size remained stable in
this period (Darmouni 2016).
23
Table 1.2: Comparison of Pre-Lehman Observed Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(housing price) Home ownership ln(income) Employment Education Household size
Unit Log % Log % Years Number
Lf -0.03 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.02
(0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.05) (0.03)
R2 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
obs 202 202 202 202 202 202
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Number of loans Amount of loans Bond List Age Multi-lead
Unit Number $b D D Years D
Lf 0.93 2.12 -0.08 -0.06 2.07 -0.02
(1.16) (2.33) (0.06) (0.07) (5.53) (0.04)
R2 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
obs 206 206 206 206 204 206
(13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
Spread (median) Maturity Total assets Employment Inventory/asset Cash/asset
Unit bp Month $m k % %
Lf -14.95 1.61 7.14 73.00 -0.00 -0.02
(23.87) (2.40) (7.49) (63.16) (0.03) (0.02)
R2 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.01
obs 191 203 121 109 72 73
Note. * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01; standard errors are
heteroskedasticity-consistent. For variable units, $b is billions of dollars, $m is millions
of dollars, D is a dummy, k is one thousand, and bp is basis points. Total assets and
employment are firm-level variables in Orbis averaged across 2004, 2005, and 2006. The
number and amount of loans are the total sums, multi-lead and maturity are averages,
and the spread is a median across loans within the pre-Lehman period. Bond access is
equal to 1 if the companies issue bonds in 2004:Q3 to 2007:Q2, and 0 otherwise.
or purchaser characteristics. Additionally, I implement a test introduced in Khwaja and
Mian, 2008 and conducted in Chodorow-Reich, 2014 to check for the selection in the unob-
served firm characteristics in my sample. Consistent with Chodorow-Reich, 2014, I find
that unobserved firm characteristics are balanced. The details of this analysis are reported
in Appendix C.8.
In addition to the measure of credit supply shock constructed above, I use three bank-
level measures of the change in bank health as instrumental variables to confirm the
findings. They are (i) banks’ exposure to Lehman, (ii) banks’ exposure to asset-backed
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securities (ABX), and (iii) bank statement items that are unlikely to be correlated with
borrower characteristics. Lehman exposure is the fraction of a bank’s syndication port-
folio in which Lehman Brothers had a lead role. This measure relies on the notion that
certain banks dealt more with Lehman Brothers than others and decrease their lending
relatively more after the Lehman collapse. According to Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010,
this pattern occurs because borrowers that had a credit line in which Lehman Brothers
had a lead role aggressively draw down their credit lines when the lead lender becomes
bankrupt because of the precautionary motive, draining the liquidity of others that dealt
closely with Lehman. The bank’s exposure to asset-backed securities is the correlation be-
tween its daily stock return with the return on the ABX AAA 2006-H1 index. This index
generates the variation in changes in bank health due to banks’ exposure to the toxic resi-
dential mortgage-backed securities issued during the second half of 2005. Finally, the bank
statement items variable is the sum of the bank’s net trading revenue—where many sub-
prime write-downs occurred—and bank deposits divided by its assets before the Lehman
failure. All three measures are likely to generate variation in a change in bank health
for reasons that are plausibly orthogonal to a borrower’s pricing decision.¹⁶ For each
bank-specific change in bank health measure, I construct a firm-level credit supply shock
following equation (1.3.2). The correlations among these three variables are weak at the
firm level in my sample, generating presumably independent variation in the producer’s
credit supply condition.¹⁷
¹⁶I am grateful to Gabriel Chodorow-Reich for making these measures available on his website.
¹⁷Corr(Lehman, ABX)=0.04, Corr(ABX, BankItem)=0.06, Corr(Lehman, BankItem)=0.44
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Firm-Group Price Index (Pfg)
I adapt the nested CES demand system in Hottman, Redding, andWeinstein, 2016 to build
the firm-group-specific price index from the ACNielsen Homescan Panel database to re-
duce the number of barcode level observations. This framework is isomorphic to the
nested logit demand system in which heterogeneous consumers demand a single product
in each stage (Anderson, Palma, andThisse 1992). There are two advantages of this frame-
work. First, it explicitly incorporates the effect of variety and quality on output price and
allows me to decompose the index into a conventional price index and a quality-variety
correction term. Second, the demand structure is consistent with the model I propose in
section 4. Using more conventional price indexes, such as the Laspeyres, Paasche, and
Tornqvist price index does not change the results, as shown in Appendix C.7.









'gtdg = 1 (1.3.3)
where subscript g is the product group, and t is time. 
 is the set for a product group, and
'gt is a consumer’s perceived product group quality (or appeal/taste) at time t. Cgt is the


















where subscript f is the firm and u is the UPC or barcode-level product, 
gt is the set
of the firms within product group g at time t, 
fgt is the set of the UPCs made by firm
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f in group g at time t, 'fgt captures perceived firm-group quality at time t, 'ut captures
the perceived UPC quality made by firm f in group g at time t, Fg governs the elasticity
of substitution across groups for each firm, and Ug governs the elasticity of substitution
across firms for each UPC.¹⁸
It is useful to illustrate the underlying consumer behavior with the nested CES demand
system used in this article. When consumers visit a store, the demand system assumes
that they first decide which product group they will buy from, then decide which brand
or firm’s product to purchase, and then purchase a specific UPC. For example, a con-
sumer decides to purchase jams, jellies, or spreads (product group), then decides to buy a
Smucker’s product (firm), and then chooses Smucker’s sugar-free strawberry-flavor fruit
spread (UPC). The elasticities govern how sensitively consumers react to changes in the
output price, and the perceived quality parameters govern how purchasing behavior is
affected by factors other than output prices, such as product quality (e.g., organic vs. non-
organic), brand quality, and product/brand advertisement.


















¹⁸As discussed in Hottman, Redding, and Weinstein, 2016, 'Ffgt cannot be defined independently of


















= 1, where NFgt is the number
of firms in product group g at time t and NUfgt is the number of UPCs made by firm f within group g at
time t.
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The above equation clarifies how this framework perceives UPC-specific and firm-
specific qualities, 'ut and 'fgt. These qualities change the market share holding output
price constant. If two products have the same price, but one has a larger market share,
that product has a higher perceived quality.






















fgt , the geometric average of the market share of UPCs for
firm f within group g at time t. Plugging (1.3.7) into (1.3.5), one can derive the following
firm-group-time price index














where the first term is the geometric average of UPC-level price within the firm and
the group. This term is analogous to the standard price index, such as the Tornqvist or
Laspeyres index. The second term is a variant of the Theil index, which measures quality
¹⁹Equation 1.3.6 can be recovered using Shephard’s lemma.
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and variety correction in the price index. Note thatPu Sut~Sfgt in the second term increases
if (1) the number of UPCs by firm f within group g (Nfgt) increases (variety effect), or (2)
the UPC share dispersion within the firm increases (quality effect).²⁰
To measure the price index in equation (1.3.8), I use the estimated demand elastici-
ties (Ug ) from Hottman, Redding, and Weinstein, 2016.²¹ Because t denotes a quarterly
frequency, I take a geometric average across quarters within 2006:Q4-2007:Q2 (the last
three quarters in the pre-Lehman period) and 2008:Q4-2009:Q2 (post-Lehman period) to
make the price index comparable to the credit supply shock for regression analysis. To
construct a dependent variable in the main regression analysis, I take the difference of
the logged price index across pre- and post-Lehman periods.
The Effect of the Credit Crunch on the Output Price
I examine the effect of a credit supply shock on producers’ output price dynamics by using
the following specification:
 lnPfg = g + Lf + Xf + "fg (1.3.9)
²⁰UPC share dispersion reflects the perceived product quality. For example, suppose that consumers see
two products offered by the same firm at the same price. It is better for consumers to see one high-quality
product and one low-quality product rather than two mediocre products because one can always choose
a high-quality product in the former scenario, whereas they must choose a mediocre product in the other
scenario. This intuition is reflected in the share dispersion term, which measures heterogeneity in product
quality.
²¹Hottman, Redding, andWeinstein, 2016 apply amodification of the “identification through heterogene-
ity” method originally developed by Feenstra, 1994 to the same data set I use in this paper. I am grateful to
the authors for providing these estimates.
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where subscript f is the firm and g is the product group or category. Pfg is the firm-
group-specific price index I constructed from the ACNielsen barcode-level data discussed
in section 3.2. Lf measures the change in the firm-level credit supply as a result of the
deterioration of bank health, as discussed in section 3.1. Xf includes initial and lagged
firm-level control variables. g is allowed in the regression to compare product prices
within product groups. I weighted the regression by the initial total sales in each product
group and firm to reveal the aggregate dynamics, similar to Amiti and Weinstein, forth-
coming. Using different regression weights, such as the number of products that allow
matching micro-level regression analysis, does not change the results, as shown in Ap-
pendix C.5.  is the coefficient of interest that measures the effect of a credit supply
shock on the change in output prices.
The key identification assumption to make a causal interpretation of  is that any
confounding factors that affect a firm’s pricing decisions do not simultaneously affect its
lender’s lending to other firms. Concerning this assumption, the biggest identification
threat is that the demand shock can potentially affect both firms’ pricing decisions and
their previous lenders’ lending decisions to other borrowers. For example, the large drop
in housing prices in this period affected different consumers differentially (Mian, Rao,
and Sufi 2013). Thus, these consumers potentially purchase products differentially across
products made by different firms, and, in turn, these firms would likely demand a different
number of loans from their lenders differentially. If these firms are large enough for the
lender to cut its lending to other borrowers, my assumption is violated.
I argue that the key assumption in this article is well-supported. The narrative evi-
dence suggests that bank health deterioration in this period originated from the Lehman
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failure (Ivashina and Scharfstein 2010), real estate and toxic assets (Santos 2011), and bank
liability structure (Fahlenbrach, Prilmeier, and Stulz 2012) rather than from the corporate
loan sector. The fact that the corporate loan sector did not cause the credit market dis-
ruption in this period is particularly true for the consumer packaged goods market in the
sample, where purchasers did not tend to change their purchasing behavior, unlike those
in other sectors. The empirical pattern of aggregate price and quantity of loans during this
period supports this view. After the Lehman bankruptcy, there was not only a dramatic
drop in the number and amount of loans, but also a sudden large increase in the interest
spread (Figure 1.2b, 1.2c). This credit market behavior suggests that there was a shift in
credit supply rather than in credit demand, at least at the aggregate level.
Additionally, I allow a rich set of initial and lagged firm-level characteristics (Xf ) in
this regression to address potential spurious correlations. To control for firms’ liquid-
ity substitution from loan markets to bond markets when banks cannot provide a loan
(Becker and Ivashina 2014), I include a pre-Lehman bond rating and issuance for each
firm. The fixed effects of firms’ four-digit NAICS industry and listed status, as well as
a firm size indicator, are included to compare firms within these categories. To address
the differential degree of loan market access for each firm, I control for the number and
amount of loans firms received in the pre-Lehman period and for the number of loans
that matured in the post-Lehman period because firms would suffer more if they had to
pay out their loans in the post-Lehman period (Almeida et al. 2012). Furthermore, to
make a reliable comparison across firms, I control for the firm age, the type of the last
loan (term loan vs. revolver/line), the year the last loan was issued, whether a firm dealt
with multiple lead banks, and the last loan’s interest spread and maturity. I also add a
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lagged change in the output price index to control for the potential pre-trend. In addi-
tion, Nielsen data provide detailed purchaser characteristics, such as income, education,
employment, age, and household size. I further merge the data with housing price data
at the zip code level from the Zillow data and home ownership at the country level from
the Census data. Adding these purchasers’ characteristics does not change the results,
as shown in Appendix C.3. Note that the observed pre-Lehman borrower and purchaser
characteristics are balanced as well as shown in Table 1.2.
Moreover, to confirm my findings, I use three instruments that are not highly corre-
lated but that generate plausibly exogenous variation in firms’ credit supply conditions:
Lehman exposure, ABX securities exposure, and bank statement items. These measures
are used as instrumental variables to interpret the coefficients consistently. Using the
cross-sectional variation in Lehman exposure is the well-established identification strat-
egy used in the literature to study bank, fund, and firm behavior (e.g.,Ivashina and Scharf-
stein 2010, Aragon and Strahan 2012, Chodorow-Reich 2014, Darmouni 2016). Before its
failure, Lehman was the fourth-largest investment bank and had more than $600 billion in
assets, and it collapse was surprising and dramatic. By using this instrument, I effectively
assume that what happened to companies in the consumer packaged goods market, such
as Smucker’s, did not lead Lehman to bankruptcy. This assumption is very persuasive,
given the ample evidence that the Lehman failure was due to the bank’s risky lending, in-
vestment strategy, and toxic mortgage-backed securities holdings. Using ABX exposure
or bank statement items (sum of bank deposits and net trading revenue to assets) also
generates credit-supply variation that is plausibly uncorrelated with factors that affect
companies’ pricing decisions. I additionally conduct numerous robustness checks regard-
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Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes
Product group FE Yes Yes Yes
F statistics 17.3 9.0 12.9
E[L: IVp90-IVp10] -.24 -.371 .495
Observations 1658 1658 1658
Note. * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01; standard errors are clustered by firm and
product group; the regression is weighted by initial sales; and firm-level controls are the
firm’s listed status, four-digit NAICS FE, age, size, bond rating, number of loans, amount
of loans, loan type, loan-year FE, multi-lead FE, number of loans due in the post-Lehman
FE, loan spread, loan maturity, and lagged lnPfg
ing concerns such as product quality and variety, retailers’ decisions, local conditions,
purchaser behavior, foreign exposure, initial cash holdings, pre-trends, and external va-
lidity. The first-stage regression for each of the three instruments is reported in Table
1.3.
The other assumption of the regression analysis is the long-run firm-bank relationship
or the existence of switching costs for companies to form new relationships with banks.
If companies can quickly change to other banks when their previous lenders cannot issue
loans, these companies might not be affected by bank shock. However, it is very unlikely
that firms can easily find a new lender quickly because of adverse selection for switchers
that prevents lenders from providing new loans. Additionally, monitoring cost is likely to
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decline more for repeated borrowers, easing the moral hazard problem for lenders as well.
This relationship lending is especially true for the United States, where the Secretary of
the Treasury has made KYC (Know Your Customer) mandatory for all U.S. banks since
2002. As a result of this regulation, there is a non-trivial implicit cost for U.S. banks in
establishing new relationships with customers. Moreover, I examine a period of credit
market disruption, when banks are especially hesitant to form new relationships.²²
Table 1.4 shows the empirical results based on equation (1.3.9). I change the sign of
Lf to interpret  as a result of a negative credit supply shock on output prices. Regard-
less of using OLS with the main credit supply shock variable or of which instruments
used, the estimated coefficients are negative, statistically significant at the 5% level, and
quantitatively similar. I standardize the credit supply shock measure (Lf ) to interpret
the coefficient. A-one-standard-deviation increase in negative credit supply shock de-
creases output prices approximately 8%. If I compare extremely credit-constrained firms
and credit-unconstrained firms in the sample by looking at the 90th-10th percentile ratio,
the effect is approximately 15 to 18 percentage points.²³
I confirm the empirical results by checking the pre-trend with the same regression
specification and credit supply shock but with a change in the log price index in previous
periods, from 2004:Q4-2005:Q2 to 2006:Q4-2007:Q2. The main assumption is that there
are no unobserved firm-level characteristics that are simultaneously correlated with their
²²Empirically, Chodorow-Reich, 2014 confirm this “sticky” firm–bank relationship with the regression
analysis.
²³Excluding control variables, I obtain the same qualitative results but a smaller magnitude of coeffi-
cients. The change in magnitude of the coefficients is driven mostly by the product-group fixed effects and
NAICS four-digit fixed effects, highlighting the importance of comparing products in the same groups and
comparing firms selling the same primary product industry code.
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Table 1.4: Main Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
lnPfg: 2006q4-2007q2 to 2008q4-2009q2
OLS (-Lf ) instrumented using
Lehman ABX BankItem All
(-Lf ) -8.43*** -7.83** -6.79** -8.23** -7.76***
(1.53) (3.56) (3.05) (3.13) (2.26)
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product group FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F statistics 17.3 9.0 12.9 10.8
J-statistics p-value 0.92
E[lnP] 11.4 11.4 11.4 11.4 11.4
E[lnP:(-Lp90)-(-Lp10)] -18.4 -17.1 -14.8 -17.9 -16.9
Observations 1658 1658 1658 1658 1658
Note. * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01; standard errors are clustered by firm and
product group; the regression is weighted by initial sales; and firm-level controls are the
firm’s listed status, four-digit NAICS FE, age, size, bond rating, number of loans, amount
of loans, loan type, loan-year FE, multi-lead FE, number of loans due in the post-Lehman
FE, loan spread, loan maturity, and lagged lnPfg
pricing decisions and the constructed credit supply shock. One way to validate this as-
sumption is to examine how firms that faced a negative credit supply shock set their
output prices before the credit supply shock was realized. The results would be worri-
some if firms that faced negative credit supply shocks changed their output prices before
the shock occurred. As shown in Table 1.5, the estimated effect of credit supply shock
on output prices in the previous period is not statistically significant regardless of which
credit supply shock is used. The results are fully consistent with Figure 1.1c, where I plot
aggregate price indexes for two groups of firm—with one facing a larger negative credit
supply shock than the other—based on the main measure constructed in equation 1.3.2.
Without conditioning on observed firm-level characteristics, two aggregate price indexes
follow each other carefully but diverge sharply after the credit supply shock is realized.
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Table 1.5: Pretreatment Trends Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
lnPfg: 2004q4-2005q2 to 2006q4-2007q2
OLS (-Lf ) instrumented using
Lehman ABX BankItem All
(-Lf ) -3.5 1.8 -6.4 -6.6 -4.1
(2.9) (4.5) (4.7) (5.2) (3.6)
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product group FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F statistics 16.8 9.2 13.1 10.8
J-statistics p-value 0.21
E[lnP] 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9
E[lnP:Lp90-Lp10] -7.7 4 -14.2 -14.7 -9
Observations 1658 1658 1658 1658 1658
Note * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01; standard errors are clustered by firm and
product group; the regression is weighted by initial sales; and firm-level controls are the
firm’s listed status, four-digit NAICS FE, age, size, bond rating, number of loans, amount
of loans, loan type, loan-year FE, multi-lead FE, number of loans due in post-Lehman FE,
loan spread, and loan maturity
The regression results confirm that this pattern is robust to the inclusion of firm-level
control variables and to the use of three other credit supply shock measures.
In addition to the main regression analysis, I conduct an event-study analysis based
on the measure of Lehman exposure by using the following regression specification:
lnPfg;t   lnPfg;t 4 = g + t(-Lf ) + Xf + "fg (1.3.10)
where t is the quarter, not the pre- and post-Lehman periods. (-Lf ) is the measure of
Lehman exposure directly used in the regression as a reduced-form, rather than instru-
menting the main measure.²⁴ Based on this regression analysis, I estimate the effect of a
²⁴Instrumenting themain credit supply shock with the Lehman exposure does not change the qualitative
results.
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credit supply shock for all quarters in the data.
The estimated coefficients are plotted in Figure 1.3. Although there is more noise
in the data compared to the main regression analysis (Table 1.4) because of the quarterly
frequency, the figure reveals the clear dynamic effect of the bank shock on output price dy-
namics. The estimated coefficients are not statistically different from 0 before the Lehman
failure, suggesting that there is no pre-trend. At the time of the Lehman failure, however,
coefficients are negative for the first two quarters and near 0 for the subsequent quarters,
showing that firms facing a negative credit supply shock decreased their output prices.
After a year, however, the estimated coefficients become positive for approximately three
quarters and then are 0 for the remaining quarters. This plot clarifies that the effect is
temporary and that firms increase their output prices in the medium run and long run.
The fire sale of inventory hypothesis is fully consistent with this effect. If it is true that
firms decrease their output prices by liquidating inventory and dumping their products on
the market, they would not be able to sell their inventories forever, and thus, they must
accumulate inventory at some point, suggesting that the effect should be temporary. I
discuss this hypothesis in detail in the next section.
Mechanism: Fire Sale of Inventory
The result in the previous section seems counterintuitive, asmost studies think of financial
distress as an increase in credit cost and hence predict an increase in prices due to a
negative credit supply shock.²⁵
²⁵Papers that emphasize the effect of financial cost on output price include Del Negro, Giannoni, and
Schorfheide, 2015, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Trabandt, 2015, and Barth and Ramey, 2002. Other mecha-
nisms are discussed in the literature. For example, Gilchrist et al., 2017 places more emphasis on consumer
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2006q3 2007q3 2008q3 2009q3 2010q3 2011q3
quarter
estimated βt confidence interval
Lehman Failure
reduced-form regression (Lehman Exposure)
Price Dynamics and Credit Market Disruptions
Note. This figure is based on equation (1.3.10),
lnPfg;t   lnPfg;t 4 = g + t(-Lf ) + Xf + "fg. Parameter estimates (^t) for each
quarter are plotted. A 95% confidence interval is reported for each estimated coefficient;
standard errors are clustered by firm and product group; the regression is weighted by
initial sales; and firm-level controls are the firm’s listed status, 4-digit NAICS FE, age,
size, bond rating, the number of loans, the amount of loans, the loan type, loan-year FE,
multi-lead FE, the number of loans due in the post-Lehman FE, loan spread, and loan
maturity
I propose a hypothesis that can rationalize the empirical finding; what I call the fire
sale of inventory hypothesis. When firms face a negative credit supply shock and cannot
borrow from banks, they have an incentive to aggressively liquidate their inventories and
sell their products at a low price to generate extra cash flow from the product market.
From a corporate liquidity management perspective, firms that cannot borrow from their
habits, and Chevalier and Scharfstein, 1996 emphasize both consumer habits and strategic interaction in
explaining firms’ price setting behavior due to the financial friction.
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lenders try to accumulate cash by selling off their inventory at low prices to generate ex-
tra cash flow. At the aggregate level, inventory holdings decreased dramatically after the
Lehman failure (Figure 1.1d), suggesting that the hypothesis I propose is plausible, at least
an aggregate level. I then return to the micro-level data and the corresponding identifica-
tion strategy used to study firms’ pricing behavior to support the proposed mechanism.
I use the following regression specification:
Yfg = g + (-Lf ) + Xf + "fg (1.3.11)
where Yfg equals four dependent variables: change in inventory, market share, cash
holding, and employment.²⁶ Note that the market share is the only firm-group specific
variable among the four dependent variables, and product-group fixed effects are not al-
lowed in the regression for other variables. Lf is the credit supply shock constructed
in section 3.1, and Xf is the corresponding firm-level control variable.
I provide strong empirical support for the fire sale of inventory hypothesis, as shown
in Table 1.6. I observe inventory holding at the firm-level and directly test this hypoth-
esis. I find that firms facing a negative credit supply shock liquidate their inventories.
Additionally, those firms increase their market share, suggesting that they increase their
sales by selling more of their products, and they accumulate more cash, suggesting that
these firms generate extra cash flow from the product market by selling off their inven-
tory. I also find that these firms lay off workers, which is a well-known result from the



























Table 1.6: Fire Sale of Inventory Hypothesis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Yfg Inventoryf Market Sharefg Cash Holdingf Employmentf
(-Lf ) instrumented using Lehman -21.1*** 2.42** 5.6*** -13.9***
(7.3) (1.18) (1.7) (6.7)
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product group FE No Yes No No
First-stage F statistics 61.0 18.9 38.2 66.7
E[ lnY:(-Lp90)-(-Lp10)] -50 5.3 13.2 -36
Observations 958 1658 1210 1011
Note. * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01; standard errors are clustered by firm and
product group for market share and by three-digit NAICS for the other three dependent
variables; the regression is weighted by initial Yfg; and firm-level controls are the firm’s
listed status, two-digit NAICS FE, number of loans, multi-lead FE, loan spread, number
of loans due in the post-Lehman FE, size, and bond rating.
literature. Note that firms that face a negative credit supply shock can increase sales even
they decrease production (or employment) because they draw down their inventories to
generate extra cash flow from the product market. I report only the regression results
instrumented with the measure of Lehman exposure, but the results are consistent if I use
other credit supply shock measures.
Heterogeneous Treatment Effect
I exploit rich firm heterogeneity and group heterogeneity in the sample to estimate the
heterogeneous treatment effect and thereby provide additional insights and confirm the
empirical findings in the previous section. I use the following regression specification:
 lnPfg = g + (-Lf ) Zfg + Xf + "fg (1.3.12)
whereZfg represents the firm- or group-level characteristics before the year 2007, such as
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cash or inventory holdings. The only difference between this specification and equation
(1.3.9) is the presence of Zfg, which allows the effect of a credit supply shock on output
prices to vary across the firm and group characteristics. The major assumption I make
in this regression is that firms or industries do not anticipate the sudden drop in their
previous lenders’ bank health after the Lehman failure and thus do not endogenously
holdmoreZfg to hedge against this particular credit supply shock. Given that the Lehman
failure in 2008 was surprising and that the signs of the mortgage crisis became apparent
in 2007, this assumption is plausible. Equation (1.3.12) is used throughout this section.
I first use the variation in initial cash holdings to find that cash-poor firms—companies
with a small amount of cash in the pre-Lehman period—decrease their output prices more
than their counterparts when they face a negative bank shock, as shown in Table 1.7. This
analysis supports the notion that firms sell off inventory to ensure their liquidity when
they face an exogenous increase in the cost of external finance. Companies originally had
two sources of liquidity to manage their operations, internal liquidity (cash) and external
liquidity (banks). When there is a surprising increase in the external cost of funding,
firms that had a large amount of cash at the beginning of the period would not need to
sell off their inventory and decrease their price to generate extra cash. Firms that lack
internal liquidity, however, are more likely to sell their inventories and decrease their
output prices to ensure extra funds. The results additionally highlight the importance of
cash in managing corporations’ liquidity.
I utilize numerous other firm-level characteristics to confirm the empirical findings
and to understand which types of firms are most likely to decrease their prices because
of the negative credit supply shock, as shown in Table 1.8. According to the fire sale of
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Table 1.7: Treatment Interaction: Initial Cash Holding
lnPfg: 2006q4-2007q2 to 2008q4-2009q2
(1) (2) (3) (4)




 (-Lf ) -5.14** -26.21*** -11.67** -3.86***
(2.09) (5.62) (5.10) (0.73)
(-Lf ) -7.73 7.35*** -8.24*** -9.53***
(5.44) (1.88) (2.56) (1.24)
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 832 832 832 832
Note. * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01; standard errors are clustered by firm and
product group; the regression is weighted by initial sales; and firm-level controls are the
firm’s listed status, four-digit NAICS FE, age, size, bond rating, number of loans, amount
of loans, loan type, loan-year FE, multi-lead FE, number of loans due in the post-Lehman
FE, loan spread, and loan maturity. The measures of Lehman exposure, ABX securities
exposure, and bank items are used as direct measures of credit supply shock, not as
instruments.
inventory hypothesis, firms that had a lot of inventory before the Lehman failure should
drop their prices more aggressively than firms with small initial inventory because they
have more inventory to sell. I test this prediction by using the variation in the initial
inventory holdings and find that the effect is indeed stronger for firms with large initial
inventory. The key assumption in this regression that firms did not store inventory in
preparation for the credit crunch is supported in Table 1.2 and consistent with the model
in section 4, where producers hold inventories to avoid the stock-out of products. Given
that the assumption is more plausible at the industry level, I also use industry-level initial
inventory variation to confirm this finding. Additionally, the effect is stronger for firms
that borrowed a higher loans amount immediately before the Lehman failure and weaker
for firms that issued a bond or had multiple lead lenders in the pre-Lehman period. These
results show that the bank shock is more damaging for companies that heavily rely on
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shocked banks but less damaging for companies that can rely on an alternative source
of financing or alternative banks. Additionally, the effect is larger for companies that
had more loans that matured in the post-Lehman period. Given that the Lehman failure
was a surprise, firms that had to pay out their debts are likely to suffer more financial
problems from the credit crunch and decrease their prices more to liquidate inventories
and generate extra liquidity. Moreover, the effect is stronger for firms that had smaller
total assets and fewer employees, consistent with studies that find that the effect of credit
supply shock is larger for small companies (e.g., Duygan-Bump, Levkov, and Montoriol-
Garriga 2015).
Finally, I explore the heterogeneous demand elasticity across firms and product groups
and find that the decrease in output prices due to the negative credit supply shock is larger
for firms that face high demand elasticity, as shown in Table 1.9. Allowing firm fixed
effects does not alter this result, suggesting that among its various product categories, a
firm chooses to decrease the price of products for which demand is more elastic. This
result is intuitive, as firms would receive a larger cash flow from the product market by
lowering their prices when they face more elastic demand.²⁷ The estimated elasticities in
the regression analysis are based on the nested CES demand system in section 3.2, and the
results are robust to different market structure assumptions. The derivation of demand
elasticity under different market structure assumptions are in Appendix A of Hottman,
Redding, and Weinstein, 2016.²⁸
²⁷Of course, such firms might have less incentive to lower their prices. If firms facing a negative bank
shock target a particular amount of sales, firms facing inelastic demand might have a stronger incentive to
lower their prices. However, reduced-form empirical analysis does not support this prediction.
²⁸I also tried the same regression with the HHI index and concentration ratio to understand how the
effect differs across the degree of competition, but the estimated coefficients are not statistically significant
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Table 1.8: Treatment Interaction: Firm-level Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lnPfg: 2006q4-2007q2 to 2008q4-2009q2
(-Lf ) invenf; 2006 -8.35***
(1.04)
(-Lf ) industry invenf -11.49**
(4.93)
(-Lf ) loan amountf -2.69**
(1.20)
(-Lf ) loan duef -9.56**
(4.27)
(-Lf ) 95.37*** 59.97* 44.72* -4.98***
(11.19) (31.32) (23.60) (1.70)
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product group FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 832 496 1844 1844
(5) (6) (7) (8)
lnPfg: 2006q4-2007q2 to 2008q4-2009q2




(-Lf ) total assetf 10.73***
(2.47)
(-Lf ) employmentf 7.69***
(1.34)
(-Lf ) -4.98*** -8.75** -163.75*** -75.85***
(1.66) (3.61) (37.71) (12.60)
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product group FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1800 1800 834 834
Note. * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01; standard errors are clustered by firm and
product group; the regression is weighted by initial sales; and firm-level controls are the
firm’s listed status, four-digit NAICS FE, bond rating, number of loans, amount of loans,
loan type, loan-year FE, multi-lead FE, number of loans due in the post-Lehman FE, loan
spread, and loan maturity; invenf : firm-level 2006 ln(inventory); industry inven: NAICS
four-digit 2001-2006 average ln(inventory); loan amountf : last pre-Lehman ln(loan
amount)
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Table 1.9: Treatment Interaction: Demand Elasticity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lnPfg: 2006q4-2007q2 to 2008q4-2009q2
(-Lf ) demand elasticityfg (Bertrand) -2.19*** -1.74**
(0.67) (0.73)
(-Lf ) demand elasticityfg (Cournot) -2.26*** -2.15**
(0.81) (0.86)
(-Lf ) demand elasticityg (UPC) -0.59**
(0.24)
(-Lf ) demand elasticityg (Firm) -1.49***
(0.53)
(-Lf ) 4.61** 3.37 1.66 3.28
(2.30) (2.38) (2.00) (2.36)
demand elasticityfg (Bertrand) -1.71* -1.00
(0.89) (1.10)
demand elasticityfg (Cournot) -1.43* -0.49
(0.73) (0.87)
Firm-level controls Yes No Yes No Yes Yes
Firm FE No Yes No Yes No No
Product group FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1811 1811 1811 1811 1811 1811
Note. * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01; standard errors are clustered by firm and
product group; the regression is weighted by initial sales; firm-level controls are the
firm’s listed status, firm age, two-digit NAICS FE, bond rating, number of loans, amount
of loans, loan type, loan-year FE, multi-lead FE, number of loans due in the post-Lehman
FE, loan spread, and loan maturity; and the number of UPCg is the number of UPCs in
each group, and number of buyersg is the number of buyers in each group.
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Additional Empirical Analyses
This section presents three additional empirical analyses. First, I discuss howmy empirical
results are related to Gilchrist et al., 2017, who find that firms in a weak liquidity position
increase their output prices. Second, I utilize the nested CES demand system to decompose
the price index into a conventional price index and a variety-quality adjustment and find
that all of the effect of a negative credit supply shock works through the conventional
price index, not through a change in the quality or variety of products. Finally, I check
and confirm the external validity of the empirical results by using more-representative
data with a different period and identification strategy.
Reconciliation with Gilchrist et al. (2017)
The results in this paper appear to oppose those in Gilchrist et al., 2017, who, based on
their empirical findings, conclude that financially constrained firms raise their output
prices relative to their counterparts. I argue that my empirical results, in fact, are fully
consistent with their results that firms in a “weak liquidity position” raise their output
prices. The difference between these two studies lies in the interpretation of the results.
I first replicate and confirm their results in my sample with their measure of financial
constraint, a small amount of cash holdings, using the following regression specification.
 lnPfg = g + LIQf + Xf + "fg (1.3.13)
where LIQf stands for liquidity, which is either initial (2006) cash to assets or contempo-
enough to infer anything conclusive.
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raneous (2008) cash to assets. As reported in Table 1.10, even in my sample, firms that
had a small amount of cash at the beginning or during the banking crisis raised their out-
put prices relative to their counterparts. The natural question that arises is why different
measures of financial constraint, liquidity and bank shock, generate different results.
Previous studies in the corporate finance literature suggest that firms in a “weak liquid-
ity position” are likely to be less financially constrained, not more financially constrained.
A large body of literature asks why firms hold liquidity. Almeida et al., 2014 survey this
literature and conclude that the main cause of cross-sectional variation in liquidity posi-
tion is financial constraint. That is, companies that hold liquidity are likely to be more
financially constrained, not less financially constrained.
More specifically, consider the contemporaneous (2008) liquidity position. Kahle and
Stulz, 2013 find that bank-dependent firms that were likely to be more affected by a credit
shortage raised—not lowered—their liquidity in 2008. I confirm Kahle and Stulz, 2013’s
finding by showing that companies facing a negative credit supply shock raise their liq-
uidity, as shown in Table 1.6. This result is consistent with the fire sale of inventory
hypothesis, reflecting that such firms want to sell their inventory to hold more liquidity
due to the precautionary motive. However, such companies facing a negative bank shock
would then be classified as firms in a “strong liquidity position” not as firms in a“weak liq-
uidity position”. Regarding the initial (2006) liquidity position, a seminal work by Bates,
Kahle, and Stulz, 2009 identifies more than 10 factors that lead firms to hold more liquid
assets. In particular, they find that the “weak liquidity position” is associated with more
investment, borrowing, and acquisitions, and stable cash flow, characteristics that likely
reflect unconstrained companies rather than constrained companies. I confirm the find-
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Table 1.10: Effect of Corporate Cash Holding on the Output Price
(1) (2) (3) (4)










2006LIQf 8.84*** 4.59** 9.08*** 5.96**
(1.96) (2.10) (2.42) (2.88)
Four-digit naics FE No Yes No Yes
Product group FE No Yes No Yes
E[lnP] 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5
E[lnP:Lp90-Lp10] 5.48 2.85 7.38 4.84
Observations 1461 1454 1524 1515
Note. * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01; standard errors are clustered by firm and
product group. LIQf is normalized to have a unit variance.
ings of Bates, Kahle, and Stulz, 2009 using liquidity position for the year 2006 only as
shown in Appendix D. Firms that had a small amount of liquidity in 2006, in fact, invest
more, borrow more, acquire more firms, and had stable cash flow in 2006 and 2008. Be-
cause of these concerns of using the “weak liquidity position” as a measure of financial
constraint, I instead use the bank shocks proposed by Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010 and
Chodorow-Reich, 2014, which are not subject to this criticism.²⁹
Price Adjustment vs. Quality-Variety Adjustment
One of the most important aspects of studying price dynamics is the effect of changes in
variety and quality on the output price index. The firm-group level price index—or the
cost-of-living index—depends crucially on howmany products are available in the market
and how appealing each product is to purchasers. The nested CES demand system used in
this article has an advantage over other conventional price indexes, such as the Tornqvist
²⁹Moreover, I find that my results are robust to the inclusion of the initial cash holdings in the regression,
as shown in Appendix D.
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or Laspeyres indexes, because it explicitly incorporates the utility gains from the products’
greater variety and high quality into the price index. The analysis so far, however, does
not reveal how large this effect of variety and quality adjustment is on the output price
index due to the negative credit supply shock. Firms that face a negative credit supply
shock decrease their output price index by increasing the number of products by drawing
down inventories of new products or by downgrading product quality to reduce costs
rather than decreasing their actual product prices.
I decompose the price index into the conventional price index and the quality-variety
correction and find that all the effects of the credit supply shock work through the con-
ventional price index rather than through quality or variety adjustment. As discussed in
section 3.2, the nested CES demand system allows the price index to be decomposed into a
conventional price index and the variety-quality correction term. I regress each part of the
price index on the credit supply shock measure and report the results in Table 1.11. The
coefficients are negative and statistically significant when the conventional price index
is used, but they are close to 0 and not statistically significant when the quality-variety
correction part of the price index is used. This result suggests that firms that face negative
credit supply shocks do not alter the variety or quality of their products to change their
output price index but instead simply decrease the prices of their products. Based on this
result, I abstract away from firms’ product entry and exit decisions and product quality
decisions to construct the business cycle model presented in section 4.
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Table 1.11: Effect of the Credit Crunch on the Output Price: Decomposition
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln ~Pfg: 2006q4-2007q2 to 2008q4-2009q2
OLS (-Lf ) instrumented using
Lehman ABX BankItem All
(-Lf ) -8.24*** -7.85* -7.34** -6.95* -7.32***
(1.90) (4.11) (3.27) (3.69) (2.43)
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product group FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F statistics 17.2 9.1 13.0 10.9
J-statistics p-value 0.98
E[lnP] 11.4 11.4 11.4 11.4 11.4
E[lnP:(-Lp90)-(-Lp10)] -18 -17.1 -16 -15.2 -16
Observations 1658 1658 1658 1658 1658
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
lnSDfg: 2006q4-2007q2 to 2008q4-2009q2
OLS (-Lf ) instrumented using
Lehman ABX BankItem All
(-Lf ) -0.02 0.46 0.46 -1.00 -0.20
(0.80) (1.38) (1.02) (1.19) (0.74)
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product group FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F statistics 16.9 9.2 12.8 10.9
J-statistics p-value 0.54
E[lnP] 0 0 0 0 0
E[lnP:(-Lp90)-(-Lp10)] 0 1 1 -2.2 -.4
Observations 1658 1658 1658 1658 1658
Note. * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01; standard errors are clustered by firm and
product group; the regression is weighted by initial sales; and firm-level controls are the
firm’s listed status, four-digit NAICS FE, age, size, bond rating, number of loans, amount
of loans, loan type, loan-year FE, multi-lead FE, number of loans due in the post-Lehman
FE, loan spread, loan maturity, and lagged dependent variable
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External Validity
A potential concern in this study is the generality of the main empirical result. I consider
only the period around the Lehman bankruptcy, and while this timing has an advantage
over other periods in identifying the effect of credit supply shock because of the surprising
nature and enormous magnitude of the credit market disruptions in this period, it limits
the scope of the study. In particular, given that Lehman failed during the middle of the
Great Recession, the results can speak only to the recession period, when other fundamen-
tal variables were likely to change simultaneously.³⁰ Additionally, my data cover products
that have a barcode and that are typically purchased at grocery stores. Studying this con-
sumer packaged goods market is again useful in addressing the internal validity problem.
This market is likely to be the least sensitive to other potential confounding factors, such
as product demand shock, compared with industries with more durable or demand-elastic
products. However, a study based on this dataset would not provide information on other
industries and is unlikely to be fully representative despite its non-negligible share of total
consumer expenditure.
To address external validity concerns, I confirm the main empirical finding with a dif-
ferent identification strategy in a different period with more-representative data. First,
I gather BLS monthly NAICS four-digit industry-level price data from December 1984
to December 1996 for manufacturing sectors, build a Rajan and Zingales, 1998 external
financial dependence index at the NAICS four-digit industry-level from the Compustat
³⁰For example, Stroebel and Vavra, 2016 suggest that demand becomes more elastic during the recession.
In this case, credit-constrained firms would be more likely to decrease their output prices in the recession
than in the boom, as firms are more likely to generate larger cash flows from decreasing output prices when
they face elastic demand, as shown in Table 1.9.
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database, and collect monthly Fed funds rate shocks from Romer and Romer, 2004. With
these measures, I examine how industries that rely heavily on external finance change
their output prices relative to their counterparts when there is an exogenous increase in
the Fed funds rate. This analysis relies on the notion of the cost channel of monetary pol-
icy. The exogenous increase in the Fed funds rate affects credit spread firms borrowing
from financial intermediaries, and firms that operate in external-finance-dependent indus-
tries should face a larger negative credit supply shock than their counterparts. Based on
this variation in the data, I evaluate the main empirical findings in a more general setup.
I use the following specification:
 lnPjt = j + t + (RZj fft) + Xjt + "jt (1.3.14)
where j is the NAICS four-digit industry code, t is the month. Pjt is the BLS industry-
level monthly price index, RZj is the industry-specific Rajan-Zingales external financial
dependent index,fft is the monthly Fed-funds rate shock,Xjt represents industry-level
control variables, and j and t are industry and time fixed effects, respectively, includ-
ing (NAICS 2-digit)fft, (Durability Index)fft, (Luxuriousness Index)fft, and
RZj(Month Dummies)t. The Luxuriousness Index and Durability Index come from Bils,
Klenow, and Malin, 2013 and measure product luxuriousness and durability for each in-
dustry, respectively. The coefficient  measures the effect of the credit supply shock on
industries dependent on external finance.
I find that external-finance-dependent industries reduce their output prices because
of the exogenous increase in the Fed funds rate relative to their counterparts, as reported
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in column (1) of Table 1.12. These results help ensure that firms that face negative credit
supply shocks decrease their output prices in other periods based on all manufacturing
data. To additionally check whether the results are generated by the recession period in
1990, I follow the NBER definition of a recession to make a dummy variable that equals 1
for the period from July 1990 to March 1991 and 0 otherwise. Then, I interact this variable
with the shock variables, but I find no evidence that the effect is larger for the recession
period. Additionally, the results are robust when this recession period is excluded from
the sample, suggesting that the effect exists at normal times. Finally, I added a lagged
monetary policy shock interacted with the financial dependent index, and I find no effect
based on this lagged shock variable. These results suggest that the effect is temporary,
consistent with the fire sale of inventory hypothesis.
In addition, I divide all the recessions that occured in 14 developed countries into
banking crises, as defined in Schularick and Taylor, 2012, and nonbanking crises, as de-
fined in Ottonello, 2015. I then take a simple average of inflation and employment across
recessions and countries within the type of crisis for each of the five years around the
year of recession and then plot the results in Figure 1.4. As shown in the figure, inflation
seems to fall in banking crises but rise in nonbanking crises, despite a large decrease in
real GDP, consistent with the empirical findings in this article. This result is robust when
I look only at the United States. Note that the magnitude of change in inflation in banking
crises is quite different from that for nonbanking crises, as the data had more historical in-
formation for banking crises, when the average inflation was lower than in recent periods.
Dropping recession years before 1950 generates a similar magnitude of average inflation
as that in nonbanking crises, from 5 to 8 percent for all 14 countries.
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Table 1.12: Effect of the Credit Crunch on the Output Price: External Validity
Dependent Variable:  lnPjt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RZj fft -0.172** -0.166** -0.155* -0.173**
(0.075) (0.079) (0.079) (0.076)
Drecession  RZj -0.000
(0.000)




Observations 3467 3251 3467 3464
R2 0.077 0.083 0.077 0.077
Industry and time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exclude recession? No Yes No No
Note. * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01; standard errors are clustered by month and
corrected for the autocorrelation following Driscoll and Kray (1998); control variables
are (NAICS 2-digit)fft; (Durability)fft; (Luxuriousness Index)fft;
RZj(Month Dummies)t
In Appendix C, I conduct numerous robustness checks to address potential concerns
related to the timing of the credit supply shock, retailers’ behavior, local conditions, and
purchaser characteristics. I also check that results are robust to the inclusion of variables
related to foreign exposure and to the use of different price indexes and regressionweights.
I re-confirm the empirical findings by showing that none of these analyses alters the main
empirical result that firms facing a negative credit supply shock decrease their output
prices.
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Note. All the above panels show the average inflation and real GDP for the five years
around the peak of the crisis year. In the upper panels, the figure compares banking and
non-banking crises in 14 developed countries for which data are available, and does so
for the United States only in the lower panels. The 14 developed countries are the United
States, Canada, Australia, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. There are 79 banking crises (7 for
the United States) from 1870 to 2008 (Schularick and Taylor 2012), and 47 other crises (6
for the United States) from 1950 to 2006 (Ottonello 2015).
1.4 Theoretical Analyses
I present a business cycle model based on micro-level empirical evidence in order to shed
light on aggregate inflation and inventory dynamics. I first present a simple model with
two identical producers with matched micro-level data to formalize the mechanism. I
then extend the model to examine the dynamics of aggregate inflation and inventory.
The model is particularly related to Iacoviello, 2005 and Wen, 2011.
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Simple Model
There are three types of agents in this model: households and two otherwise identical
representative entrepreneurs facing different degrees of credit supply shock. Two identi-
cal entrepreneurs are included in order to expressly reflect a micro-level analysis of the
differential change in variables. Entrepreneurs face the borrowing capability that is exoge-
nously given to them. The thought experiment is a sudden decrease in a representative
entrepreneur’s borrowing capacity to determine how the output price, sale, inventory,
and employment dynamics evolve compared to the other.
To integrate the fire sale of inventory hypothesis, I adapt the product stock-out motive
of inventory holding, as described in Wen, 2011. I assume that entrepreneurs produce a
continuum of products and that each product faces an idiosyncratic shock. The shock is
realized after entrepreneurs produce their products, and this timing lag gives them the
incentive to store products in inventory to avoid product stock-out. Introducing multiple
products with idiosyncratic shock makes an inventory positive at the steady state and
makes it easy to apply the conventional log linearization technique to solve the model.
Moreover, this formulation allows the introduction of capital, another form of saving,
without inducing firms to hold capital over inventory. Inventory yields a liquidity pre-
mium to facilitate sales, giving companies an incentive to hold both inventory and capital.
This feature is useful in the extended model, in which entrepreneurs invest in capital.
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where E0 is the expectation operator,  2 (0; 1) is the discount factor, cHt is consump-
tion at time t, and lHt is hours of work households supply for entrepreneurs. Denote
wt  Wt/Pt the real wage. Assume that households lend in real terms  bHt and receive


















where cH1t is produced by entrepreneur 1 and consumed by households, and cH2t is produced
by entrepreneur 2 and consumed by households. The corresponding price index is given
by





where p1t is the price of good 1 and p1t is the price of good 2. The aggregate price index
is normalized to 1. Solving the above household problem yields the following first-order
conditions for the aggregate consumption (1.4.2), labor supply (1.4.3), and consumption
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There are two representative entrepreneurs, and they are identical except that one ex-









where cEjt is the aggregate consumption of type j entrepreneurs at time t, and  is the dis-
count factor for entrepreneurs. I assume entrepreneurs are more impatient than house-
holds ( < ). This assumption ensures that entrepreneurs borrow from households.
Similar to households, entrepreneurs’ aggregate consumption index is the following nest


















t + pjtyjt (1.4.6)
where lEjjt is the hours of work they employ, bEjjt is borrowing from households, and yjt
is good j produced by type j entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs face the following borrowing
constraint
bEjt  bEjt (1.4.7)
where bEjt follows an exogenous AR(1) process for the type 1 entrepreneur but remains
constant for the type 2 entrepreneur. Note that equation (1.4.7) binds at the steady state
because entrepreneurs’ discount factor is smaller than that of households. I further as-
sume that shocks are small enough that this equation always binds.
Type j entrepreneurs produce good j using the following process. All intermediate
goods and final goods are produced by entrepreneurs internally. First, they produce a
continuum of intermediate goods with the entrepreneur-level Cobb-Douglas technology.
Z 1
0
xjt(i)di  (lEjt )1  (1.4.8)
where  2 [0; 1] governs the efficiency of labor in producing output. xjt(i) is the interme-
diate good i produced by entrepreneur j at time t. Each intermediate good can be stored
in inventory before being used to produce a final good




where invenjt(i) is type j entrepreneurs’ inventory for each product i and yjt(i) is the sum
of the last period’s inventory (invenj;t 1(i)) and what is left after producers store their in-
termediate goods (xjt(i)) in inventory (invenjt(i)) during this period. Then, they produce








where (i) is product-level idiosyncratic shock to an intermediate good (yjt(i)). I assume
that there is an information lag, that is, (i) is realized after entrepreneurs produce the
intermediate good xjt(i). In this way, entrepreneurs in this model have an incentive to
store goods in inventory to prevent product stock-out. For analytical tractability, I further
assume that (i) is drawn from the Pareto distribution.
Note that entrepreneurs hold inventory to avoid product stock-out, not to hedge
against a decrease in their borrowing capability. This formulation is consistent with the
micro level empirical evidence, because companies do not seem to hold inventory before
the Lehman failure to hedge against the credit supply shock, as shown in Table 1.2. How-
ever, the effect on output price is likely to be larger if entrepreneurs hold inventory to
hedge against the credit supply shock as they are more likely to liquidate inventory due
to the shock.
Entrepreneur-Level Optimality Conditions
The first-order conditions with entrepreneur-level variables are as follows. Detailed
derivations of the first order conditions are presented in Appendix A, and since en-
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trepreneurs have identical first-order conditions, I suppress the notation of the en-
trepreneur, Ej.







where t is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the borrowing constraint (equation
1.4.7). A decrease in borrowing capability leads to an increase in t and in the marginal
utility of consumption.
The labor demand equation for the entrepreneur j is













where jt is an optimal cutoff value of the idiosyncratic shock, RI(jt) measures the rate
of return to inventory investment, and G(jt) is the function of jt. Entrepreneurs face
a product stockout if the idiosyncratic shock, (i), is larger than jt, but they have an
excess supply if (i) is smaller than jt. The optimal cutoff value jt is time-varying and
determined at the point at which the marginal cost of production equals the expected
marginal benefit. The mathematical expression of each term is in Appendix A.









equation collapses to the standard labor demand equation with monopolistic competition.
Then, the borrowing shock does not change the labor demand in this simplemodel. Allow-
ing inventory in the model generates a variable markup between the marginal product of
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labor and real wages and creates an important change in the labor demand. Given that en-
trepreneurs liquidate inventory, inefficiency increases as a result of more products being
on stock-out, which leads entrepreneurs to lay off workers.

















The consumption-smoothing motive generates a change in optimal cutoff jt, compelling
entrepreneurs to liquidate inventory. The good 1 demand and good 2 demand are the
same as in the household optimality conditions.
Calibration and Results
Calibration of parameters is standard, as in Table 1.13. I assume (i) is drawn from





. bt follows an exogenous AR(1) process
ln(bt) = b ln(bt 1)+ bt , where b is the standard error of the bt . Calibration of inventory
parameters ( and ) follows Wen, 2011 and matches the inventory-investment-to-GDP
ratio of 0.01 and the inventory-to-sales ratio of 1. Demand elasticity of substitution is
calibrated based on the median value of the estimated elasticity used in section 3.3.
The simple model is designed to capture the micro-level empirical evidence and for-
malize the fire sale of inventory hypothesis. A thought experiment here is an exogenous
decrease in type 1 entrepreneur’s borrowing capability. This decrease reflects the dif-
ferential change in producers’ credit supply condition analyzed with the micro-level data.





 Labor share 0.33
 HH discount factor 0.99
 E1 and E2 discount factor 0.98
c Intertemporal elasticity 2
l Frisch elasticity 1
 Production elasticity of substitution 0.1
 Product-level shock distribution parameter 3
 Demand elasticity of substitution (producer) 3.9

b Borrowing shock parameter 0.95
b Borrowing shock parameter 1
Extended model
Parameter Meaning/governing Value
 k Capital adjustment cost 15 or 0
 Price rigidity 0.75
 Demand elasticity of substitution (product) 6.9
 Capital depreciation 0.03
rR Persistence parameter in the Taylor rule 0.73
r Inflation parameter in the Taylor rule 0.27
rY Output parameter in the Taylor rule 0.13
b Borrowing shock parameter 10
1 because he or she wants to smooth the consumption. This consumption-smoothing mo-
tive enables entrepreneur 1 to aggressively liquidate the inventory and sell it at a low price
in the product market to generate extra revenue. However, because entrepreneur 1 ini-
tially holds inventory to avoid the stock-out of products—not to hedge against the credit
supply shock—this fire sale leads to a greater stock-out of products and corresponding
larger inefficiency. This inefficiency, in turn, makes entrepreneur 1 lay off workers.
Figure 1.5 shows the impulse response function of relative output price, inventory,
market share, and employment. Note that the model generates a temporary decrease in
the relative output price, as shown in Table 1.4 and Figure 1.3. This relative price dynamics
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Figure 1.5: Differential Response of Price, Output, Inventory, and Employment
with respect to the Negative Credit Supply Shock
Note. The top-left panel shows the dynamics of relative price, the top-right panel shows
the dynamics of relative market share, the bottom-left panel shows the dynamics of
relative inventory, and the bottom-right panel shows the dynamics of relative labor due
to the negative credit supply shock to type 1 entrepreneurs.
occurs because entrepreneur 1 decreases employment and production, but increases sales
as he or she draws down inventory, consistent with Table 1.6.
Extended Model
I extend the simple model by adding money, price rigidity, a central bank, and capital
investment. The simple model presented in section 4.1 is a purely real model and cannot
speak to inflation dynamics. To examine the aggregate inflation dynamics, I introduce
money into the household utility, retailers with Calvo-Yun price rigidity, and the central
bank that follows the Taylor rule. I assume that real money balance is additively sepa-
rable from consumption and labor in the household utility function so that the quantity
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of money has no implications for the rest of the model. This extension is a parsimonious
way to convert a real model to a nominal model. Additionally, I introduce capital invest-
ment with a quadratic adjustment cost in addition to inventory. Capital is another form of
saving and can be used to smooth the consumption, similar to inventory. When there is
an exogenous decrease in borrowing capability, entrepreneurs can either liquidate inven-
tory or disinvest in capital to increase their current consumption. This substitution is gov-
erned by the capital adjustment cost. If the capital adjustment cost is high, entrepreneurs
sell inventory and lower their output prices, but with a low capital adjustment cost, en-
trepreneurs instead disinvest in capital to smooth consumption.
In the extended model, retailers, not households, purchase products from en-
trepreneurs. Two identical types of retailers correspond to the two identical types of
entrepreneurs, and each type produces differentiated products that face CES demand. Re-
tailers use what they purchase from entrepreneurs, differentiate the products, and sell to
consumers. In this process, they face Calvo-Yun price rigidity in changing their output
















yj;t+s(z) = 0 (1.4.14)
where pjt(z) is the “reset” price, yj;t+s(z) is the corresponding demand,  is the share
of firms that can change the price, and  is the elasticity of substitution across retailers
within each type. This condition states that the discounted expected value of marginal
revenue is equal to the discounted expected marginal cost.
³¹With the log-linearization, this extension is the same as introducing Rotemberg price adjustment cost
at the entrepreneur level.
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The central bank follows the Taylor rule:




where Rt is the interest rate at time t and yGDPt is total production in the economy at time
t. I allow for persistence in the interest rate Rt and calibrate the parameters following Ia-
coviello, 2005. Allowing other realistic parameters does not make a qualitative difference
in the results.
Finally, I introduce capital investment in the entrepreneurs’ flow budget constraint
(1.4.6).
Ijt = kjt   (1  )kj;t 1 + (kjt; kj;t 1)
where Ijt is capital investment of entrepreneur j at time t, kjt is the capital used by en-
trepreneur j at time t,  is the capital depreciation, and (kjt; kj;t 1) is a quadratic ad-







kt 1. Unlike inventory, capital investment is a
perfect substitute for consumption and can be used to smooth the consumption without
changing the output price. This capital is used in production and the production function








The key parameter in this setup is the capital adjustment cost. In the benchmark case,
I assume that the capital adjustment cost parameter,  k, equals 15. This parameter is large
enough such that entrepreneurs cannot disinvest enough capital to smooth their consump-
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tion when borrowing capability decreases. Borrowing-constrained entrepreneurs instead
liquidate inventory and lower their prices to generate extra sales from the product market
to smooth consumption. The counterfactual scenario is when there is no capital adjust-
ment cost,  k = 0. In this case, rather than liquidating their inventory, entrepreneurs
disinvest in capital to smooth consumption. The magnitude of the borrowing shock, b,
is calibrated to be 10 to match the relative decrease in the output price of 15% due to the
negative borrowing shock to entrepreneur 1. This 15% decrease is observed in the micro-
level data when I regress the change in the log of output price on the dummy variable,
which equals 1 if the credit supply shock measure is smaller than its median value, and
0 otherwise. This result is reported in Appendix E. Calibration of other parameters in
the extended model is standard, as in Table 1.13. Parameters in the Taylor rule follow Ia-
coviello, 2005³², and the demand elasticity across products follow the median value used
in section 3.3. I assume that the shock is persistent given that the bank shock is likely to
affect firms persistently. Using a temporary shock, in fact, magnifies the increase in the
medium-run inflation. The entrepreneur facing a temporary shock accumulates inventory
immediately in the next period, whereas an entrepreneur facing a persistent shock slowly
stocks inventory and raises the price.
Based on the benchmark calibration, I find that a drop in entrepreneur 1’s borrowing
capability leads to a decrease in relative price and inventory and a drop in aggregate infla-
tion and inventory. The results are reported in Figure 1.6. A decrease in relative variables
in this model is consistent with the micro-level empirical analysis, the same as the simple
³²Allowing other parameters does not change the qualitative results. To motivate a zero lower bound, I
also fix the interest rate for four quarters and then allow it to follow the Taylor rule. This analysis makes
the results even stronger since the central bank cannot use monetary policy to stabilize inflation.
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Figure 1.6: Aggregate and Differential Response of Price and Inventory
with respect to the Negative Credit Supply Shock
Note. The top-left panel shows the dynamics of relative output price, the top-right panel
shows the dynamics of relative inventory, the bottom-left panel shows the dynamics of
aggregate inflation, and the bottom-right panel shows the dynamics of average
inventory due to the negative credit supply shock to type 1 entrepreneurs.
model presented in section 4.1. At the same time, this model generates a large decrease
in aggregate inflation and inventory dynamics. Both aggregate and relative dynamics are
driven by the fire sale of inventory mechanism. Entrepreneur 1—who faces a negative
credit supply shock—aggressively liquidates inventory and lowers the price to generate
extra sales to smooth consumption. In the next period, entrepreneur 1 starts to accumu-
late inventory and raise the price, leading both the relative price and aggregate inflation
to increase.
I compare the impulse response generated from themodel with the U.S. producer price
index and inventory data, as shown in Figure 1.7. The magnitude of the shock, which is
calibrated to match the change in the relative price observed in the micro-level data, ex-
68
plains the approximately 10% drop in the output price. This drop in inflation explains
almost all of the drop in the producer price index during the financial panic of 2008 under
the standard parameter calibration. Then, inflation overshoots in the next period because
entrepreneur 1 raises the price back to the original level. This increase is consistent with
the “missing disinflation puzzle”, which discusses that inflation did not fall during the
2007-09 recession despite high unemployment and low demand. The credit supply shock
counteracts the usual deflationary force and explains this puzzle in my model, consistent
with the previous literature. In explaining the stable medium-run inflation dynamics,
however, I propose a new mechanism based on the micro-level empirical analysis that
explains not only the “missing disinflation puzzle” but also the short-run drop in the in-
flation. The model also generates a large decrease in inventory, consistent with the data.
Finally, I set the capital adjustment cost to be 0 to compare it with the case when the
entrepreneur does not liquidate inventory but instead disinvests capital. As shown in Fig-
ure 1.6, aggregate inflation does not change much in this case, because the entrepreneur
can smooth the consumption by disinvesting capital and use this resource to consume
directly, rather than liquidating inventory and decreasing the price. Additionally, in this
case, there is a large increase in inventory at the time of the shock. If the entrepreneur
raises consumption by lowering the capital investment, production in the next period falls
despite a moderately large demand, giving an incentive to hoard inventory at the time of
the shock in order to meet the demand in the next period. Note that the entrepreneur
chooses to disinvest capital instead of liquidating inventory when the capital adjustment
cost is 0. This behavior is due primarily to increased product stock-out as a result of liqui-
dating inventory. When the inventory is liquidated, there is a greater stock-out for pro-
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Figure 1.7: Aggregate Response of Price and Inventory
Compared with the Data
Note. The top-left panel shows the U.S. inflation dynamics observed in the data during
the financial panic, and the top-right panel shows the U.S. inventory dynamics observed
in the data during the same period. The bottom-left panel shows the dynamics of
aggregate inflation due to the negative credit supply shock to type 1 entrepreneurs, and
the bottom-right panel shows the dynamics of average inventory due to the same shock.
ducers because of idiosyncratic shock, leading to larger inefficiency for the entrepreneur.
Overall, this comparison shows that without the fire sale of inventory, there is no dramatic
change in inflation dynamics in the model, which is inconsistent with the data.
1.5 Conclusion
In this paper, using novel micro-level data and a change in bank health at the time of the
Lehman failure as an exogenous variation of companies’ credit condition, I find that firms
that face a negative credit supply shock decrease their output prices. I posit a ”fire sale”
of inventory hypothesis to explain this empirical finding: firms that face a negative credit
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supply shock decrease their prices because they need to quickly sell off their inventories
and generate extra cash. I empirically support this hypothesis by first showing that in
the data, both aggregate inflation and inventory fall but corporate cash holdings rise. I
further show that firms that face a negative credit supply shock reduce their inventories
and increase their market share and cash holdings, supporting the hypothesis. I then
build a simple dynamic general equilibrium model to formalize this mechanism explicitly
and to discuss aggregate inflation dynamics. The model features two competing mecha-
nisms: the fire sale of inventory channel emphasized in this paper and the conventional
production effect of credit supply shock discussed in previous studies. As a result of the
adverse credit supply shock for a group of producers, the model predicts a drop in the
relative price by firms that face a negative credit supply shock, consistent with the micro-
level empirical evidence. A simple model without inventory, however, features a rise in
relative prices, which is inconsistent with the micro-level empirical evidence. The model
features aggregate inflation dynamics consistent with observations for the middle of the
financial panic.
This paper highlights that corporate inventory and liquidity management, which has
been neglected in the previous studies on banking crises, is a crucial determinant of output
price dynamics. Models that feature inventories will better account for the fluctuation of
inflation, inventory, and other aggregate variables.
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Chapter 2
Price-Cost Markup Cyclicality: New Evidence and Implications
2.1 Introduction
Price-cost markup cyclicality is a first-order building block in many sub-fields of macroe-
conomics. In the context of models of nominal rigidity, countercyclical markups that
are conditional on demand change are necessary to explain both procyclical wages and
countercyclical unemployment (Rotemberg and Woodford 1991, Rotemberg 2013). In the
study of monetary policy, many New Keynesian models suggest that central banks should
target constant average markup for price stability (Goodfriend and King 1997). In the
scholarship on price dynamics, countercyclical markups that are conditional on financial
distortion explain missing disinflation during the Great Recession (Gilchrist et al. 2017).
Finally, Bils, Klenow, and Malin, 2016 argue that unconditional countercyclical markups
explain at least half of the cyclicality in the labor wedge.¹
Despite the importance of markup cyclicality, empirical evidence on the topic is mixed.
Some studies find that markups are countercyclical, whereas others find that markups are
¹Models predict countercyclical markups casued by increases in marginal cost and rigid prices (Smets
and Wouters 2003, 2007, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans 2005), imperfect competition (Rotemberg and
Woodford 1992, Opp, Parlour, and Walden 2014), firm entry and exit (Jaimovich and Floetotto 2008, Bilbiie,
Ghironi, and Melitz 2012), and deep habits (Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe 2006).
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either procyclical or acyclical.² It is particularly unclear how markups move uncondition-
ally, and how they move with respect to demand shock.
This paper finds that markups are procyclical both unconditionally and conditional
on demand shock based on a flexible production function.³ A flexible production function
plays a crucial role in markup cyclicality because markups refer to the extent to which
firms price their products over the marginal costs, and the price is generally observed
in the data. Then the key objective in this literature is determining how to recover the
marginal cost, which heavily depends on the underlying production functional form as-
sumption. Previous studies rely on a tightly parameterized production function, such as
the Cobb-Douglas production function or the CES production function, which restricts
the movement in the marginal cost in a particular direction. In this study, I allow large
flexibility in the production functional form specification to enable the marginal cost to
vary without imposing many restrictions. The flexibility I assume is essentially the same
as that in a Translog production function, which can be interpreted as a second-order ap-
proximation of an arbitrary production function.⁴ The Cobb-Douglas production function
is considered a first-order approximation.
I find that the flexible production function features larger input complementarity than
the conventional production function, causing a procyclical markup. For instance, the
²Refer to Bils, 1987, Rotemberg and Woodford, 1991, Rotemberg and Woodford, 1999, Gali, Gertler, and
Lopez-Salido, 2007, Bils, Klenow, and Malin, 2013, Bils, Klenow, and Malin, 2016 for countercyclicality and
Hall, 2014, Nekarda and Ramey, 2013, Stroebel and Vavra, 2016 for procyclicality
³I find that markups are procyclical conditional on product exit, and countercyclical conditional on
financial shock and price rigidity. These results confirm the prediction of models with firm dynamics
(Jaimovich and Floetotto 2008), financial friction (Chevalier and Scharfstein 1996, Gilchrist et al. 2017), and
price rigidity.
⁴This relationship is explicitly derived in Hyun and Kim, 2017
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amount of output produced from one unit of labor (marginal product of labor) can in-
crease with one additional unit of the other input, which is more than the complementar-
ity assumed in the restrictive production function, such as the Cobb-Douglas production
function. This large complementary implies that the marginal cost of production can
decrease in the boom when firms employ more different complementary inputs. Given
the modest change in output price, this decrease in cost causes markups to increase and
become procyclical. Note that the corresponding markup dynamics occur without neces-
sarily integrating wage rigidity or contradicting price rigidity.
Because of the input complementarity in a general production function, markup pro-
cyclicality has two striking implications. First, input complementarity can explain pro-
cyclical real wages and employment (conditional on demand shock) without incorporat-
ing markup countercyclicality. Consider a neoclassical labor market with a positive de-
mand shock, such as an increase in government spending. In this setup, a positive demand
shock must shift the labor demand curve outward to increase real wages and employment.
According to the previous literature, this decrease in markup is necessary to generate that
shift.⁵ Assume an input that is complementary to labor that firms increase in response to
a positive demand shock. Then, the efficiency of labor increases, and shifts in the labor
demand are not dependent on countercyclical markups. In other words, labor demand can
shift without relying on a decrease in markups if there is a strong input complementarity.
Second, estimatedmarkups indicate strong procyclical returns to scale in United States
production. Returns to scale are constant for a conventional Cobb-Douglas or a CES pro-
duction function but depend on inputs once we allow a more flexible production function,
⁵E.g., Rotemberg and Woodford 1991, Rotemberg 2013
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such as a Translog production function. Since inputs vary across time, returns to scale
can vary across time. When firms employ a greater number of inputs during expansion,
such as labor, capital, energy, and material, the complementarity among these inputs gen-
erates large returns to scale. When firms employ fewer different inputs in a recession, the
complementarity among these inputs generates small returns to scale. In addition to other
channels, such as an exogenous productivity change, increasing returns to scale, resource
reallocations and cyclical factor utilization, this novel channel explains procyclical produc-
tivity. One important implication of procyclical returns to scale is that the U.S. economy
behaves as if it has increasing returns to scale even though it has constant returns to scale
on average.
The greatest challenge associated with using the flexible production function in busi-
ness cycle research is the parameter calibration. The flexible production function implies
that there are many parameters to recover, precisely because of this flexibility. For exam-
ple, for the NBER-CES data that I use in this project, five inputs are available: production
worker, non-production worker, material, energy, and capital. Assuming that the produc-
ers use all five inputs to produce outputs, five parameters can be employed for calibration
using the Cobb-Douglas specification, six parameters can be applied for the CES specifica-
tion, and twenty parameters can be applied for the flexible Translog specification. Given
the variation available in the data, it is challenging to consistently estimate all twenty
parameters in the flexible production function. Thus, I exploit the first-order condition
with respect to the energy input and apply panel data techniques to disaggregated data
to overcome this challenge. The parameters are estimated without making additional
assumptions about the demand system or market structure by utilizing input prices as
75
instrumental variables. Estimated industry-specific, time-varying markups enable me to
use panel data techniques to assess the markup cyclicality. Energy input is used to avoid
commonly discussed concerns about labor input when estimating markups.
My approach is in spirit of Bils, 1987 and Hall, 1986. First, like Bils, 1987 and many
subsequent papers (Rotemberg and Woodford 1991, 1999, Gali, Gertler, and Lopez-Salido
2007, Bils, Klenow, and Malin 2013, 2016, Nekarda and Ramey 2013), I utilize a firm’s
first order condition to derive the markup expression. Unlike that approach, my analy-
sis uses energy input, not labor or material, as the firm’s choice variable. I allow for a
more general substitution pattern across inputs that produces strong markup procyclical-
ity, and estimate markups rather than calibrate them, which is typical in the literature.
Second, the estimation techniques that I used in this paper resembles the techniques of
Hall, 1986 and many subsequent papers (Hall 1988, Haskel, Martin, and Small 1995, Klette
1999, Konings, Cayseele, and Warzynski 2005, De Loecker and Warzynski 2012, Gandhi,
Navarro, and Rivers 2013, De Loecker et al. 2014). Previous studies use labor or material
as a firm’s choice variable and make assumptions about, inter alia, a Hicks-neutral pro-
duction function; such assumptions that are not discussed in this paper.⁶ Most papers
that employ this type of markup estimation technique answer questions related to trade
liberalization, rather than markup cyclicality. I am unaware of any paper that assesses
markup cyclicality using the recent development of this estimation technique.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical
⁶For example, Gandhi, Navarro, and Rivers, 2013 assume that markups do not vary across entities,
and De Loecker and Warzynski, 2012 need to use a productivity estimation technique to recover markups,
necessitating assumptions such as timing of input choice and strict monotonicity on the investment demand
function.
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framework and the empirical specifications for markup estimation. Section 3 compares
and contrasts the method in this paper with those used in previous studies. Section 4
discusses the data, section 5 presents the estimated markups, and section 6 presents the
markup cyclicality results. Section 7 discusses the implication of the results. Section 8
concludes.
2.2 Markup Estimation: Theory & Empirics
Theoretical Framework
Becausemarkups are not directly observed in the data, it is necessary to impose a structure
for firms in the economy to recover markups. I first illustrate the conventional methodol-
ogy in a simple setup with a Cobb-Douglas technology, and extend this method to obtain
a general production function.
Simple Setup
Assume that firms use only labor and capital to produce output in the economy. Assume
a Cobb-Douglas production function with Hicks-neutral productivity: Qjt = AjtLjtKjt,
where Qjt is the output, Ajt is the productivity, Ljt is the labor and Kjt is the capital for





s.t. AjtLjtKjt = Q
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where Wjt is a nominal wage, and Rjt is the nominal rental rate of capital. Form a La-
grangian function and take the derivative, which yields the following first-order condi-
tion:
f.o.c. Wjt = jtQjt
Ljt
where jt is a Lagrangianmultiplier or nominal marginal cost. Multiply LjtPjtQjt on both
sides of the equation to obtain:
WjtLjt








) jt = 
sljt
Markups, jt, are constant  over labor share, sljt. Note that only the inverse of the
labor share is needed to recover the detrended markups and assess cyclicality. The inverse
of the labor share has been used tomeasuremarkups in previous studies (e.g., Gali, Gertler,
and Lopez-Salido 2007, Bils, Klenow, and Malin 2013). Section 3 compares and contrasts
previous studies, and section 5 presents the results with the inverse of the labor share.
General Setup














Production Function: Qjt = F (V 1jt; :::; V Kjt ; Ajt)
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A firm j uses K different inputs, such as labor and capital, at time t to produce a good Qjt.
V kjt denotes each input indexed by k, W kjt is an input price that corresponds to input V kjt.
W kjt depends on V kjt in the cost function because a firm affects input price by purchasing
different amount of input V kjt (monopsony effect). k(V kjt/V kj;t 1) denotes the adjustment
costs that a firm must pay to change the input V kjt. Ajt is a firm’s productivity, and F ()
is a continuous and twice differentiable production function with F1() > 0.
Note that this setup is markedly general. I will only make assumptions about the
energy input to simplify a firm’s production decision based on the previous three
equations. Assume that V 1jt is an energy input. The approach in this paper rely on the
following assumptions:⁷
Assumption 1: Cost Minimization. A firm minimizes its cost expenditure subject to
the output constraint by choosing an energy input.
Assumption 2: 1(V 1jt/V kj;t 1) = 0. The energy input is fully flexible.
Assumption 3: W 1jt(V 1jt) = W 1jt. An individual firm does not affect the energy price.
Note that these assumptions only apply to V 1jt, not to other inputs that are used to
produce a goodQjt. With these three assumptions, all the firms in the economy solve the
⁷These assumptions are more plausible than either labor input or material input. Comparing the esti-
mation result based on energy input in section 5 and labor or material input in Appendix C suggests that
energy input is more plausible for these assumptions. Even though these assumptions are violated for en-
ergy input, the main result will not change unless factors that arise from relaxing these assumptions are
strongly cyclical in a particular manner to change the direction of the markup cyclicality.
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s.t. F (V 1jt; :::) = Q
Form Lagrangian function, take derivatives with respect to the energy input, and di-









jt is both a Lagrangian multiplier and the marginal cost of firm j at time t because it
denotes howmuch the cost changes in response to a marginal increase in output quantity.
Define markup jt  Pjtjt . Then the markup is a wedge between the real input price and
the marginal product of input. Multiply V 1jt
Qjt
















 ejt(V 1jt; :::)









The left-hand side of equation (2.1) is the markup, jt, and the right-hand side of equa-
tion (2.1) is the ratio of ejt, which is the output elasticity with respect to the energy input,
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and sejt, which is the energy input share. For the three previously discussed assumptions,
the markup is a simple ratio of the output elasticity with respect to the energy and energy
input share.
In addition to labor input flexibility and the monopsony effect or the marginal wage
schedule, there are three other commonly discussed concerns when measuring markups:
labor overhead, labor hoarding, and variable capital utilization. The overhead component
of energy input is less likely to exist and less likely to be cyclical than labor input. Al-
lowing aggregate time-varying overhead components for all inputs does not change the
main result in this paper. I discuss this issue in Appendix A.2. Allowing labor hoarding
is likely to generate more countercyclical markups in previous studies (Rotemberg and
Woodford 1999), but it is likely to generate more procyclical markups with equation (2.1).
I discuss this change in Appendix A.3. Variable capital utilization is likely to be unrelated
since ejt does not depend on capital input as shown in section 5.1.
Empirical Specification
Since sejt is typically observed in the data, we can recover markups once we estimate ejt.
The estimation requires one additional assumption:
Assumption 4: ejt(V 1jt; :::; V Kjt ; Ajt) = ejt(V 1jt; :::; V Kjt ). The output elasticity with
respect to energy does not depend on productivity.
This assumption implies the lack of firm-specific energy-augmenting technology.
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Note that this assumption is more general than the conventional approach. Consider
two specific cases. First, assume that a researcher only allows labor and capital in the
production function with a value-added measure of output, thus, a separable energy is
implicitly assumed: ln(Qjt) = ln(H1(V 1jt)) + ln(H2(Ajt; :::)). In this case, ejt = @ ln(Qjt)@ ln(V 1jt)
does not depend on Ajt. Second, suppose a researcher assumes Hicks-neutral produc-
tivity as in the Solow-residual method: ln(Qjt) = ln(Ajt) + ln(G(V 1jt; :::)). In this case,
ejt =
@ ln(Qjt)
@ ln(V 1jt) does not depend on Ajt. Assumption 4 allows either a labor-augmenting or
a capital-augmenting technology.
Taking the logs of equation (2.1) with assumption 4, we have:
ln(sejt) = ln(ejt(V 1jt; :::; V Kjt ))  ln(jt) (2.2.2)
The idea of estimating elasticity ln(ejt) is to run a regression with instruments
based on equation (2.2) by specifying a flexible functional form on ln(ejt) and treating
the markup ln(jt) as residual. I assume the following specification on ln(ejt), which
nests a Cobb-Douglas production function assumption with respect to the energy input:
ln(ejt) = 0 +
PK
k=1 k ln(V kjt). This equation is a first-order approximation of output
elasticity, which corresponds to the flexible production function that enables input com-
plementarity among inputs.⁸ Allowing second-order terms on ln(ejt) strengthens the
results in this paper, and I report this specification and result in Appendix D.1. I also dis-
⁸This approximation is very similar to a Translog production function with respect to energy, which







. A first-order approximation specification can be considered a linear-approximation of a
Translog production function.
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cuss two other commonly employed testable specifications in section 2.4 and report the
results in section 5 and 6.
With the first-order approximation on ln(ejt), equation (2.2) becomes the following
equation:
ln(sejt) = 0 +
KX
k=1
k ln(V kjt)  ln(jt) (2.2.3)
Markup Estimation and Identification
From a theoretical point of view, direct estimation of equation (2.3) with ordinary least
sqaures (OLS) regression suffers from the endogeneity problem. Based on equation (2.2),
firms change markups whenever they change inputs if we do not make additional assump-
tions about either the demand system or the market structure. IV regression, however,
can identify elasticity and markup if there are exogenous variations that cause firms to
change their inputs but not change their markups. Although this situation imposes a re-
strictive assumption on firms’ behaviors, I conduct several empirical tests and reveal that
this assumption does not violate many leading models of variable markups. I detail the
restuls in the following paragraphs.
I first double-demean equation (2.3) across entities and across time to eliminate entity-
specific and aggregate components of markups.⁹ This equation addresses the omitted
variable bias that arises from the correlation between entity-specificmarkups or aggregate
time-varying markups and the input usage of firms. By double-demeaning across time t
⁹Double-demeaning works the same as incorporating both time fixed effects and industry fixed effects
in the regression. Double-demeaning also eliminates all overhead inputs that may be fixed across either
entities or time.
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where ….X jt = Xjt   Xt, Xjt = Xjt   Xj for variable X . By running the







ln(V Kjt )] = 0.
However, two problems are identified with double-demeaning regression based on
equation (2.4). First, since the energy input share (sejt) has energy on the numer-







ln(V Kjt )] = 0 is restrictive. This assumption holds for a CES de-
mand with monopolistic competition in a static setting¹⁰, but does not hold without the
CES demand system or in a dynamic setup. Assume a demand elasticity change with
respect to the business cycle in the manner discussed by Stroebel and Vavra, 2016. Sup-
pose that the demand elasticity faced by a firm declines during a boom due to higher
wealth that decreases the search efforts of households.¹¹ The decrease in demand elas-
ticity leads to an increase in a firm’s desired markups. According to equation (2.1), a
cost-minimizing firm must either decrease sejt (energy share) or increase ejt (output elas-
ticity with respect to energy) by choosing different inputs V kjt. This condition violates
¹⁰Consider a monopolist’s profit maximization problem, instead of the cost-minimization problem. Solv-
ing a monopolist’s static profit maximization with respect to V 1jt yields a first-order condition analogous to
equation (2.2): ln(sejt) = ln(ejt) + ln(1   1jt ), where jt is demand elasticity. Note that (1   1jt ) = 1jt
with the monopolistic competition. If we further assume a CES demand system, jt must be constant and….
ln(jt) disappears.
¹¹Note that this situation differ from the standard channel discussed in rigid price models with con-
stant elasticity. In standard rigid price models, markups decrease in booms because of sticky prices and an








ln(V Kjt )] = 0.¹²





ln(W kj;t 2), as instrumental variables. First, this approach
prevents the mechanical correlation discussed in OLS regression.¹³ Second, instruments
solve issues related to the previously discussed demand shock. Consider a demand shock
that shifts demand elasticity, markups, and firms’ input usage. If we assume firms ex-
ogenously consider input prices, demand shock does not change these input prices, and
therefore, input prices generate exogenous variation that is not correlated with demand
shock. If we believe that each firm has monopsony power, demand shock will produce a
change in input prices via a change in input demand. Thus, I employ lagged input prices,
because an idiosyncratic demand shock is unlikely to change the previous year’s input
prices.
More concretely, consider the relevance and the exogeneity condition of instruments.
As illustrated in figure 2.1a, the assumption is that the variation in the previous year’s
double-demeaned input prices is strong enough to affect double-demeaned inputs this
year (relevance), but not to affect double-demeaned markups this year (exogeneity). The









0;8k, and operates by the autocorrelation of input prices, or input price rigidity, as shown
in figure 2.1b. In Appendix B, I demonstrate that the F-statistics from this regression are
greater than 10.
¹²If we assume that firms only change the energy share sejt with respect to a demand shock and do not
change ejt(V 1jt; :::), there is no bias. However, firms likely change inputs such that ejt(V 1jt; :::) change.
¹³Using the contemporaneous input prices,
….
ln(W kj;t), generates a mechanical correlation.
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Figure 2.1: Instrument: Identification
Time: t-1                   Time: t  





(a) Relevance and Exogeneity
Time: t-1                   Time: t  
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑗,𝑡−1 (IV)  
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑗,𝑡 (Endogenous) 
(Relevance) 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑗,𝑡  
(b) Relevance
Time: t-1                   Time: t  
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑗,𝑡−1 (IV)  
𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑗,𝑡 (P-rigidity/Habit/Durability) 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑗,𝑡−1/𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑗,𝑡−1 
(Exogeneity) 
? 
(c) Concern on Exogeneity
Time: t-1                   Time: t  
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑗,𝑡−1 (IV)  
𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑗,𝑡 (P-rigidity/Habit/Durability) 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑗,𝑡−1/𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑗,𝑡−1 
(Exogeneity) 
Control Control 
(d) Control for Exogeneity
Note. (a) shows the relevance and exogeneity conditions of instruments. (b) shows that
the relevance condition works via the autocorrelation of input prices. (c) shows
concerns of the exogeneity condition because of the factors that cause markups to be
persistent. (d) shows how controls address concerns of the exogeneity condition.
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ln(W kj;t 2)] = 0;8k. Intuitively, when a firm is confronted by input
prices that are idiosyncratically higher in the previous year than those of other firms,
I assume that this firm does not set idiosyncratically high markups in the following
year. I acknowledge that there are effects that generate time persistency in markups,
including price rigidity, product durability, and consumer habits that can potentially
violate the exogeneity assumption as shown in figure 2.1c. For example, if an increase in
government spending that differentially affects industries’ markups and input prices is
observed in period t-1, and if markups are persistent over time due to price rigidity, the
exogeneity assumption is violated.
To address this concern, I conduct two analyses. First, I control the double-demeaned
previous year’s output price in my regression because all time-persistent markup chan-
nels operate with lagged output prices, and I discover that coefficients do not change in
response to this control. Intuitively, consider decomposing lagged input prices into two
parts: a related part that is employeed when firms set the output price last year, and an
unrelated part that is not used when firms set the output price last year. By controlling the
lagged output price, I assume only that the unrelated part of the variation in the lagged
input prices is also unrelated to the current markup. In this setup, I allow firms to set
markups based on its last year’s price, its expectation of future economic conditions, and
current economic conditions, but not on the unrelated part of the lagged input prices.
Second, I control for the price rigidity index, product durability index and necessities in-
dex in Bils, Klenow, and Malin, 2013 in my regression and discover that the coefficients
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are robust to these controls. If any of these channels violate the exogeneity assumption,
controlling these indexes must change coefficients. I report this result in Appendix D.2.
In addition to the persistence-markup effect, inventory adjustments and investment
decision can potentially violate the exogeneity assumption.¹⁴ I address these two concerns
by controlling double-demeaned inventories and investment for both last year and this
year and reveal that the coefficients do not change with these controls, as reported in Ap-
pendix D.2. I confirmmy analysis by conducting three additional robustness checks. First,
I discover that Hansen’s J-test cannot reject the validity of these instruments.¹⁵ Second, I
use two- and three-year lagged double-demeaned input prices as instrumental variables,
and the coefficients remain the same with these instruments as reported in Appendix
D.3. The first-state F-statistics are still well above ten, and Hansen’s J-test cannot reject
the validity of instruments. Finally, I estimate ejt separately from the production func-
tion estimation to recover markups as discussed in De Loecker and Warzynski, 2012, and
markups remain unconditionally procyclical, and procyclical or acyclical conditional on
a demand shock.¹⁶ I report this specification and result in Appendix D.4.
¹⁴Markups and inventories are known to be closely related (Bils and Kahn 2000, Kryvtsov and Midri-
gan 2013). For example, assume that input prices are exogeneous to firms and the input price is low in
the previous year but high in the coming year. Forward-looking firms might then have the incentive to
accumulate inventories in the previous year and sell these inventories this year with a low output price,
potentially generating a correlation between last year’s input prices and this year’s markups. For similar
reasons, adjustments in investment may violate the exogeneity assumption.
¹⁵Hansen’s J-test should reject the validity of instruments if one of assumptions 1-6 is violated and the
new term that appears from relaxing the assumption is correlated with the input prices. In Appendix C, I
demonstrate that Hansen’s J-statistics are large when markups are estimated based on the labor or material
input, which implies that assumptions 1-6 are more plausible for energy inputs than for other inputs.
¹⁶Markups are acyclical conditional on various shocks in this method because of a lower variation in
the output elasticity with respect to energy. I assume a restricted Translog production function to recover
ln(ejt) with Hicks-neutral technology. Allowing labor-augmenting technology is crucial for capturing the
strong input complementarity between labor and energy, which is not allowed in this type of production
function estimation technique.
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A discussion of identification with equation (2.4) is useful to understand the variation
in the data that identifies ejt. We need random variation in inputs that affect the share of
energy. If the share of energy increases (decreases) with an exogenous increase (decrease)
in input V kjt, I can interpret this result as an increase (decrease) in energy efficiency (ejt)
due to the increase (decrease) in V kjt under the assumptions 1-3. In this case, energy and
V kjt are complements (substitute) and coefficient k captures this complementarity. The
exogenous variation in inputs are derived from the lagged input prices. With assumptions
1-3 and the double-demeaning technique, I need only to assume that last year’s idiosyn-
cratic input prices are uncorrelated with the idiosyncratic markup this year to identify ejt.
Notice that I do not make any assumption about either the demand system or the market
structure in estimating ejt and markups.





^k ln(V kjt)  ln(sejt) + C (2.2.5)
where C = 0 +
PK
k=2 ^k ln( V k). This estimation technique identifies markups up to
constant.
Two Special Cases
This section discusses two special testable specifications on ln(ejt) as part of my anal-
ysis. The first specification is a constant ejt, or ejt = c where c is an arbitrary con-
stant. This assumption corresponds to the Cobb-Douglas production functional form as-
sumption with respect to the energy input. To be explicit, consider the production func-
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tion ln(Qjt) = c ln(V 1jt) + g(V 2jt; :::; V Kjt ; Ajt) with the arbitrary function g(). Note that
ejt =
@ ln(Qjt)
@ ln(V 1jt) = c. With this assumption, equation (2.2) becomes
ln(sejt) = ln(c)  ln(jt)
One advantage of this assumption is that regression is not required to recovermarkups
up to a constant. We can directly observe a variation in the markups in the data because
sejt is typically observed in the data. This simple assumption is nested in equation (2.3),
and therefore, is testable. I demonstrate that the estimated 0s in equation (2.3) are signif-
icantly different from zero in section 5, rejecting ejt = c.






) . This assumption corresponds to
a CES production functional form assumption with respect to the energy input, which is
a conventional generalization of the Cobb-Douglas production function. Assume that we
have Qjt = (c(V 1jt) + g(V 2jt; :::; V Kjt ; Ajt))
1
 , where g() is an arbitrary function of other








ln(sejt) = ln(c)   ln(Qjt) +  ln(V 1jt)  ln(jt)









Based on this equation, we can perform a regression and estimate ’s with instruments.
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I use three instruments: lagged and double-demeaned input prices for energy, labor (total
payroll) and capital (price of investment). Then I recover markups by subtracting the es-
timated ln(ejt) from ln(sejt). Notice that this regression specification enables a researcher
to test the CES production functional form assumption with respect to energy. If we reject
the hypothesis that the coefficient of energy is equal to the negative coefficient of output,
the data reject the CES production functional form assumption with respect to the energy
input. In section 5, I demonstrate that this specification is strongly rejected by the data.
2.3 Comparison with Previous Literature
This section discusses how the approach in this paper differs from that of other studies
with regards to measuring price-cost markup cyclicality. More specifically, I compare
and contrast this paper’s approach with the input margin method proposed by Bils, 1987
and the Solow-residual approach proposed by Hall, 1986.¹⁷ Both approaches adopt a cost-
minimization framework, to which this paper adds different assumptions and empirical
specifications.
Approach 1
Suppose we have the three assumptions discussed in section 2 regarding input V kjt. Then,
an expression similar to equation (2.1) can be derived from a firm’s cost minimization
condition:
¹⁷As discussed in Nekarda and Ramey, 2013, two other direct approaches and two other indirect ap-
proaches can be employed to access markup cyclicality. Other methods for recovering markups can be
found in the industrial organization and international trade literature. Atkin et al., 2015 discuss three com-






where jt is the markup, kjt is the output elasticity with respect to the input V kjt, and skjt
is the input share for the input V kjt.
The input margin method (Rotemberg and Woodford 1999, Nekarda and Ramey 2013)
uses a labor input or labor hours input instead of energy input as a choice variable of a
firm to derive equation (3.1), that is, V kjt is the labor or labor hours input. This method






where c is an arbitrary constant. The markups can be identified up to a constant by con-
sidering the inverse of the labor share. This method is the method discussed in section
2.4., except that the labor input is employeed instead of the energy input. Bils, Klenow,
and Malin, 2016 adopts this method using a material input as a choice variable, and, the
inverse of the material input share to assess markup cyclicality. I present and discuss the
results based on the inverse of labor input share and the inverse of material input share
in section 5.
This method separately generalizes these assumptions. Assume a CES production









where c is an arbitrary constant. The markup can be recovered by calibrating  from this
expression. This method is similar to that discussed in section 2.4, with the exception that
the labor input instead of energy input was employed, and  was calibrated instead of
estimated.
Instead of making a CES production functional form assumption, assume that there










. Then, the markup can be calibrated by calibrating the labor
overhead component. Similarly, this method does not relax any monopsony power as-
sumption in the labor market, and it allows wages to change with respect to labor input
demand by making a structural assumption about the marginal wage schedule and cali-
brating the corresponding parameters. This method does not relax the labor adjustment
cost assumption by explicitly specifying the adjustment cost.¹⁸
Approach 2
Consider the Solow-residual approach derived from Hall, 1986. This approach uses either
the labor input or the material input as a choice variable and makes the four assumptions
discussed in section 2 to derive equation (3.1). Then, kjt is estimated from the techniques
used in the productivity literature with the control function (Olley and Pakes 1996, Levin-
¹⁸Please refer to Rotemberg andWoodford, 1999 and Nekarda and Ramey, 2013 for a complete treatment
of this approach.
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sohn and Petrin 2003, Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer 2006), and markups are recovered
with the observed input share skjt from equation (3.1) (De Loecker and Warzynski 2012,
De Loecker et al. 2014).¹⁹
The estimation technique used in this paper is similar to the approach discussed in
Gandhi, Navarro, and Rivers, 2013. They also derive equation (2.2) and propose to es-
timate aggregate markups by allowing time fixed effects and performing partial linear
regressions with the flexible functional form on ln(ejt). In this manner, estimated fixed ef-
fects are time-varying aggregate average markups. This method encounters the same two
problems in the OLS regression that I discussed in section 2.3. When I apply this methodol-
ogy, I discover that time fixed effects are not precisely estimated with my database. Many
fixed effects have p-value higher than 0.5 when I test the hypothesis that the coefficient
is equal to zero.
2.4 Data
This paper uses annual six-digit NAICS industry-level data from the NBER-CES Manufac-
turing Industries Database. The industry-level database has two advantages over the ag-
gregate database. First, it enables me to use panel data techniques to estimate markups by
exploiting both cross-sectional variation and time-series variation. Second, once I obtain
time-varying, industry-specific markups, I can assess both unconditional and conditional
¹⁹Some papers, such as Haskel, Martin, and Small, 1995, use this framework to study markup cyclicality.
However, they require stronger assumptions than those used in the recent development of this technique
and in this paper. For example, they assume that a change in productivity is not correlated with a change
in inputs, and assume 1-3 in section 2 for every inputs employed by a firm. De Loecker, 2011 discusses the
limitations of previous studies and their development.
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markup cyclicality using panel data techniques.
This database records detailed information about 473 manufacturing industries from
1958 to 2009. The data are compiled from the Annual Survey of Manufacturers and the
Census ofManufactures. The variables in this database include gross output (value of ship-
ment), value added, and five-factor inputs (production worker, non-production worker,
capital, material, and energy) for each industry over time. These data also records de-
flators for output, material, energy, investment, and wage bills for production workers
and total employees. I present summary statistics in Appendix B.1, and a more detailed
explanation of this database is provided in Bartelsman, Becker, and Gray, 2000. I supple-
ment this database with gross domestic product (GDP) data from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis.²⁰
2.5 Estimation Result
In this section, I present the estimation result based on the approach taken in section 2.
First, I present the estimate of ln(ejt) based on equation (2.4) and discuss how instruments
fix the potential bias in the OLS regression. Then I present the estimate of ln(ejt) with
a CES production functional form assumption with respect to energy and demonstrate
²⁰A firm-level database may be necessary to estimate markups. One advantage of a firm-level database is
that a researcher permit a more flexible functional form on output elasticity with respect to energy because
of greater variation in the data. However, the use of a firm-level database is not a panacea. A typical
firm-level database, including a confidential U.S. Census database, does not contain output prices and input
prices at the firm-level, thus preventing the adaptation of this paper’s methodology and generating the
famous output price and input price bias that potentially changes the direction of markup cyclicality when
the Solow-residual method is employed (Gorodnichenko 2012, De Loecker and Goldberg 2014). A typical
firm-level database experiences external validity concerns because of its narrow industry and short time
period coverage; thus, it may not be adequate for studying the cyclical pattern of markups over a business
cycle.
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how the data rejects this specification. Second, I show the distribution of markups across
industry and time. I find that previous markup measures based on the inverse of input
share underestimate the dispersion of markups across time and industry.
Elasticity Estimation
Table 2.1 presents the estimated ln(ejt) based on equation (2.4). Based on column (1), I
discover that energy input follows the law of diminishing returns and that most other
inputs, especially production workers, are complements to energy. First, the coefficient
in front of energy–1–is negative. This finding indicates that energy input becomes less
efficient as a firm uses more energy, result that is attributed to the law of diminishing
returns to energy.²¹ Second, coefficients in front of other inputs, with the exception of
non-production workers, are positive, implying that energy becomes more efficient as a
firm uses additional inputs. This finding indicates that these inputs are complements to
energy. In particular, the coefficient in front of production workers is economically and
statistically significant, which implies that it is a strong complement to energy input.²² A
non-production worker is a substitute since its coefficient is negative; however, the result
is not very statistically significant with the t-statistics of 1.73. I use the results in column
(1) to recover the markups.
I find that the OLS regression results are the polar opposite of the IV regression result.
The coefficient of the energy input is positive, and the coefficients of the other inputs
²¹Note that this finding differ from the conventional law of diminishing returns with the Cobb-Douglas
production function. The Cobb-Douglas production function produces a constant ejt, whereas a more gen-
eral production function, such as the Translog production function, yields ejt, which depends on inputs.
²²If I only allow a labor input instead of both a production worker and a non-production worker, the
labor input is a strong complement to energy input.
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Table 2.1: Elasticity (ejt) estimation based on equation (2.4)







energy  0:4??  0:56??  0:4?? 0:85??? 0:85???
(0.16) (0.23) (0.16) (0.03) (0.03)
material 0:32?? 0:17 0:29?  0:42???  0:41???
(- energy) (0.15) (0.22) (0.16) (0.03) (0.03)
labor (p) 1:41??? 1:69??? 1:33???  0:33???  0:33???
(0.31) (0.45) (0.29) (0.03) (0.03)
labor (np)  0:45?  0:59? -0.39  0:12???  0:12???





obs 23,220 23,220 23,220 24,166 24,166
J-test 6.76 6.04 8.73
(p-value) (0.34) (0.3) (0.19)









Columns (1), (2) and (3) show the regression result with instrumental variables, and
columns (4) and (5) show the OLS results. Five inputs are employed in this regression:
energy, material that exclude energy, non-production worker, production worker, and
capital. All the inputs and lagged input prices are logged and then double-demeaned
across industries and time. The standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the
NAICS industry code. The J-test refers to Hansen’s J-statistics for the overidentifying
restriction. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.1 level, 0.05 level, and 0.01 level,
respectively.
are negative in column (4). This difference arises because of the two problems in the
OLS regression discussed in section 2.3. First, a mechanical correlation with the energy
input appears on both the left-hand side and the right-hand side of equation (2.4). This
correlation yields a positive estimated coefficient of energy input. Second, the coefficients
are likely to be biased because of the demand shock discussed in section 2.3. The direction




V ar(ln( ~V kjt))
. The direction of bias is dependent on the correlation of the markup
and the input for each coefficient. The correlation can be assessed with the first order
condition  = F1(V 1jt;:::)
(W 1jt/Pjt)
. Under the law of diminishing returns, a firm must decrease its
energy input to increase the marginal product of the energy (F1(V 1jt; :::)) and the markups.
This situation causes upward bias in the coefficient of energy input. Similarly, a firmmust
increase the complements of energy and decrease the substitutes of energy to increase
efficiency (F1(V 1jt; :::)) and themarkups, which causes a downward bias for the coefficients
of complements and an upward bias for the coefficients of substitutes, as shown in table
2.1.
Controlling the lagged output price does not change the results, as shown in column
(3). More specifically, the coefficient in front of the lagged output price is negligible and
not statistically significant, which implies that the persistence in markups is unlikely to
cause inconsistency in my estimates.²³ I present Hansen’s J-statistics to test the exogene-
ity condition of the instruments for regressions (1), (2), and (3); the p-values exceeds 0.1.
Although columns (2) and (5) include capital in the regression, the estimated coefficient
of capital is neither economically nor statistically significant. This situation only makes
other coefficients less statistically significant, which implies that capital and energy are
neither substitutes nor complements holding all other inputs constant. Note that all co-
efficients are statistically significant, with the exception of the capital input coefficient.
This result implies that we reject constant ejt, or a Cobb-Douglas production functional
form assumption with respect to energy.
²³I treat the lagged output price as the control variables in my regression. Instrumenting the lagged
output price with lagged input prices does not change the result.
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The alternative production function discussed in section 2.4 is a CES production func-
tion. Table 2.2 presents the estimate of ln(ejt) with a CES production functional form
assumption based on equation (2.6). Based on column (1), I conclude that the data re-
jects a CES production functional form assumption with respect to energy. If the CES
production functional form assumption holds, the coefficient of energy must be equal to
the negative coefficient of the output. I strongly reject this hypothesis with the small
p-value, 0.0052 and 2 = 7:82. This finding implies that the CES production functional
form assumption with respect to energy input suffers from a misspecification problem. If
I restrict the coefficient of energy to be equal to the negative coefficient of output in the
estimation, the energy and output can be substituted with  = 0.23 as shown in column
(3).²⁴ This result is misleading and contradicts the result in table 2.1. Note that I also re-
ject both the Leontief function and the linear production functions with respect to energy
since a CES production function nests these production functions as a special (or limiting)
case.
Column (2) reports the OLS result, which suffer from both mechanical correlation and
omitted variable bias as discussed in relation to the first-order polynomial specification
for ln(ejt). I also refer to Hansen’s J-statistics to test the exogeneity condition of the
instruments and ensure a p-value greater than 0.1.²⁵
I use my benchmark result to estimate ln(jt), which is column (1) of table 2.1. I
recover markups by subtracting ln(sejt) from\ln(ejt), as shown in equation (2.5). Because
²⁴ should be equal to one for a linear production function, and  should approach negative infinity for
a Leontief production function.
²⁵In Appendix B, I present the first-stage F-statistics for the regression based on equations (2.4) and (2.6);
all statistics exceed 10 for all inputs. This result holds if I regress each input using only one input’s price.
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Table 2.2: Elasticity (ejt) estimation based on equation (2.6)
(1) (2) (3) (4)….
ln(sejt)
Unconstrained (e 6=  q) Constrained (e =  q)





energy 0:06 0:58 0:23??? 0:50???
(0.12) (0.05) (0.01) (0.07)
output  0:37???  0:45???  0:23???  0:50???
(0.1) (0.07) (0.01) (0.07)
obs 23,694 24,167 23,694 24,167
J-test 0.1
(p-value) (0.75)







ln(jt). Columns (1) and (2) present the results based
on unconstrained regression, and columns (3) and (4) present the results based on
constrained regression, such that the coefficient of the energy input is equal to the
negative coefficient of the output. Columns (1) and (3) show the regression results with
instrumental variables, and columns (2) and (4) show the OLS results. The output,
energy and corresponding lagged input prices are logged and double-demeaned across
industries and time. The energy price deflator, total payroll, and price of investment are
used to instrument the endogenous variables. The standard errors in parentheses are
clustered on the NAICS industry code. The J-test refers to Hansen’s J-statistics for
overidentifying restriction. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.1 level, 0.05 level,
and 0.01 level, respectively.
I double-demean the variables to estimate the coefficients, markups are identified up to a
constant.
Markups
I find greater variation in markups across time and industries than is evident in previously
known markup measures. A distribution of estimated markups and other conventional
measures of markups across time and industries are presented in table 2.3. Column (1) is
based on the estimated markups, and other columns are based on the inverse of the input
100
shares.²⁶
Table 2.3: Markup distribution across time and industries
(1) (2) NR (2013) (3) BKM (2014) (4)
\ln(t)   ln(slt)   ln(smt )   ln(set )
ln(jt) 1st order poly constant constant constant
V 1jt energy labor material energy
markup distribution across time (averaged across industry)
min -0.71 -0.40 -0.04 -0.24
p10 -0.42 -0.30 -0.03 -0.21
p50 -0.04 -0.02 -0.00 0.00
p90 0.49 0.28 0.03 0.20
max 0.58 0.34 0.05 0.30
mean 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
sd 0.34 0.21 0.02 0.16
p75-p25 0.58 0.35 0.03 0.31
obs 52 52 52 52
markup distribution across industry (averaged across time)
min -5.54 -2.79 -0.58 -1.05
p10 -1.86 -1.08 -0.28 -0.49
p50 0.16 0.18 -0.00 -0.11
p90 1.74 0.77 0.30 0.58
max 3.37 1.43 0.80 2.21
mean 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00
sd 1.45 0.74 0.23 0.47
p75-p25 1.59 0.85 0.30 0.53
obs 473 473 473 473
Note. Markups are averaged across industries to construct the aggregate time-varying
markups and averaged across time to construct industry-specific markups. Column (1)
shows the results based on the markup measures in this paper. Column (2) shows the
results based on the labor share in Nekarda and Ramey, 2013, column (3) shows the
results based on the material share, as discussed in Bils, Klenow, and Malin, 2016, and
column (4) shows the results based on the energy share. Since markups are only
identified up to a constant, all markup measures are centered at 0 to facilitate the
comparison.
The dispersion in estimated markups across time is greater than the inverse of any
²⁶As shown in equation (3.2), the inverse of the input share is equal to the markups up to the constant
based on the assumptions discussed in section 2 and 3.
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input shares. The standard error is 0.34 with the estimated markups, and the standard
error is 0.16 for the inverse of energy share. The 75-25 ratio is 0.58 for markups and 0.35
for the inverse of the labor shares. The inverse of the material share seems to have the
minimum variation across time. Its standard error is only 0.02, and the 75-25 ratio is only
0.03. Similarly, a dispersion in the estimated markups across industries is greater than the
inverse of any input share, and the inverse of the material share has a minimum variation
across industries.
2.6 Markup Cyclicality
In this section, I present the results for markup cyclicality. I first assess unconditional
markup cyclicality with a graph and regression analysis. Then I show howmarkups move
with respect to demand shocks, product entry and exit, financial shock and price rigidity
using a panel data technique.
Unconditional Markup Cyclicality
To assess markup cyclicality, I take the simple average of ln(jt) across industries, linearly
detrend the measures, and plot the linear-detrended ln(GDPt) in figure 2.2.²⁷ Figure 2.2
shows a strong procyclical pattern of markups. This procyclicality is driven by either
the procyclicality of   ln(sejt) or the procyclicality of ln(ejt). I plot the linear-detrended
simple averages of   ln(sejt) to decompose the cyclical pattern of the markups and dis-
²⁷The same pattern is illustratedwhen using either Hodrick-Prescott filter or the Baxter-King filter. Refer
to Appendix D.5 for the results based on different filters.
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ln(GDP), ln(Markup) & -ln(energy share)
Note. The Y-axis represents the deviation from the linear trend, and the x-axis represents
the years from 1958 to 2009. The estimated markups, ln(jt), are constructed by
assuming a first-order polynomial specification for ln(ejt). The estimated markups and
  ln(sejt) are averaged across industries within each time period, and detrended from the
linear trend. Both measures are then divided by 5 the resulting value with the detrended
GDP on the graph. The GDP database is supplemented by the Bureau of Economic
Analysis.
cover that   ln(sejt) is weakly procyclical. This result implies that the variation in ln(ejt)
explains the procyclicality of the markups.
The procyclicality of ln(ejt) is driven by a strong input complementarity as shown
in section 5.1. ln(ejt) positively depends on the production worker and material and
negatively depends on the energy and non-production worker. Given that all inputs are
procyclical, the procyclicality of ln(ejt) must be driven by the procyclicality of the com-
plementary inputs, particularly because there is a production worker that is a strong com-
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plement to the energy input. This result suggests that the use of a flexible production
functional form that allows input complementarity is extremely important in assessing
markup cyclicality.
To bemore concrete, I conduct the regression analysis based on industry-specific, time-
varying markups and the value of the shipment measure in the NBER-CES database. I
allow both time and industry fixed effects to precisely identify the cyclical pattern. Con-
sider the following regression.
 ln(jt) = j + t + 1 ln(vshipjt) + jt (2.6.1)
\ln(jt) is the estimated log of markups, ln(vshipjt) is the log of value of shipment, and 
is the fixed effect.²⁸ Table 2.4 lists the results based on equation (6.1).
Three main observations are evident in table 2.4. First, markups are strongly procycli-
cal as shown in column 1. An increase of 1 % of the value of shipment is correlated with
an increase in 1.18 % of the markup. Second, all other measures of markups exhibit a
procyclical pattern, with the exception of the material share.²⁹ An increase of 1% of the
value of shipment is correlated with an increase in 0.50 % of the markup with the energy
share, an increase of 0.39 % of the markup with the labor share, and an increase of 0.41
²⁸Note that this specification enables markups to be identified up to not only the constant, but also
time varying or industry-specific parameters to assess markup cyclicality. For example, allowing the time-
varying or industry-specific overhead components of inputs, wich the exception of the energy input, will
identify markups up to time-varying or industry-specific parameters. However, this situation will not
change the results because these values will be absorbed in the fixed effects.
²⁹The direction of cyclicality does not change despite the use of a more flexible production functional
form than the Cobb-Douglas production function when a labor input or material input is used to construct
the markups. In Appendix C, I measure markups and assess its cyclicality based on both labor and material
with flexible production functions.
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Table 2.4: Unconditional Markup Cyclicality
(1) (2) NR (2013) (3) BKM (2014) (4) (5)
\ln(jt)   ln(sljt)   ln(smjt)  ln(sejt) \ln(CESjt )
ln(jt) 1st order poly constant constant constant CES
V 1jt energy labor material energy energy
 ln(vshipjt) 1:18 0:39  0:01 0:50 0:41
[1.12, 1.24] [0.37, 0.42] [-0.03, 0.01] [0.47, 0.54] [0.38, 0.44]
industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 .3632 .4033 .0570 .2310 .2699
obs 23,693 23,694 23,694 23,694 23,694
;y 0:52 0:58  0:07 0:32 0:31
[0.49, 0.55] [0.56, 0.61] [-0.1, -0.04] [0.29, 0.35] [0.28, 0.34]
Note. The regression results based on equation (6.1):
 ln(jt) = j + t + 1 ln(vshipjt) + jt. Column (1) shows the regression results
based on estimated markups. Column (2) shows the results based on inverse labor share
as discussed in Nekarda and Ramey, 2013. Column (3) shows the results based on
inverse material share, as discussed in Bils, Klenow, and Malin, 2016. Column (4) shows
the results based on inverse energy share and column (5) shows the result based on
estimated markup by assuming a CES production function. The markups for the CES
production function are estimated using constrained regression and double-demeaning
techniques with lagged double-demeaned input prices as instruments. Ninety-five
percent confidence intervals are constructed with the standard errors that are cluster
bootstrapped based on industry with 5000 repetitions.
;y = Corr( ln(jt); ln(vshipjt)) is reported separately. Column (1) lacks one
observation found in other columns since one observation has 0 non-production worker
in the data.
% of the markup with the CES production functional form specification. Although the
markup measure based on the material share is negative, it is not economically signifi-
cant. In addition, the 95% confidence interval of the regression coefficient based on the
material share includes zero, which suggests the difficulty in concluding that the markups
are countercyclical even based on the material share. The material input is likely to suf-
fer from a monopsony effect and a heterogeneous input quality issue that can change
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the direction of the markup cyclicality.³⁰ Third, although procyclical, a conventional CES
production functional form specification produces more countercyclical markups than
do other specifications. However, this specification is strongly rejected in the data. The
markup cyclicality results based on a correlation of  ln(jt) and  ln(vshipjt) are con-
sistent with the results of the regression analysis.
Based on both the figure and table, I conclude that markups are unconditionally pro-
cyclical.³¹
Conditional Markup Cyclicality
In this section, I present how markups change with respect to demand shocks, product
entry and exit, financial shock and price rigidity. I utilize estimated industry-specific,
time-varying markups and a difference-in-difference technique to exploit both the cross-
sectional variation and the time-series variation. The construction of shocks is substan-
tially dependent on the previous literature.
The regression specification is expressed as:
\ln(jt) = j + t + (Zt Xj) + jt (2.6.2)
whereXj presents seven industry-specific variables: Xj = fj ,Xdurj ,Xengelj ,Xpfreqj ,Xfinj ,
Xentryj ,Xentryj g. j measures industry-specific sensitivity to government spending, which
³⁰In Appendix C.4, I discuss why the inverse of the material share is more countercyclical than other
measures.
³¹Using different weights for industries in the regression analysis does not change the result. I used two
different weights, the share of the value of shipment and the share of value added, for a robustness check
and present the results in Appendix D.6.
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is obtained from Nekarda and Ramey, 2011.³² Xdurj denotes the durability index, Xengelj
represents the slope of the Engel curve or luxuriousness index, and Xpfreqj denotes the
price frequency. All three measures are obtained from Bils, Klenow, and Malin, 2013.
Xfinj is a Rajan and Zingales, 1998 four-digit NAICS financial constrained index.³³ Xentryj
represetns the product entry rate, andXexitj denotes the product exit rate; both measures
are obtained from Bernard, Redding, and Schott, 2010.³⁴ Zt represents two different time-
specific aggregate variables: Zt = fln(GDPt); ln(Gt)g. ln(GDPt) is the log of GDP.
ln(Gt) represents government defense spending.³⁵ \ln(jt) is the estimated change in
the log of markups and  denotes the fixed effect.
I assess all conditional markup cyclicality with this regression. First, markup cycli-
cality conditional on demand change is assessed with ln(Gt)  j , Xdurj  ln(GDPt) and
Xengelj  ln(GDPt) as noted in Nekarda and Ramey, 2013 and Bils, Klenow, and Malin,
2013. With ln(Gt)  j ,  indicates the extent to which the markup of a government-
spending-sensitive industry increase compared to the markup of a government-spending-
insensitive industry when government demand increases. Government defense spending
has been argued to vary for political reasons instead of economic reasons (Barro 1981,
Nekarda and Ramey 2011). With Xdurj  ln(GDPt) and Xengelj  ln(GDPt),  indicates
³²j is constructed by taking the average of the value of shipment to government across time for each
four-digit NAICs industry. Using the initial value of shipments to government for j does not change the
result.
³³This measure is constructed using Compustat database by constructing a financial dependence index




. i denotes the firm, j denotes
the industry, and t denotes the time. Then I take the median of Financial Dependenceij within four-digit
NAICs to construct Xfinj .
³⁴The product entry (exit) rate is defined by the number of firms that add (drop) the product between
census years divided by the average number of firms that produce the product in both years.
³⁵The results in this paper do not change when entire government spending is used instead of defense
spending.
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the extent to which a demand-sensitive industry’s markup increases compared to that of
a demand-insensitive industry during expansion. According to Bils, Klenow, and Malin,
2013, a durability index is a strong predictor of demand shock. A consumer must increase
N% expenditure to increase 1% stock on a product that lasts N years. Thus, his or her
consumption of a durable product must be more sensitive to the business cycle.³⁶ Simi-
larly,Xengelj captures relative demand sensitivity because luxury goods are more likely to
be sensitive to a demand shock. In this setup, I interpret  > 0 as procyclical markups
conditional on demand change.
Table 2.5 presents the results. The regression results support the notion that markups
are procyclical with respect to demand shocks and product exit, and countercyclical with
respect to financial shock and price rigidity. Ninety-five precent confidence intervals do
not include zero, which suggests that these results are statistically significant. For prod-
uct entry, the coefficient is negative but not statistically significant. These results confirm
the predictions of models with firm entry and exit (Jaimovich and Floetotto 2008, Bilbiie,
Ghironi, and Melitz 2012), financial friction (Chevalier and Scharfstein 1996, Gilchrist et
al. 2017), and price rigidity but contraddict models with countercyclical desired markups
conditional on a demand shock.³⁷ This finding is consistent with the findings of Nekarda
and Ramey, 2013, who discover that markups are either procyclical or acyclical with re-
spect to demand shock, but it is inconsistent with the findings of Bils, Klenow, and Malin,
³⁶For a detailed argument, please refer to Bils and Klenow, 1998 and Bils, Klenow, and Malin, 2013.
³⁷The markup cyclicality results conditional on financial friction should be interpreted with caution.
The price-cost markups measured in this analysis can be interpreted as financial friction for the model
with financial friction, instead of the difference between output price and marginal cost. In this case, the
interpretation is that external financially dependent sectors experience an increase in inefficiency relative
to their counterparts when financing production during a recession. This interpretation is intuitive.
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Table 2.5: Conditional Markup Cyclicality
\ln(jt)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
 ln(Gt)  j 3:76
[1.12, 6.40]
 ln(GDPt) Xdurj 1:17
[0.99, 1.35]




industry FE Yes Yes Yes No
year FE Yes Yes Yes No
R2 .1408 .1400 .1346 .0682
obs 14,832 18,569 18,569 23,693
(5) (6) (7) (8)
 ln(GDPt) Xentryj  0:12
[-0.57, 0.33]
 ln(GDPt) Xexitj 0:52
[0.07, 0.97]
 ln(GDPt) Xfinj  0:27
[-0.50, -0.03]




industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 .1310 .1363 .1303 .3632
obs 23,673 23,693 18,569 23,693
Note. Regression results based on equation (6.3): \ln(jt) = j +t+(Zt Xj)+ jt.
Each column uses a different Zt Xj to assess conditional markup cyclicality. Column
(4) reports the total relationship between GDP and average markups, and column (8)
assesses the unconditional markup cyclicality. Ninety-five percent confidence intervals
are constructed with the standard errors that are cluster bootstrapped based on the
NAICS industry code with 5000 repetitions.
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2013, who suggest that markups are countercyclical with respect to demand shocks. These
works employ a similar identification strategy but construct markups based on the inverse
of the labor share.
2.7 Implications
Input Complementarity vs. Markup Countercyclicality
One striking implication of the result in this paper is that strong input complementar-
ity can explain both procyclical (or acyclical) wages and countercyclical unemployment
conditional on demand change without incorporating markup countercyclicality. Input
complementarity explains why markups are procyclical. Figure 2.3 shows how both tradi-
tional countercyclical markup and input complementarity explain the increase in wages
and labor when firms experience a positive demand shock.
Figure 2.3a shows the labor market in perfect competition. Since the production func-
tion only depend on labor, capital, and productivity, the marginal product of labor de-
pends only on labor, capital and productivity. When firms experience a positive demand
shock, they can only adjust the labor input, since the capital input is a predetermined
variable and productivity is not correlated with a positive demand shock. They cannot
shift the labor demand schedule; however, the labor supply schedule must shift to the
right to increase employment.³⁸ This effect causes a decrease in wages and an increase in
labor input because of a positive demand shock, which cannot be reconciled with empiri-
³⁸The labor supply shifts to the right with respect to demand shock for various reasons (Rotemberg and
Woodford 1991). For example, the labor supply can shift to the right because of an increase in the marginal
utility of wealth resulting from an increase in government spending.
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Note. The Y-axis is real wage and the x-axis is labor. The figures show how the labor
market reacts to a positive demand shock (a) with perfect competition, (b) with markup
countercyclicality, and (c) with input complementarity.
cal evidence.³⁹ Markup countercyclicality has been proposed to reconcile this seemingly
contradictory prediction, as shown in figure 2.3b. In models with nominal price rigidity,
markups decrease when firms face positive demand shock because of rigid prices and in-
creases in marginal costs. The decrease in markups enables the labor demand schedule
to shift to the right, which causes both an increase in labor and an increase in wages (or
³⁹Real wage procyclicality with respect to a demand change is consistent with Rotemberg andWoodford,
1991; Rotemberg and Woodford, 1992. Although there is some evidence of weakly countercyclical real
wages conditional on government spending (Nekarda and Ramey 2011), I am not aware of any paper that
reveals strong countercyclical real wages conditional on demand change predicted by conventional models
with a perfectly competitive market
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constant wages) at the equilibrium.
Input complementarity, however, can also shift the labor demand schedule when firms
experience a positive demand shock as shown in figure 2.3c. If we allow inputs, such as
energy and material, in the production function, then the marginal product of labor de-
pends not only on labor, capital, and productivity but also on energy and material. When
flexible inputs are complementary to the labor input, the increase in these inputs due to
positive demand shock must shift the labor demand schedule to the right, similar to coun-
tercyclical markups. Given a strong complementarity of energy and a production worker,
as shown in section 5, and that markups are procyclical with respect to a demand shock, as
shown in section 6, input complementarity is a better explanation for countercyclical un-
employment and procyclical (or acyclical) wages than countercyclical markups. Note that
if input complementarity is sufficiently strong, we can not only allow procyclical markups
but also explain procyclical (or acyclical) wages and countercyclical unemployment.
To determine how markup cyclicality is driven by input complementarity and other













If we assume that Qjt
V kjt
is acyclical⁴⁰, and kjt is a constant by assuming the Cobb-Douglas
production function, the only factor for markup cyclicality is the relative strength of
rigidity in the output and input prices. A standard price rigidity model predicts that
markups are countercyclical with respect to a demand shock because of output price rigid-




ity. Studies that reveal markup procyclicality or acyclicality emphasize either wage rigid-
ity (Nekarda and Ramey 2013) or a desired markup effect that causes a change in output
price (Stroebel and Vavra 2016) to justify their analysis.
In addition to output and input price rigidity, I allow a flexible functional form on kjt
and let it vary across time. As shown in section 5, this estimated kjt explains a large part of
the variation in the procyclical pattern of markups, suggesting that markup cyclicality is
driven by input complementarity, rather than nominal rigidity. Note that this result may
not contradict the empirical evidence for price rigidity (Bils and Klenow 2004, Nakamura
and Steinsson 2008). Output price can be sticky with procyclical markups because of
countercyclical marginal costs that arise from input complementarity.
Returns to Scale Procyclicality
The estimated markups and their cyclicality indicate strongly procyclical returns to scale
in United States production. Procyclical markups imply countercyclical real marginal cost
by definition ( = P
MC
). In other words, the real marginal cost decreases with output; this
movement in real marginal cost should indicate on returns to scale.⁴¹
Formally, returns to scale is defined as follows:
(V 1jt; :::; V
K
jt ) 



















⁴¹For example, with auxiliary assumptions, the constant marginal cost with a positive fixed cost causes
increasing returns to scale, and the increasing marginal cost with one input and zero fixed cost causes
decreasing returns to scale.
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where (V 1jt; :::; V Kjt ) represents the percentage increase in output from a one percent
increase in all inputs. For the conventional Cobb-Douglas production function, jt is
constant. If we assume ln(Qjt) = ln(Ajt) +  ln(Ljt) +  ln(Kjt), we have  =  + .
In this case,  > 1 refers to increasing returns to scale,  = 1 refers to constant returns
to scale, and  < 1 refers to decreasing returns to scale. Once we allow a more flexible
production function such as the Translog production function, jt is not constant but
depends on inputs. Consider a restricted version of the Translog production function that
allows input complementarity: ln(Qjt) = ln(Ajt) +  ln(Ljt) +  ln(Kjt) +  [ln(Ljt) 
ln(Kjt)]. The only difference between this function and the Cobb-Douglas production
function is an interaction term. In this case, jt = (ljt; kjt) = +  + [ljt+ kjt]. Since
jt depends on inputs, it varies across time and industries.
The insight provided by Hall, 1990 and Basu and Fernald, 1997 allows markups to
indicate returns to scale parameter. Consider that we make three assumptions for every
input, as listed in section 5. Then, equation (2.1) holds for every input: kjt = jt(skjt); 8k.












jt is observed in
the data and ln(jt) is estimated up to a constant, I can assess the cyclicality of jt with
the specification in equation (6.1).⁴² Table 2.6 presents the regression result based on
\ln(jt) = j + t + 1 ln(vshipjt) + jt.
Column (1) presents the regression results based on jt recovered from markups esti-
mated in section 5. The coefficient is positive and economically and statistically signifi-
cant, implying that returns to scale are strongly procyclical. Other measures of markups
⁴²I can only assess cyclicality jt and cannot recover the jt parameters because markups are only
identified up to a constant.
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Table 2.6: Returns to Scale Cyclicality
(1) (2) NR (2013) (3) BKM (2014) (4) (5)
\ln(jt)
ln(jt) 1st order poly constant constant constant CES
V 1jt energy labor material energy energy
 ln(vshipjt) 1:08 0:29  0:11 0:40 0:31
[1.01, 1.14] [0.26, 0.31] [-0.13, -0.10] [0.36, 0.43] [0.28, 0.33]
industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 .3238 .3157 .1629 .1813 .2021
obs 23,693 23,694 23,694 23,694 23,694
;y 0:49 0:49  0:35 0:26 0:24
[0.46, 0.51] [0.47, 0.52] [-0.38, -0.32] [0.24, 0.29] [0.22, 0.27]
Note. The regression results based on the following equation:
\ln(jt) = j + t + 1 ln(vshipjt) + jt. Column (1) shows the regression result
based on jt constructed from estimated markups. Column (2) recovers jt by assuming
that markups are equal to inverse labor shares, as discussed in Nekarda and Ramey, 2013.
Column (3) recovers jt by assuming that markups are equal to inverse material share,
as discussed in Bils, Klenow, and Malin, 2016. Column (4) shows the results based on
markups equal to the inverse energy shares assumption and column (5) shows the result
based on estimated markup with a CES production function assumption. Markups based
on the CES production function are estimated using constrained regression and
double-demeaning techniques with lagged double-demeaned input prices as
instruments. Ninety-five percent confidence intervals are constructed with standard
errors that are cluster bootstrapped based on industry with 5000 repetitions.
;y = Corr(\ln(jt); ln(vshipjt)) is separately reported.
underestimate the procyclicality of returns to scale.⁴³
Procyclical returns to scale offer a novel explanation of procyclical productivity in
addition to conventional explanations, such as exogenous productivity change, increas-
ing returns to scale, resource reallocation and cyclical factor utilization. A restrictive
production function that does not allow flexible substitution across inputs, such as the
Cobb-Douglas production function, cannot capture the cyclicality of returns to scale in
⁴³Because a CES production function has constant returns to scale, it must not vary across time. Procycli-
cality is likely to be derived from the inconsistent estimation because of the misspecification of a production
function.
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explaining procyclical productivity. Factor utilization is known as the most important
driving force of procyclical productivity (Basu 1996); however, this result will be over-
stated if a flexible production function is not incorporated.
This result has the striking implication that an economy behaves as if it has increas-
ing returns to scale even though it has constant returns to scale on average. Using the
constant  assumption with the Cobb-Douglas production function, some studies find a
constant returns to scale in the U.S. economy (Basu and Fernald 1997) and others find
increasing returns to scale (Hall 1990, Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen 1988). Assume
that the economy has constant returns to scale on average with procyclical jt. Then,
when firms employ additional inputs during an expansion, they can produce additional
outputs because of increasing returns to scale. In a recession, when firms employ a small
amount of inputs, they can only produce an even smaller outputs due to the decreasing
returns to scale. This finding is consistent with the assumption of increasing returns to
scale in the study of business cycles.
2.8 Conclusion
In this paper, I find that markups are procyclical using a new method that does not rely
on a CES production functional form assumption. I examine a first order condition for
an energy input to avoid assumptions and calibrations for the overhead components, ad-
justment cost, monopsony power, and input quality with labor inputs. I apply panel data
techniques to recover time-varying, industry-specific markups with a flexible production
function. Finally, I find that markups are procyclical unconditionally, procyclical with
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respect to demand shock and product exit, and countercyclial with respect to financial
shock and price rigidity.
This result has the novel implication that input complementarity can explain both
procyclical (or acyclical) wages and countercyclical unemployment without relying on
countercyclical markups. The findings also indicate that returns to scale are strongly pro-
cyclical, rather than invariant across time. These results do not necessarily contradict the
evidence on price rigidity, but instead suggest the need to reevaluate business cycle mod-
els that generate countercyclical markups with a restrictive production function. Models
that incorporate markup procyclicality with a flexible production functional form are bet-
ter at explaining both the facts of the business cycle and how monetary and fiscal policy
affect the real economy.
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Chapter 3
Business Cycles with Input Complementarity
3.1 Introduction
Standard business cycle models make strong a priori structural assumptions about the
supply side or the shape of the production function. The most widely used production
function in macroeconomics models is the Cobb-Douglas production function. Despite its
convenient tractable features, this production function imposes an excessively restrictive
structure on how firms substitute their inputs (elasticity of substitution), the productivity
of each input (marginal product of input) and the productivity of all inputs together (re-
turns to scale). This production function was often justified with the Kaldor, 1957 growth
facts, but the recent decline of the labor share (Karabarbounis and Neiman 2014) calls
this justification into question. Many researchers acknowledge this limitation and have
started to adopt a more general Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) production func-
tion, but even this production function has important limiting properties: one single con-
stant parameter governs the elasticity of substitution among inputs and returns to scale
are assumed to be constant and fixed over time.
We first empirically assess the plausibility of these restrictions by imposing a flexi-
ble Translog production function (Christensen, Jorgensen, and Lau, 1973; Christensen,
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Jorgensen, and Lau, 1975). Compared to a CES, this function is another generalization
of a Cobb-Douglas production function but allows more flexibility in input substitution,
the marginal product of input, and returns to scale. The most important drawback of
this production function is that there are too many parameters to estimate despite lim-
ited variation in the data, precisely due to its flexible structure.¹ Instead of estimating all
parameters in the production function, we utilize the first-order condition of firms for a
particular input to estimate part of the production function to avoid this problem. We
choose energy input to mitigate concerns related to the estimation and use panel data
techniques with detailed industry-level data to recover the efficiency of energy that de-
pends on other inputs.
Although we do not find any violation of a CES production function regarding con-
ventional inputs like labor and capital, we do find a complementarity between energy
and labor that leads to procyclical time-varying returns to scale, which goes beyond con-
ventional production functions. The idea of time-varying returns to scale sounds striking
yet simple. It reflects the idea that in boom periods, when firms employ more differ-
ent inputs than in recessions, there are synergies among these inputs that lead to larger
returns to scale than in recessions. A flexible Translog production function allows this
complementarity-induced change in returns to scale, especially between labor and energy,
as we identified in our framework. Note that the complementarity we found is very dif-
ferent from what is in the Leontief production function, which restricts returns to scale
to be constant and invariant.
¹It is also difficult to calibrate parameters given that there is no previous work that integrates a Translog
production function into the business cycle model.
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To integrate our empirical analysis into the business cyclemodel, we propose a normal-
ized Translog production function that reflects the complementarity-induced procyclical
returns to scale we find in the data while being compatible with the balanced growth
path. To capture the essence of the empirical analysis in the model, we only allow one
parameter more than in the conventional Cobb-Douglas production function. This single
parameter, which is mapped from our empirical analysis, governs the degree of comple-
mentarity between energy and labor and returns to scale cyclicality. To avoid making
firms choose their own returns to scale, we introduce these factors as externalities for
individual firms’ optimization conditions, similar to what has been done in the previous
literature that assumes increasing returns to scale.²
Armed with our new production function, we find that a simple business cycle model
that relies on neither nominal rigidity nor countercyclical markup can generate strikingly
consistent aggregate variable dynamics caused by demand shock.³ It is well-known that a
standard neoclassical model without nominal rigidity or countercyclical markups gener-
ates countercyclical real wages, capital, investment, and labor productivity with respect to
demand shock (e.g., government spending shock), which is inconsistent with the business
cycle if one believes demand shock is a main source of business cycle fluctuation. Instead
²However, our assumption that individual firms take returns to scale of the economy as a given makes
our model similar to internal increasing returns to scale models with monopolistic competition, not external
increasing returns to scale models. See Benhabib and Farmer, 1994 for a detailed explanation of internal vs.
external increasing returns to scale.
³We assume monopolistic competition without nominal rigidity or countercyclical markup (Blanchard
and Kiyotaki, 1987; Benhabib and Farmer, 1994), similar to what has been done in the increasing returns
to scale literature. Our results do not change if we make a perfect competition assumption with mild
decreasing returns to scale at the steady state. Either monopolistic competition or decreasing returns to
scale (at the steady state) is needed to make our model internally consistent. We assume only a negligible
degree of price-cost markup (2%) in our model, so our benchmark monopolistic competitive economy with
a normalized Translog technology can be interpreted as an “approximated” perfect competitive economy,
and is thus directly comparable to a standard RBC model with a conventional Cobb-Douglas technology.
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of incorporating markup countercyclicality, for which there is mixed empirical evidence,⁴
we rely on complementarity-induced procyclical returns to scale to generate strong fluc-
tuation in input demand caused by demand shock. This fluctuation in input demand leads
to a favorable dynamic in aggregate variables with respect to all standard demand shocks,
including changes in government spending, taste, and impatience. In addition, compared
to the conventional production function, our production function amplifies the business
cycle.
We then incorporate our production function into the benchmark medium-scale New
Keynesian model and repeat the business cycle accounting exercise to find a dramatic in-
crease in the role of fundamental shocks compared to the role of “dubious” shocks. Accord-
ing to Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan, 2009, nearly half of the aggregate output fluctuation
is explained by so-called “dubiously structural” shocks,⁵ at a horizon of 10 quarters (i.e.,
there is a 10 quarter conditional variance decomposition). This raises concerns about the
usefulness of the New Keynesian models that do not micro-found the suspicious shocks.
Since our production function makes a model less reliant on countercyclicality price-cost
markups in generating fluctuation, our model can suppress the role of suspicious shocks,
such as the labor wedge. Incorporating our production function into the standard Smets
and Wouters, 2007 model, we find that the role of suspicious shocks in explaining the
aggregate output variation drops from 49% to 34% on a horizon of 10 quarters. Simulta-
⁴The countercyclicality of markup plays a central role in New Keynesian literature (Rotemberg and
Woodford, 1991; Rotemberg and Woodford, 1992; Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans, 2005; Smets and
Wouters, 2007; Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe, 2006; Bils, Klenow, and Malin, 2014). However, some
recent papers argue that markups are either procyclical or acyclical (Nekarda and Ramey, 2013; Stroebel
and Vavra, 2016; Kim, 2016).
⁵These shocks include shocks to wage markups, price markups, exogenous government spending, and
risk premia.
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neously, the role of wage markup shock decreases by one-third. The role of investment
shock approximately doubles from 15% to 28%, and this result is in line with Justiniano,
Primiceri, and Tambalotti, 2010, who discuss the importance of investment shock.⁶
To our knowledge, this is the first paper to investigate the role of time-varying returns
to scale in a business cycle framework. Our paper contributes to a growing literature that
generalizes a conventional Cobb-Douglas production function (Antras, 2004; Chrinko,
2008; Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014; Oberfield and Raval, 2014; Raval, 2015; Atalay,
2017; Koh and Santaeulàlia-Llopis, 2017). Most of this literature rejects a Cobb-Douglas
production functional form assumption and finds complementarity among inputs.⁷ Our
empirical analysis complements this literature by generalizing a Cobb-Douglas produc-
tion function and finds complementarity among inputs. One key difference is that we
use a Translog production function that allows time-varying returns to scale. To the best
of our knowledge, we are the first to build up a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
(DSGE) model with a Translog production function.
Our modeling techniques and results are closely related to the literature that incorpo-
rates increasing returns to scale in business cycle analysis (Benhabib and Farmer, 1994;
Benhabib and Farmer, 1996; Schmitt-Grohe, 200; Benhabib and Wen, 2004). Probably the
biggest challenge to this literature is its weak empirical support (Basu and Fernald, 1997;
Basu and Fernald, 2001; Basu and Kimball, 1997). Our empirical analysis and theoretical
model do not violate the returns to scale results in Basu and Fernald, 1997 as our produc-
⁶In contrast to Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti, 2010, we use the same dataset as Smets and
Wouters, 2007 and abstain from placing more structure inside the model.
⁷One notable exception is Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014, who find that labor and capital are sub-
stitute; however, in estimating their parameters, they study long-term trends rather than business cycle
movements.
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tion function features constant returns to scale on average (i.e. at the steady state), and
is fully consistent with Basu and Kimball, 1997 emphasizes the role of capital utilization
if one interprets energy as capital utilization.⁸ Although our model can generate indeter-
minacy depending on the value of the parameters governing input complementarity, we
do not explicitly analyze behavior under indeterminacy.⁹ The main conclusion is similar
to that of Bai, Ríos-Rull, and Storesletten, 2012 who use search friction in the frictionless
model to generate plausible dynamics with respect to demand shock.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the empir-
ical analysis, data, and results. Section 3 presents the normalized Translog production
function used in our business cycle models and illustrates the key mechanisms. Section 4
presents a simple neoclassical model with our proposed production function and shows
the business cycle dynamic following demand shocks. Section 5 presents the medium-
scale New Keynesian model with our production function and results associated with the
business cycle accounting exercise. Section 6 concludes.
3.2 Empirical Analysis
In this section, we estimate production function coefficients under the Translog produc-
tion functional form assumption. We first present the data we use to estimate parameters,
followed by our framework to recover the parameters and our estimated results.
⁸Energy or electricity is often used as a proxy for capital utilization (Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo,
1995).
⁹Our calibrated value of the parameter governing input complementarity based on empirical analysis
is mild enough to avoid indeterminacy.
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Data
This paper uses annual six-digit North American Industry Classification System (NAICS)
industry-level data from the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industries Database. This
database records detailed information on 473 manufacturing industries from 1958 to 2009.
The information is compiled from the Annual Survey of Manufacturers and the Census of
Manufacturers. The variables in this database include gross output (value of shipment),
value added, and 5-factor inputs (production worker, non-production worker, capital, ma-
terial, and energy) for each industry over time. These data also records deflators for output,
material, energy, investment, and wage bills for production workers and total employees.
We report our summary statistics in Appendix B.1, and a more detailed explanation of
this database can be found in Bartelsman, Becker, and Gray, 2000.
The biggest advantage of these data over the aggregate data is that they allow us to
exploit both time-series and cross-sectional variation, along with corresponding panel
data techniques, to estimate production function parameters. This feature is especially
important to estimate a Translog production function, which has excessive parameters to
estimate. These data covers more than 50 years with five different disaggregated inputs,
suitable for studying business cycle dynamics than are more detailed micro-level data
with shorter time spans.
Empirical Framework
Estimating the production function with a Translog production is a key challenge for this
project. Because of its flexible structure, there is an excessive number of parameters to
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estimate in this production function. For example, for the five input variables available
in our data, we must estimate five parameters with a Cobb-Douglas production function
and, six parameters with a CES production, but twenty parameters with a Translog pro-
duction function. Even with our detailed industry-level data for many years, it is difficult
to consistently estimate all twenty parameters in the Translog production function.
To overcome this challenge, we exploit a firm’s first order condition to estimate key
parameters that we can consistently estimate rather than estimating a full Translog pro-
duction function.¹⁰ Firms’ optimization conditions deliver the relationship between the
marginal product of a particular input and its price. Using this relationship, one can allow
the flexible form for the efficiency of this input to estimate parameters using the limited
variation in the data. The remainder of this section discusses how we implement this
approach.
For simplicity, consider a following Translog production function with only two in-
puts, labor and capital:
ln(Y ) = ln(A) + l ln(L) + k ln(K)| {z }
Cobb-Douglas
+ kl ln(L) ln(K) + ll ln(L) ln(L) + kk ln(K) ln(K)| {z }
second-order terms
(3.2.1)
where Y is output, A is productivity, L is labor, and K is capital. The first part of the
production function is an entirely conventional Cobb-Douglas function. One can view
¹⁰The other way to proceed is either to reduce the number of inputs or to impose more structure on the
production function. Reducing the number of inputs would worsen the problem of identification, as we are
likely to omit the important variables that could be correlated with our regressors. Imposing more structure
on the production function is inconsistent with our original motivation to relax the heavy parameterization
of the production function.
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this function as a first-order approximation of a general production function. A Translog
production function is a simple extension, allowing both second- and first-order terms.
Thus, a Translog production function can be thought of as a second-order approximation
of a general production function. One can see that assuming lk = 0; ll = 0; kk = 0
recovers a Cobb-Douglas production function.
One can rewrite the above production function by allowing five different inputs:
ln(Y ) = ln(A) +
5X
i=1







ij ln(V i) ln(V j)| {z }
second-order terms
(3.2.2)
where V i is one of five different inputs available in the data indexed by i (production
worker, non-production worker, capital, material, and energy).
The simplest way to recover the parameters in the above equation is to run a regression
based on equation (3.2.2), treating productivity as a residual. This approach, however,
has two key problems. First, there are too many parameters to estimate, which is more
demanding in terms of the data. Second, flexible inputs are likely to be correlated with
productivity, generating inconsistent estimates of the parameters.¹¹
To avoid the two concerns listed above, we exploit a firm’s first-order condition. With-
out loss of generality, all firms choose a particular input V 1 to solve the following cost-
¹¹Despite these problems, we still run a regression based on equation (3.2.2) with various methods, in-
cluding demeaning and Olley and Pakes, 1996. Our results are generally consistent with our main results
that use first-order condition. The results are available upon request.
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minimization problem with a Translog production function:
min
V 1
W 1V 1 + :::
s.t. ln(Y ) = ln(A) +
5X
i=1





ij ln(V i) ln(V j)
whereW i is the nominal price of input V i. The problem is written such that we suppress
the expression that does not have a particular input V 1 for the cost function. Forming a
Lagrangian, taking derivatives with respect to V 1, and dividing both sides by output price














V 1| {z }
marginal product of input
(3.2.3)
where  is both a Lagrangian multiplier and firm’s nominal marginal cost as it denotes
how much the cost changes with respect to the marginal increase in output quantity.¹²
Define the markup   P

. Then the markup is a wedge between real input price and the
marginal product of input. Note that assuming i1 = 0 for all i recovers the conventional
first-order condition under the Cobb-Douglas production function.
By multiplying V 1
Y










where s1  W 1V 1
PY
. The left-hand side is the input share out of total sales, and the right-
hand side is the efficiency of input V 1 divided by the price-cost markup, . The term





i=1 i1 ln(V i)
 is an output elasticity with respect to input V 1, which is a unit-
free measure of the marginal product of input.
In the next section, we utilize equation (3.2.4) to estimate parameters associated with
the Translog production function. Our goal is to estimate i1 for all i.
Estimation
To take the equation (3.2.4) to the data, we allow input share (s1), markup (), and all





i=1 i1 ln(V ijt)

jt
where j is industry and t is time. To make the above equation linear in parameters, we








V^ ijt   ^jt (3.2.5)
where x^ denotes the log-deviation from the steady-state value of variable x, and s1 =
1+
P5
i=1 i1 ln(V i). We assumed that the steady-state values of  and s1 do not depend






jt   jt (3.2.6)
where xjt = lnxjt   1J
PJ
j=1 lnxjt for variable x. We exploit the panel data to detrend
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each variable by subtracting the time-specific component across the industry.
Because s1jt and V ijt are observed in the data, we can use the above equation to run a
regression. The idea of estimating parameters i1 is to regress s^1jt on all five inputs V^ ijt and
to treat markups ^jt as residual based on equation (3.2.6). Based on the above equation,
we can identify i1  i1s1 and recover i1 by calibrating s1. Given that minimizing with
respect to each input delivers equation (3.2.6) for each input, we can, in principle, run a
regression for five different input shares.
There are two crucial problems, however, with running a regression based on the
above equation. First, the price-cost markup is likely to be correlated with the inputs
we allow in the equation above, generating the confounding relationship. Additionally,
although we assumed that the only wedge between the marginal product of input and
real input prices is the price-cost markup in the above equation, there are likely to be
other factors that can be regarded as the wedge in the data. For example, if there is an
adjustment cost for input, this adjustment cost term will appear as a wedge in addition
to price-cost markup. Second, since the left-hand side variable has input V 1 in s1, there
is a mechanical correlation between the left-hand side variable and the right-hand side
variable. The estimated coefficient will be positive mechanically.
To address the first concern about the confounding relationship, we only choose en-
ergy input as a choice variable (V 1) and estimate using just this particular input. The
utilization of energy input is less likely to suffer from concerns such as adjustment cost
and monopsony. In addition, we demean our variable across time within industry to get
rid of any industry-specific component in our variables that could potentially correlate





















for variable x. Finally, we use lagged double-demeaned
input prices as instrumental variables to generate exogenous variation across inputs that
are unlikely to be correlated with price-cost markups. Our instrumental variable strategy
also addresses the second concern, as it will generate variation that does not lead to a
mechanical correlation of variables.
It is useful to discuss identification with equation (3.2.7) to understand what variation
in the data identifies i1. Ideally, we need random variation in inputs that affect the share
of energy. If the share of energy increases (decreases) with an exogenous increase (de-
crease) in input V ijt for i > 1, we can interpret this as an increase (decrease) in energy
efficiency because of the increase (decrease) in V ijt. In this case, energy and V ijt are comple-
ments (substitutes), and the coefficient i1 captures this complementarity. The exogenous
variation in inputs stem from lagged input prices, and with demeaning, we need only as-
sume that last year’s idiosyncratic input prices are uncorrelated with the idiosyncratic
markup this year to identify the parameters of interest.
Estimation Results
Table 3.1 presents the estimated parameters based on equation (3.2.7), highlighting the
complementarity between energy and production worker. Based on column (1), we find
that energy input follows the law of diminishing returns and that most other inputs, es-
pecially production workers, are complements to energy. First, the coefficient in front of
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energy, 1, is negative. This states that energy input becomes less efficient as a firm uses
more energy, thereby capturing the law of diminishing returns to energy. Second, coef-
ficients in front of inputs other than non-production workers are positive, implying that
energy becomes more efficient as a firm uses more of these inputs. This states that these
inputs are complements to energy. In particular, the coefficient in front of production
worker is economically and statistically significant, implying that it is a strong comple-
ment to energy input.¹³ Non-production worker is a substitute since the coefficient of a
non-production worker is negative, but the result is not very statistically significant with
a t-statistics of 1.79.
Controlling the lagged output price does not change the result as shown in column (3).
In particular, the coefficient in front of the lagged output price is negligible and not statis-
tically significant, implying that persistence in markups is unlikely to cause inconsistency
in our estimates.¹⁴ Columns (1) and (4) include capital in the regression, whereas (2) and
(5) exclude capital; however, the estimated coefficient of capital is neither economically
nor statistically significant. Finally, notice that all coefficients are statistically significant
except the capital input coefficient. This result implies that we reject constant ejt, or a
Cobb-Douglas production functional form assumption with respect to energy.
¹³If we only allow labor input instead of both production worker and non-production worker, we still
find that labor input is a strong complement to energy input.
¹⁴We treat lagged output price as a control in our regression, but making the lagged output price en-
dogenous and using lagged input prices as instruments does not change the result.
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Table 3.1: Elasticity (ejt) estimation based on equation (3.2.7)







energy  0:56??  0:4??  0:4?? 0:85??? 0:85???
(0.23) (0.16) (0.16) (0.03) (0.03)
material 0:17 0:32?? 0:29?  0:41???  0:42???
(- energy) (0.22) (0.15) (0.16) (0.03) (0.03)
labor (p) 1:69??? 1:41??? 1:33???  0:33???  0:33???
(0.45) (0.31) (0.29) (0.03) (0.03)
labor (np)  0:59?  0:45? -0.39  0:12???  0:12???





obs 23,220 23,220 23,220 24,166 24,166
J-test 6.04 6.76 8.73
(p-value) (0.3) (0.34) (0.19)









Columns (1), (2) and (3) show the regression result with instrumental variables, and (4)
and (5) show the OLS result. Five different inputs are used in this regression: energy,
material that excludes energy, non-production worker, production worker, and capital.
All inputs and lagged input prices are logged and then double-demeaned across
industries and across time. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the NAICS
industry code. J-test refers to Hansen’s J-statistics for overidentifying restriction. *, **,
and *** indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
Returns to Scale Cyclicality
The estimated results inform us about the returns to scale in United States production.
Formally, returns to scale with our production function is defined as follows:
(V 1jt; :::; V
5
jt) 














where (V 1jt; :::; V 5jt) measures the percentage increase in output from one percent in-
crease in all inputs.¹⁵ Under the conventional Cobb-Douglas production function, jt is
constant across industry j and time t and equal toP5k=1 k. In this case,  > 1 refers to
increasing returns to scale,  = 1 refers to constant returns to scale, and  < 1 refers to
decreasing returns to scale. Once we allow a more flexible production function such as a
Translog production function, jt need not be constant and depends on inputs.
The insight from Hall, 1990 and Basu and Fernald, 1997 allows our parameter esti-
mates to inform on the cyclicality of returns to scale. Suppose we derive equation (3.2.4)
for all five inputs: skjt = [k+
P5
i=1 ik ln(V ijt)]

;8k. Rearranging the equation and summing

















is observed in the data and ln(jt) can be recovered as a residual from our main regres-
sion, we can assess the cyclicality of returns to scale parameter.¹⁶ Table 3.2 presents the
regression result based on \ln(jt) = j + t + 1 ln(vshipjt) + jt.
Column (1) presents regression results based on jt recovered frommarkups estimated
in the previous section. The coefficient is positive, and it is both economically and statis-
tically significant, implying that returns to scale is strongly procyclical.
¹⁵Consistent with the previous section, we redefined 2kk as kk for notational simplicity.
¹⁶We can only assess cyclicality jt and cannot recover jt parameters because markups (or residuals)
are only identified up to constant.
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Table 3.2: Returns to Scale Cyclicality
(1) (2) NR (2013) (3) BKM (2014) (4) (5)
\ln(jt)
ln(jt) 1st order poly constant constant constant CES
V 1jt energy labor material energy energy
 ln(vshipjt) 1:08 0:29  0:11 0:40 0:31
[1.01, 1.14] [0.26, 0.31] [-0.13, -0.10] [0.36, 0.43] [0.28, 0.33]
industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 .3238 .3157 .1629 .1813 .2021
obs 23,693 23,694 23,694 23,694 23,694
;y 0:49 0:49  0:35 0:26 0:24
[0.46, 0.51] [0.47, 0.52] [-0.38, -0.32] [0.24, 0.29] [0.22, 0.27]
Note. The regression result based on the following equation:
\ln(jt) = j + t + 1 ln(vshipjt) + jt. Column (1) shows the regression result
based on jt constructed from the estimated markups. Column (2) recovers jt by
assuming that the markups are equal to the inverse labor shares as in Nekarda and
Ramey, 2013. Column (3) recovers jt by assuming that the markups are equal to the
inverse material share as in Bils, Klenow, and Malin, 2014. Column (4) shows the result
based on the markups equal to the inverse energy shares assumption and column (5)
shows the result based on the estimated markup with a CES production function
assumption. The markups based on the CES production function are estimated using
constrained regression and double-demeaning techniques with lagged double-demeaned
input prices as instruments. The 95% confidence intervals are constructed with the
standard errors that are cluster bootstrapped based on the industry with 5000
repetitions. ;y = Corr(\ln(jt); ln(vshipjt)) is reported separately.
3.3 Production Function with Complementarity-induced
Procyclical Returns to Scale
Here, we propose a production function, which we will call the normalized Translog pro-
duction function, that exhibit complementarity-induced procyclical returns to scale in the
short run, fSR, and has conventional constant returns to scale in the long run, fLR.
We introduce some notations for illustrative purposes. Consider an arbitrary variable
Xt. Let the lower-case xt  XtXss denote a ratio between the level Xt and its steady-state
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be a log-deviation of Xt from the steady state.
Additionally, define ~Xt as a cross-sectional average level of Xt, which individual agents
take as exogenous, but in equilibriumXt = ~Xt. Thus, it follows that xt = ~xt and X^t = ~^Xt
in equilibrium.
Our production function has the following form :
Yt =
8>>><>>>:
fSR (kst ; lt; et; "
a
t ;t)  fLR (Ksss; Lss; Ess; ss)
fLR (Ksss; Lss; Ess; )
(3.3.1)
Here,t is a vector of endogenous parameters that governs potentially time-varying short-
run returns to scale of the economy. We say “endogenous” parameters because the time-
varying components are endogenously determined in equilibrium, although individual
agents take these values as given.¹⁷  is a vector of strictly exogenous parameters that
govern (time-invariant) long-run returns to scale of the economy.¹⁸ The functional forms
are given by
fSR (ks; l; e; "a;t) = "
a(ks)k  ll+ellog ~et  ee+ellog ~lt (3.3.2)
fLR(K;L;E; ) = (Ks)kLlEe (3.3.3)
¹⁷Because the time-varying components in t are endogenously determined in equilibrium, the termi-
nology “parameter” can be somewhat misleading. Still, we call it a (endogenous) parameter because individ-
ual agents take t as exogenous. The long-run value of t, , is a vector of strictly exogenous parameters
in the sense that there are no endogenous components involved, and the vector consists of deep structural
parameters.
¹⁸We assume constant returns to scale in the long-run.
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where
t  [k; l + ellog ~et; e + ellog ~lt]0 (3.3.4)
  [k; l; e]0 (3.3.5)
Note that if we evaluate t at the steady-state (or, at the long-run horizon), we have











Properties of the Normalized Translog Production Function
Several features are worth mentioning. (i) The complementarity between energy input
and labor input is reflected by a single parameter el > 0. If el > 0, our model features
procyclical returns to scale in the short-run, provided that the dynamics of log ~et and log ~lt
are procyclical.
(ii) If we evaluate our production function (3:3:1) in the equilibrium (i.e., if we impose
Et = ~Et and Lt = ~Lt), then we can show that in the short run, our technology implies
the following Translog expression (which is why we call it normalized “Translog”) :
log yt = log "at + k log kst + l log lt + e log et + el  2log(lt) log(et)
(iii) In equation (3:3:1), each input inside function fSR is normalized by its steady
state value (i.e., recall the definition xt  XtXss ), which is why we call our production func-
tion as “normalized” Translog. This kind of normalization can also be found in Koh and
Santaeulàlia-Llopis, 2017, who distinguish between a short-run and a long-run aggregate
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production function, allowing a time-varying CES parameter in the short run. As in that
paper, the normalization of inputs with their steady state counterparts causes the produc-
tion function to collapse to a conventional Cobb-Douglas at the steady state. There are
two important advantages to doing so. First, it facilitates the calculation of the steady
state of the economy, as the steady state is identical to that of the model without com-
plementarity. Additionally, because the steady state is exactly the same as in the model
using the typical Cobb-Douglas technology, our model becomes directly comparable to
existing models in the literature.
Second, and more importantly, normalization allows the model to be compatible with
balanced-growth path. This captures the idea that the input complementarity we identify
is a short-run characteristic that does not affect the long-run growth of the economy.
(iv) Despite procyclical returns to scale, the production function becomes scale-free
up to the first order because log-linearizing the production function yields exactly the
same form as the log-linearized Cobb-Douglas production function: in the equilibrium
(i.e., impose ~Et = Et and ~Lt = Lt), the first-order approximation of our production





t + lL^t + eE^t
Hence, the procyclicality of returns to scale does not generate any additional fluctua-
tion of output by itself and behaves exactly the same as conventional Cobb-Douglas up to
the first order. All the interesting dynamics arise through the first-order condition of the
firm. This scale-free characteristic differentiates our model from models with increasing
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returns to scale, in which propagation occurs because the fact that the economy exhibits
increasing returns to scale.
(v) Finally, we assume that when each firm solves the problem, it takes the returns
to scale of the economy as given. Remember that we introduced cross-sectional average
variables ~Et and ~Lt, and individual firms take these variables as exogenous. The returns
to scale of the economy is given by the sum of all powers in (3:3:1):
Short-Run Returns to Scale = k + l + e + el
h
log( ~Et/Ess) + log(~Lt/Lss)
i
Long-Run Returns to Scale = k + l + e = 1
This assumption is technically required to guarantee that firms’ optimizing behavior
is well-characterized by the first-order conditions. If an individual firm can internalize
the change in returns to scale, then by choosing the larger amount of labor and energy,
each firm can make the returns to scale it faces arbitrarily large. This will induce firms to
choose an infinite amount of labor and energy. By assuming that individual firms do not
perceive that it can affect the economy’s returns to scale, this problem no longer arises.¹⁹
In addition, this assumption reflects the idea that the returns to scale is more of an
economy- or industry-wide characteristic than a firm-specific characteristic. Hence, a
single firm’s change of input does not affect the returns to scale, but when all firms jointly
increase (decrease) labor and energy inputs, then the returns to scale parameter changes
¹⁹The assumption we make renders our model similar to an internal increasing returns to scale (IRS)
model. In contrast to an external IRS mode, an internal IRS model requires some degree of market power of
individual firms. Following Benhabib and Farmer, 1994, we also assume a monopolistic competitive model,
but with a negligible amount of constant markup (2% markup). Hence, our model can be considered an
“approximation” of a perfect competitive model.
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(c) Complementarity-induced Procyclical RTS
Note. Y-axis is real wage and x-axis is labor. The figures show how the labor market
reacts to positive demand shock (a) in a standard RBC model with constant returns to
scale, (b) in a model with markup countercyclicality with constant returns to scale, and
(c) in a model with complementarity-driven procyclical returns to scale.
toward IRS (DRS).
Key Intuition of Model Mechanism
In this section, we convey the basic intuition behind our mechanism. An important fea-
ture of the complementarity-induced procyclicality of returns to scale is that it generates
strong cyclicalmovement of input demand evenwith respect to demand shocks. Figure 3.1
shows how both traditional countercyclical markup and complementarity-induced pro-
cyclical returns to scale explain an increase in wage and labor when firms face a positive
demand shock.
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Figure 3.1a shows the labor market under the standard RBC model with constant re-
turns to scale technology. Because the production function only depends on labor, capital,
and productivity, the marginal product of labor only depends on labor, capital and pro-
ductivity. When firms experience a positive demand shock, they can only adjust labor
input since the capital input is a predetermined variable and productivity is not corre-
lated with positive demand shock. In other words, they cannot shift the labor demand
schedule. Only the labor supply schedule shifts to the right which results in increased
employment.²⁰ However, this effect leads to a decrease in wages and an increase in la-
bor input because of a positive demand shock, which cannot be reconciled with empirical
evidence.²¹ Markup countercyclicality has been proposed to reconcile this seemingly con-
tradictory prediction as in Figure 3.1b. In models with nominal price rigidity, markups fall
when firms face positive demand shocks because of rigid prices and increases in marginal
cost. The decrease in markups allows the labor demand schedule to shift to the right,
capturing both the increase in labor and the increase in wages (or constant wages) at the
equilibrium.
Input complementarity that induces procyclical returns to scale, however, can also
shift the labor demand schedule when firms face positive demand shock as shown in
Figure 3.1c. Suppose we allow other flexible inputs such as energy, which has strong
²⁰The labor supply shifts to the right with respect to demand shock for various reasons (Rotemberg and
Woodford 1991). For example, the labor supply can shift to the right because of an increase in the marginal
utility of wealth resulting from an increase in government spending.
²¹Real wage procyclicalitywith respect to demand change follows the argument in Rotemberg andWood-
ford, 1991; Rotemberg and Woodford, 1992. There is evidence of weakly countercyclical real wages condi-
tional on government spending (Nekarda and Ramey 2011), but we are not aware of any paper that finds
strong countercyclical real wages conditional on demand change predicted by conventional models with a
perfectly competitive market
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complementarity with the labor input, in the production function. In that situation, the
marginal product of labor depends not only on labor, capital, and productivity but also
on energy. Now consider a positive demand shock. First, this shifts the labor supply
schedule as in a standard RBC model, which increases labor input (movement along the
labor demand curve). This initial increase of labor increases the marginal productivity of
energy, which induces firms to hire more energy. This increase of energy input increases
the marginal productivity of labor, which eventually shifts the labor demand schedule
(shift of the labor demand curve). This interaction between energy input and labor input
is strong enough to make real wages increase when complementarity between these two
inputs generates the procyclicality of returns to scale.²²
3.4 The Model with Input Complementarity
In this section, we present a simple dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with
a new production function that allows us to capture complementarity between factor in-
puts. Three features are different from simple real business cycle model: (i) we use a new
production function that can be interpreted as a “normalized” Translog production func-
tion; (ii) we explicitly consider energy as an input and allow complementarity with labor
to reflect our empirical findings; and (iii) we cast the model in a monopolistic competitive
framework in which final goods firms aggregate differentiated intermediate goods and
sell them to households.
²²We emphasize complementarity-induced procyclical returns to scale because complementarity itself
is not sufficient to generate procyclical real wage with respect to demand shock. This is why we propose a




The economy is populated by a large number of identical infinitely lived households. The
representative household chooses sequence of consumption Ct, labor supplied Lt, invest-







subject to the following budget constraint
Ct + It +
Bt
Rt
+ Tt = R
k
tKt 1 +Bt 1 +WtLt +t +
e
t
and the law of motion of capital
Kt = It + (1  )Kt 1 (3.4.1)
where R is a (gross) risk-free rate, Rk is real rental rate of capital, W is real wages, T is
tax paid by the household in terms of consumption units,  is the dividend paid to the
households by the intermediate goods firms, and e is the dividend paid by the energy
firms. We assume UC;t > 0, UCC;t  0, UL;t  0, ULL;t  0.
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The FOCs are given by




Rkt+1 + 1  
	 (3.4.2)
Wt =  UL(Ct; Lt)
UC(Ct; Lt)
(3.4.3)
UC(Ct; Lt) = RtEt [UC(Ct+1; Lt+1)] (3.4.4)
Final Goods Producers
The final goods producers purchase differentiated intermediate goods products and aggre-
gate them using the Dixit-Stiglitz CES technology. We assume that the final goods sector














where Yt, Yt(i) are the final and intermediate goods, respectively, and P it is intermediate
goods price.  is the inverse of markup.
The optimality implies
Yt(i) = Yt  Pt(i)1/( 1) (3.4.5)
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Intermediate Goods Producers
We assume a monopolistic competitive intermediate goods sector. Following (3:3:1), we
assume intermediate goods producer i’s technology is characterized by the following pro-














ellog( LtLss )# (3.4.6)
Here, Yt(i) is intermediate goods producer i’s output, Kst (i) is capital services used in
production, Lt(i) is labor input, and Et(i) is energy input. Lt and Et are aggregate labor
and energy, which individual firms take as given. Total factor productivity "at follows
log "at = a log "at 1 + at ; at  N(0; 2a) (3.4.7)
Each intermediate goods producer’s periodic profit is given by
t(i) = Pt(i)Yt(i) WtLt(i) RktKst (i)  P et Et(i) (3.4.8)
whereWt, Rkt , and P et are the aggregate real wage, the real rental rate of capital, and real
energy price, respectively. Note that because there is no price rigidity, we are using the
final good as a numeraire.
Each intermediate goods producer maximizes (3:4:8) subject to the demand for its
































= P et (3.4.11)
Althoughwe explicitly introduce energy as a factor inputy, we abstract frommodeling
the energy sector separately, following Rotemberg and Woodford (1996). In other words,
there are no resource costs associated with energy production. As in Rotemberg and
Woodford (1996), energy is freely available at no cost to the oligopolistic firms that sell
it, and the exogenous variations in P et represent variations in the degree to which they
succeed in colluding to keep the price of energy where they want it (here taken as given
rather than modeled). Thus, the intermediate goods producers pay P et to get energy input
Et(i), and






directly becomes the profit of (implicit) energy firms. These profits are distributed to the
shareholders, who are representative households in our model. We assume that energy
price follows an exogenous process
logP et = (1  e) logP ess + e logP et 1 + et ; et  N(0; 2e) (3.4.12)
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In the appendix of this paper, we provide a model with the energy-producing sector
and make the energy price endogenous (Kilian, 2008). We show that the main results are
robust to this alternative specification.
Government
The government budget constraint is given by




where Gt is government spending, Tt is lump-sum taxes (or subsidies). Following Smets
and Wouters, 2007, we denote gt = GtYss , where Yss is the steady-state value of output, and
assume gt follows an exogenous process
log gt = (1  g) log gss + g log gt 1 + gt ; gt  N(0; 2g) (3.4.14)
Resource Constraints
The market clearing of capital implies Kst = Kt 1. Additionally, the social resource con-
straint can be written as
Yt = Ct +Kt   (1  )Kt 1 +Gt
The full description of the equilibrium conditions can be found in Appendix.
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Functional Form
To simulate the model, we impose the following functional form of the utility function,









Following the existing literature, we calibrate the model by setting the time interval as
a quarter. We set the discount factor  = 0:99 and the degree of relative risk aversion
 = 1. We let the labor share l = 0:7, the capital share k = 0:24, and the energy
share e = 0:06, which are within the range of widely used values in the literature.²³
Additionally, we set the steady state government spending to output ratio as g = 0:2,
which is consistent with post-war U.S. data. The parameter governing labor disutility  
is calibrated so that the steady state of L matches 1/3, which means that people work
approximately one-third of the time. We calibrate 1/ = 3.31, which is the average Frisch
elasticity used in the RBC literature (Chetty et al., 2013).
To calibrate the input complementarity parameter between labor and energy, el, we
bring the value from our micro-estimate. The first order condition with respect to energy











²³Depending on the data source and the definition of value added, the energy share varies from 0.04 to
0.08. We use an average of these values.
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Table 3.3: Calibration Strategy
parameter meaning value
k capital share 0.24
l labor share 0.70
e energy share 0.06
 inverse of markup 1/ = 1:02
 discount factor 0.99
c intertemporal elasticity 1
 depreciation of capital 0.025
 labor disutility Lss = 1/3
P ess energy price Ess = 1




and log-linearizing the above equation yields:
^et =
~elL^t (3.4.16)
where ~el  el/e. Note that the equation (3.4.16) is the theoretical counterpart of
equations (3.2.5) and (3.2.7) in our empirics. Thus, our micro-estimate ~el = 1:69 implies
el = 0:10, given our calibration of energy share e = 0:06. Hence, we calibrate the input
complementarity parameter as el = 0:10, which is quite mild.
Correspondingly, the required amount of markup is also quite mild, as the observed
fluctuation of energy and labor inputs is less than 10%. Approximately 1 to 2% of markup
is sufficient to make our model well-behaved. We calibrate the inverse-markup  to match
the 2% markup: 1/ = 1:02. Quantitatively, this makes no difference in a perfect compet-
itive model. Thus we can interpret our calibrated model as an approximation of a perfect
competitive economy, making the model directly comparable with standard RBC models.
We summarize our calibration strategy in Table 3.3.
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3.5 Dynamics of the Economy
In this section, we compare our benchmark model with the normalized Translog technol-
ogy using a model with a Cobb-Douglas production function. We assume a 2% markup in
the model with the normalized Translog, whereas we assume perfect competition in the
model with the Cobb-Douglas function. Hence, the model with Cobb-Douglas is identical
to the standard RBCmodel except that firms use energy as a factor input.²⁴ Quantitatively,
2% markup (in the model with normalized Translog) is nearly indistinguishable from zero
markups (i.e., perfect competition), so this model can be regarded as an approximation of
a perfect competitive economy.
Below, we present the impulse response of selected variable. The results for all vari-
ables can be found in Appendix.
ProcyclicalW , K, I w.r.t. Government Spending Shock
We begin our analysis by investigating the impulse response of key variables following
the government spending shock.²⁵ Figure 3.2 shows the dynamics of real wageW , capital
stock K , and investment I after a 1% increase in government spending. The solid black
lines depict the dynamics of these variables under the normalized Translog production
function. We find a procyclical real wage, capital, and investment, consistentwith the data.
In contrast, the red dashed lines depict the responses of these variables in the model with
²⁴Under the Cobb-Douglas production function, whether firms use energy as a factor input has minor
effect on the model’s performance. Thus, it is not the inclusion of energy input per se that is important but
the existence of complementarity-induced procyclical returns to scale that is crucial. In Appendix we also
include impulse responses of the standard RBC model without energy input.
²⁵We only considered a government spending shock here, but our results are robust to other types of
demand shocks, such as preference shock or shock on discount factor.
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Figure 3.2: Procyclicality : Increase in government spending by 1 %
Note. Y-axis represents a percent deviation from steady state. Dashed lines represent the
model with a Cobb-Douglas production function, and solid lines represent the model
with a normalized Translog production function.
the Cobb-Douglas production function. One can verify the well-known countercyclicality
of these variables.
Strong Propagation
Complementarity-induced procyclical returns to scale generate strong amplification with
respect to both supply and demand shocks. This is because the interaction between energy
and labor does not depend on a particular type of shock: any shock that induces firms to
increase factor inputs generate interactions between energy and labor, which turn into
strong propagation.
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Figure 3.3: Amplification : Increase in productivity by 1 %
Note. Y-axis represents a percent deviation from steady state. Dashed lines represent the
model with a Cobb-Douglas production function, and solid lines represent the model
with a normalized Translog production function.
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show the impulse response of output, consumption, labor, invest-
ment, capital, and energy with respect to a 1% positive productivity shock and a 1% pos-
itive government spending shock, respectively. Again, solid black lines depict dynam-
ics of the model with normalized Translog, and the red dashed lines depict the model
with Cobb-Douglas. In both shocks, the model with a normalized Translog generates
stronger amplification than the model with the Cobb-Douglas function. In this sense,
complementarity-induced procyclical returns to scale can be thought as having a similar
role as capital utilization.
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Figure 3.4: Amplification : Increase in government spending by 1 %
Note. Y-axis represents a percent deviation from steady state. Dashed lines represent the
model with a Cobb Douglas production function, and solid lines represent the model
with a normalized Translog production function.
Using Micro-consistent Frisch Elasticity
In this section, we show that complementarity-induced procyclical returns to scale have
the potential to reconcile the micro vs. macro Frisch elasticity debate. Conventionally,
the macroeconomic literature has used a large Frisch elasticity to match labor market mo-
ments observed in aggregate data. However, this approach has been criticized by several
papers, which argue that micro-evidence shows Frisch elasticity to have lower values than
are conventionally used in the macro literature (see Chetty, 2012; Chetty et al., 2013).
Complementarity-induced procyclical returns to scale provide new insight. Allow-
ing complementarity-induced procyclical returns to scale generates large movement in
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labor demand even with a small Frisch elasticity given the shift of the labor supply. This
movement generates larger fluctuation of labor evenwithmicro-consistent value of Frisch
elasticity in equilibrium.
Figure 3.5 illustrates this point. We use 0.86 as the micro-consistent Frisch elastic-
ity reported by Chetty et al., 2013 and use 3.31 as the macro-consistent Frisch elasticity
which is also reported in Chetty et al., 2013 as an average value used in the RBC litera-
ture. We assume a 1% positive productivity shock and compare the responses of output
and labor in three different models : (i) a model with normalized Translog with a micro-
consistent Frisch elasticity of 0.86 (blue solid lines); (ii) a model with Cobb-Douglas with
a micro-consistent Frisch elasticity of 0.86 (green dashed lines); and (iii) a model with
Cobb-Douglas with a macro-consistent Frisch elasticity of 3.31 (red dotted-dashed lines).
By comparing the blue solid lines and the red dotted-dashed lines, we can see that the
behavior of the model with normalized Translog with micro-consistent Frisch elasticity
closelymimics themodel with Cobb-Douglas withmacro-consistent Frisch elasticity. This
is a striking result considering the parsimonious structure of our model.
3.6 Business Cycle Accounting: A Medium-Scale DSGE
Model with Input Complementarity
The analysis based on our benchmark model with input complementarity in the previ-
ous section shows that complementarity-induced procyclical returns to scale can gener-
ate data-consistent dynamics under demand shocks, not relying on nominal rigidities or
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Figure 3.5: Frisch elasticity : Increase in productivity by 1 %
Note. Y-axis represents a percent deviation from steady state. Blue solid lines represent
the model with a normalized Translog with micro-consistent Frisch elasticity of 0.86.
Green dashed lines represent the model with a Cobb-Douglas with micro-consistent
Frisch elasticity of 0.86. Red dotted-dashed lines represent the model with a
Cobb-Douglas with macro-consistent Frisch elasticity of 3.31.
countercyclical markups. This strongly suggests that even if we allow realistic frictions
in the model, its reliance on either price or wage markup shocks will drastically decrease.
Because the main criticism by Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan, 2009 of the New Keynesian
literature concerns its reliance on “dubiously structural shocks” (i.e., price markup shock,
wage markup shock, government spending shock, risk premium shock), it would be an
interesting exercise to re-do business cycle accounting after allowing complementarity-
induced procyclicality.
To this end, we extend the well-known medium-scale DSGE model by Smets and
Wouters, 2007 by using the normalized Translog production function with energy input.²⁶
²⁶We do not adopt Kimball aggregators for final output and composite labor and instead use Dixit-Stiglitz
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A full description of the model can be found in the online Technical Appendix. In the fol-
lowing analysis, we compare two models : (i) the original Smets andWouters, 2007 model
in which, as in the original model, we assume Cobb-Douglas technology and do not explic-
itly include energy²⁷ (SW model); and (ii) the extended version of the Smets and Wouters,
2007 model with normalized Translog technology and energy input (HK model).²⁸ We
perform variance decomposition and compare across two models. Here, we present the
main variance decomposition results. The estimation result of the structural parameters
can be found in Appendix.
Table 3.4 provides the 10-quarter (business cycle frequency) conditional variance de-
compositions of the HK model and Table 3.5 shows that of the SW model. In SW model,
27% of the output fluctuation is explained by wage markup shock. In HK model, wage
markup shock only explains 12% of the output variation. Instead, the role of investment
shock andmonetary policy shock increases from 15% to 28% and 3% to 9%, respectively. In-
vestment shock and monetary policy shock are classified as “structural” shocks in Chari,
Kehoe, and McGrattan, 2009. In general, the role of “suspicious shocks” drastically de-
creases and that of “structural shocks” increases in theHKmodel. Table 3.6 and 3.7 provide
unconditional variance decomposition for the HK model and the SW model, respectively.
Again, one can easily verify that the role of wage markup shock drastically decreases and
the roles of investment shock and monetary policy shock increase.
aggregators throughout the analysis, following Cantore et al., 2015. The results are not sensitive to the
choice of aggregator.
²⁷Even if we include energy input, variance decomposition results are similar to the model without
energy as long as we use Cobb-Douglas technology.
²⁸For direct comparison between the two models, we shut down energy price shock and assumed it to
be constant.
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Table 3.4: Conditional Variance Decomposition: 10 Quarters, HK model
Output Cons. Invest. Hours
Prod. 28.97 17.79 12.32 4.06
Risk P. 3.93 11.03 0.48 6.05
Gov. 9.82 3.29 0.65 16.27
Invest. 28.00 9.15 73.90 25.84
Monetary 9.05 15.76 4.00 11.60
P. Mark 8.70 10.40 5.60 8.02
W. Mark 11.52 32.58 3.05 28.17
Table 3.5: Conditional Variance Decomposition: 10 Quarters, SW model
Output Cons. Invest. Hours
Prod. 32.87 16.33 14.55 3.44
Risk P. 3.08 7.54 0.24 4.76
Gov. 7.96 4.57 2.16 13.95
Invest. 14.64 0.77 65.62 13.37
Monetary 3.15 5.34 0.96 4.39
P. Mark 10.81 9.86 7.86 11.61
W. Mark 27.48 55.60 8.62 48.48
Note. Table 3.4 and 3.5 provide 10 quarter conditional variance decomposition for the
HK model and the SW model, respectively. In the HK model, we assumed a normalized
Translog production function with energy input. For direct comparison with the SW
model, we shut down the energy price shock and assumed it to be constant. In the SW
model, we assume a Cobb-Douglas production function without energy input. The only
difference between our SW model and the original Smets and Wouters, 2007 model is
that we used the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator instead of the Kimball aggregator.
Finally, Figure 3.6 plots the energy data and smoothed energy input timeseries ob-
tained from our estimated model.²⁹ As shown in the graph, our model closely mimics
the true dynamics of energy input even though we did not explicitly target any moment
related to the energy market. This shows the external validity of our model.
²⁹Energy data refers to “Total Energy Consumed by the Industrial Sector” from the U.S. Energy Infor-
mation Administration. Both energy data and model-derived smoothed energy input are HP filtered.
156
Table 3.6: Unconditional Variance Decomposition, HK model
Output Cons. Invest. Hours
Prod. 33.42 17.25 20.89 2.65
Risk P. 1.62 2.71 0.31 2.81
Gov. 6.32 7.18 2.44 14.05
Invest. 14.44 10.51 49.87 14.21
Monetary 4.40 4.73 3.04 5.95
P. Mark 5.66 4.69 5.47 5.26
W. Mark 34.13 52.92 17.97 55.06
Table 3.7: Unconditional Variance Decomposition, SW model
Output Cons. Invest. Hours
Prod. 27.05 10.79 20.25 1.48
Risk P. 1.02 1.39 0.15 1.67
Gov. 3.84 4.64 4.28 9.50
Invest. 5.33 2.51 41.82 5.83
Monetary 1.05 1.00 0.58 1.55
P. Mark 6.34 4.19 8.07 5.80
W. Mark 55.36 75.49 24.84 74.16
Note. Table 3.6 and 3.7 provide unconditional variance decomposition for the HK model
and the SW model, respectively. In the HK model, we assumed a normalized Translog
production function with energy input. For direct comparison with the SW model, we
shut down energy price shock and assumed it to be constant. In the SW model, we
assumed a Cobb-Douglas production function without energy input. The only difference
between our SW model and the original Smets and Wouters, 2007 model is that we used
the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator instead of the Kimball aggregator.
3.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we studied the business cycle with normalized Translog production function
exhibiting complementarity-induced procyclical returns to scale. Through our empirical
study, we identified a complementarity between labor and energy that leads to procycli-
cal returns to scale, which is not compatible with the tightly parametrized production
functions commonly used in the literature such as Cobb-Douglas or CES. The normalized
Translog production functionwe propose not only features complementarity-induced pro-
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Figure 3.6: Energy Input Dynamics : Data vs. Model
Note. Data refers to “Total Energy Consumed by the Industrial Sector” from the U.S.
Energy Information Administration. Model refers to smoothed energy input time series
obtained from the estimated HK model. Both “Data” and “Model” are HP filtered.
cyclical returns to scale but is also consistent with the balanced growth path. We showed
that a simple calibrated business cycle model with the proposed production function gen-
erates strikingly data-consistent aggregate variable fluctuations due to demand shock
without relying on nominal rigidities or countercyclical markups. Our model also pro-
duces a stronger amplification effect than the model without complementarity. We then
showed that by incorporating our production function into the benchmark medium-scale
New Keynesian model (Smets and Wouters, 2007), input complementarity leads to a dra-
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Appendix A
Appendix for Chapter 1





xjt(i)di, st  invent and ft; 3;t; 2;t(i); t(i); 1;tg as the non-negative
Lagrangian multipliers for the constraints (1.4.7)-(1.4.10), respectively. For simplicity, sup-
press notation for entrepreneurs Ej since the solution is identical. First-order conditions
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Et1;t+1Rt = 0 (A.1.2)




















2;t(i) = Et2;t+1(i) + t(i) (A.1.6)
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plus relevant transversality conditions and the complementarity slackness condition,
st(i)t(i) = 0, for all i 2 [0; 1]. Notice that equation (A.1.5) shows the timing lag with Ei.
Decision Rules for Inventories
The key to solving the decision rules in the intermediate goods sector is to determine the
optimal stock, xjt(i)+sjt(i), based on the distribution of . Using the iterated expectation,
2;t(i) = Et3;t+1 + t(i) (A.1.7)
There are two possible cases to consider:
• CASE A: Suppose (i)  . We then have (i) = 0; s(i)  0, and 2;t(i) =
Et3;t+1. The budget constraint (1.4.9) implies that yjt(i)  xjt(i) + sj;t 1(i). Be-
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where the left-hand side is the marginal cost of inventory, the first term on the right-hand
side is the shadow value of inventory when there is excess supply, and the second term is
the shadow value of inventory when there is a stock-out. Thus, the optimal cutoff value
is determined at the point where the marginal cost equals the expected marginal benefit.




where RI()  F () + R
(i)>
(i)
 dF () > 1 measures the rate of returns to liquidity
or inventory investment. Notice that the optimal cutoff value t is time-varying and that
dRI()
d < 0.
Given the aggregate economic condition, equation (A.1.9) solves the optimal cutoff
value as t = (RI) 1(3;t/E3;t+1). The decision rules for xjt(i) are given by




































































The shadow price of inventory i is determined by












sjt(i)di, and aggregating the
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The entrepreneur-level budget constraint (1.4.6) can be written as
ct + wtlt +Rt 1bt 1   bt = pjt yjt
Yjt
h






D() 1 measures the hypothetical relative price of intermediate
goods with respect to the final good.
The first order conditions with entrepreneur-level variables are as follows:








































ct; j = 1; 2 (A.1.21)
where
The equations correspond to the Euler equation (1.4.11), labor demand (A.1.18), inven-
tory demand (A.1.19), good 1 demand (A.1.20), and good 2 demand (A.1.21)
The aggregate budget constraints are:


















bt = bt (A.1.25)
where yjt
Yjt
 G() 1D() 1 measures the relative price of intermediate goods with re-
spect to the final good.
A.2 Measurement of Variables in Figure 1
The consumer price index in Figure 1 (a), producer price indexes in Figure 1 (b), and ag-
gregate inventory in Figure 1 (d) were downloaded from the FRED Economic Data.¹. The
aggregate corporate cash holding is measured using the quarterly Compustat database,
which was downloaded from the WRDS. The Compustat database is a listed firm-level
database compiled by Standard and Poor’s and includes detailed firm-level information
including corporate cash holdings. Following Bates, Kahle, and Stulz, 2009, I exclude fi-
nancial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999).² I require firms to
have a non-negative and non-missing measure of cash holdings. In constructing aggre-
gate corporate cash holdings, I sum up corporate cash holdings across firms within each
quarter. I adjust for the seasonality in cash holdings by using the X-13ARIMA-SEATS
Seasonal Adjustment Program from the Census to obtain the aggregate series plotted in
Figure 1 (d).³
¹Visit https://fred.stlouisfed.org/ to download the relevant variables
²financial firms might increase cash holdings to meet the capital requirement, rather than liquidating
inventory or other economic reasons. The cash holdings of firms in the utilities can be subject to regulatory
supervision.
³See https://www.census.gov/srd/www/x13as/ for more information.
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The scanner price index in Figure 1 (c) is measured using the ACNielsen Homescan
Panel database discussed in Section 2. I first divide my sample into two groups based on
the measure of the credit supply shock (Lf ) constructed in Section 3.1. If a firm’s credit
supply shockmeasure is larger than the 80th percentile of the credit supply shockmeasure,
I assume that firm faces a large negative credit supply shock. On the other hand, if a firm’s
credit supply shock measure is smaller than the 20th percentile of the credit supply shock
measure, I assume that firm faces a small negative credit supply shock. Using another
threshold, such as the 75th percentile and 25th percentile, shows similar results.
For each group of firms, I construct the price index in the following way. I take a
geometric average of price across UPC within firm-group-time, and then take a geometric













These indexes correspond to the price index at the firm-group-level and group-level
based on the nested-CES demand system that does not incorporate the variety-quality
correction as discussed in Section 3.2. I then use the following Tornqvist price index to











where t0 is the base time (2004:Q1), and 'gt is a market share weight for group g at time
t.
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2004q1 2006q1 2008q1 2010q1 2012q1
quarter
Scanner Price Index BLS Price Index
Scanner Price Index & BLS Food Price Index
The scanner price index is measured based on price and quantity data available in the
ACNielsen Homescan Panel database. The BLS food price index is the official price index
downloaded from FRED.
I checked to see how well this index follows the official price index for the United
States. I construct aggregate scanner price index by using all price and quantity available
in the ACNielsenHomescan Panel database. I plot this index alongwith the BLS food price
index downloaded from FRED to check the validity of index I constructed. As shown in
Figure A.1, the scanner price index closely follows the official price index.
A.3 Robustness Checks
Different Timing of the Credit Supply Shock
A potential concern related to the definition of the pre- and post-treatment periods is that
the period between 2007:Q3 and 2008:Q2 is not used in the main regression analysis. I
did not use this period because it is unlikely to be suitable either for the pretreatment
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period because of the moderate degree of credit market stress at this time or for the post-
treatment period because I cannot exploit the surprising nature of the Lehman bankruptcy.
Excluding this period, however, raises questions about what occurred to firms that faced a
negative credit supply shock during this time. For example, firmsmight increase their out-
put prices in response to the modest degree of credit market stress between the pre- and
post-Lehman periods but then drop their output prices when they face an extreme degree
of negative credit supply shock, such as the Lehman bankruptcy. In addition, although
the negative relationship between the price and quantity of loans after the Lehman failure
in Figure 1.2 ensures that this period is characterized by a shift in credit supply, Duchin,
Ozbas, and Sensoy, 2010 indicate that demand-side factors becamemore important during
this period.⁴ They suggest the period before the Lehman failure is more appropriate for
studying the effect of a credit supply shock, at least for corporate investment.
I utilize three other definitions of pre- and post-treatment periods that incorporate
2007:Q4 to 2008:Q2 in order to corroborate the empirical findings, as shown in Table
A.1. The first two columns report the results by defining 2007:Q4 to 2008:Q2 as a post-
treatment period. Using the main credit supply shock variable, I still find that the negative
credit supply shock leads firms to decrease their output prices. These results not only
ease concerns related to the demand-side effects that might be stronger after the Lehman
failure but also suggest that the effect is robust to the moderate degree of credit market
stress, consistent with the external validity check in section 3.6.3. In addition, given the
⁴In choosing the post-treatment period, however, Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy, 2010 examine the rela-
tionships between corporate investment, Tobin’s Q, cash flow, and initial corporate cash holdings, not the
credit market. In particular, the bank shock I use generates an entirely different variation than the initial
cash holdings.
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Table A.1: Robustness: Different Pre- and Post-Treatment Periods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lnPfg (Pre-Lehman) lnPfg (Post-Lehman)
Lf (Pre-Lehman) Lf (Post-Lehman I) Lf (Post-Lehman II)
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Lehman Lehman Lehman
(-Lf ) -3.7** 1.5 -14.4*** -16.5** -18.5*** -16.4**
(1.5) (6.2) (3.6) (7.9) (3.5) (7.6)
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product group FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F statistics 13.9 21.3 24.0
E[lnP] 11.4 11.4 11.4 11.4 11.4 11.4
E[lnP:(-Lp90)-(-Lp10)] -8.2 3.2 -31.4 -36.1 -40.3 -35.7
Observations 1639 1639 1658 1658 1658 1658
Note. * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01; standard errors are clustered by firm and
product group; the regression is weighted by initial sales; and firm-level controls are the
firm’s listed status, four-digit NAICS FE, age, size, bond rating, number of loans, amount
of loans, loan type, loan-year FE, multi-lead FE, number of loans due in the post-Lehman
FE, loan spread, loan maturity, and lagged lnPfg; lnPfg (Pre-Lehman):
2006:Q4-2007:Q2 to 2007:Q4-2008:Q2, lnPfg (Post-Lehman): 2006:Q4-2007:Q2 to
2008:Q4-2009:Q2, Lf (Pre-Lehman): 2005:Q4-2006:Q2, 2006:Q4-2007:Q2 to
2007:Q4-2008:Q2, Lf (Post-Lehman I): 2006:Q4-2007:Q2 and 2007:Q4-2008:Q2 to
2008:Q4-2009:Q2, Lf (Post-Lehman II): 2005:Q4-2006:Q2, 2006:Q4-2007:Q2,
2007:Q4-2008:Q2 to 2008:Q4-2009:Q2.
somewhat large degree of credit market stress in this period, this timing provides a useful
placebo test for the measure of the Lehman failure. I find that the Lehman failure does not
lead firms to change their output prices in this period, additionally validating the measure
of the Lehman failure. In addition, I define 2007:Q4 to 2008:Q2 as a pre-Lehman period




In this section, I address concerns related to retailer behavior and conduct three additional
empirical analyses to show that the qualitative results in this article are robust to retail-
level decisions. A potential concern regarding the regression analysis is that I observe
the prices of products that households purchase, not the prices that firms set. Using these
prices would not be a problem for retailers in my sample but would generate some dis-
crepancy for manufacturers because they need to sell their products to retailers to reach
their final consumers. For this subsample, if retailers do not completely pass through
manufacturers’ output prices, the estimated coefficient could be biased. While complete
pass-through is assumed in many macroeconomic and international trade models with
the CES demand system and monopolistic competition, in reality, retailers are likely to
adjust their margins as the result of a decrease in their costs.
I argue that the estimated coefficients are at most underestimated because I observe
only retailer-level price variation. First, studies document that retailers incompletely pass
through their costs to output prices (e.g., Burstein and Gopinath 2014). If it is true that
manufacturers that face a negative credit supply shock decrease their output prices, retail-
ers that face this decrease in their costs will also decrease their output prices, but less than
they decrease their cost. I rule out the case where manufacturers facing a negative credit
supply shock increase their output prices, but retailers decrease their output prices due
to this increase in their costs, thereby dramatically decreasing their profits. This case is
very unlikely, and to the best of my knowledge, no narrative evidence or previous studies
document this pattern.
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To confirm that the results do not change as a result of retailers’ behavior, I first allow
a retail store dimension in the data and run a regression with retail store fixed effects to
absorb all store-level characteristics in the sample.⁵ In my main regression analysis, I use
a nested CES demand system across all UPCs and firms in the data and hence abstract
away from the production network effect of the retailer and manufacturer. In this way, I
aggregate each product sold in different stores across retailers within manufacturers. For
example, Smucker’s jam is likely to be sold in different retail stores, such as CVS,Walmart,
and Walgreens, and by collapsing the retailer dimension, I focus on Smucker’s behavior
for this particular product instead of on retailers’ behavior. While this approach is a
conventional way to aggregate and construct a price index and is valid when considering
a large number of retailers, one might be worried that a particular type of retailer deals
with a particular type of manufacturer that is more or less exposed to the credit supply
shock I constructed, generating bias in the coefficient. Hence, I explicitly allow a retail
store dimension in the data and remove all retail-level characteristics from the regression
analysis.
Table A.2 reports the results. Because I allow retail store fixed effects, credit supply
shock at the retail level cannot be used. As one can see, despite the fact that I absorb
retail-level variations, I still find that firms that face a negative credit supply shock de-
crease their output prices. Note that the estimated coefficients are approximately 3% to
5%, smaller than the estimates reported in Table 1.4. A plausible explanation for this find-
ing is the incomplete pass-through. I drop all retail-level variation in the credit supply
⁵Allowing retail-group fixed effects, which absorb all retail-group-level variation, does not alter the
results.
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Table A.2: Robustness: Retail Store Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln ~Pfgr: 2006q4-2007q2 to 2008q4-2009q2
OLS (-Lf ) instrumented using
Lehman ABX BankItem All
(-Lf ) -2.9*** -5.0*** -3.9** -3.2* -3.9***
(0.7) (1.3) (1.5) (1.8) (1.3)
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product group FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Retail store FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F statistics 25.60 16.30 24.50 13.30
J-statistics p-value 0.43
E[lnP] 10.2 10.2 10.2 10.2 10.2
E[lnP:(-Lp90)-(-Lp10)] -7.2 -12.2 -9.5 -7.9 -9.6
Observations 40519 40519 40519 40519 40519
Note. * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01; standard errors are clustered by firm and
product group; the regression is weighted by initial sales; firm-level controls are the
firm’s listed status, four-digit NAICS FE, age, size indicator, bond rating, number of
loans, amount of loans, loan type, loan-year FE, multi-lead FE, number of loans due in
the post-Lehman FE, loan spread, loan maturity, and a lagged dependent variable; and
ln ~Pfgr is the conventional part of the price index at the retail level that excludes the
variety-quality correction.
shock and use only manufacturers that must pass through retailers to sell their products
to households. If there exists incomplete pass-through at the retail level, the estimated
coefficients must be smaller, which is indeed what I observe.
In addition, I use only companies that are classified as retailers according to the NAICS
industry code and find an even stronger result. Table A.3 reports the results. Despite the
smaller number of observations, based on the main measure of the credit supply shock, I
still find that firms that face a negative credit supply shock decrease their output prices.
Themagnitude of the coefficients is larger than that reported in Table 1.4, again suggesting
the possibility that incomplete pass-through causes the coefficient in the main analysis
to be underestimated. Using bank statement items as an instrumental variable generates
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Table A.3: Robustness: Retailers Only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
lnPfg: 2006q4-2007q2 to 2008q4-2009q2
OLS (-Lf ) instrumented using
Lehman ABX BankItem All
Lf -12.59** -61.90 -52.09* -13.66** -14.87**
(5.83) (91.88) (28.06) (4.95) (5.57)
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product group FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F statistics 0.40 3.50 43.20 47.60
J-statistics p-value 0.20
E[lnP] 11.4 11.4 11.4 11.4 11.4
E[lnP:Lp90-Lp10] -27.5 -135 -113.6 -29.8 -32.4
Observations 763 763 763 763 763
Note. * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01; standard errors are clustered by firm and
product group; and firm-level controls are the firm’s four-digit NAICS FE, bond rating,
loan type, loan-year FE, multi-lead FE, and number of loans due in the post-Lehman FE
consistent coefficients. Using Lehman or ABX securities exposure as instruments gener-
ates larger estimates with less statistical significance, but this result is very likely due to
the weak instrument for this particular subsample. As observed, the first-stage F statistics
are very small. Firms in this subsample face a negative credit supply shock due to lending
and the deterioration of bank balance sheets, but they are unlikely to be constrained by
the Lehman exposure or ABX securities exposure.
Finally, I gather and combine manufacturer price data from the Promodata, which is
also available from the Kilts Marketing Data Center to confirm the empirical findings.
These data provide detailed competitive manufacturer costs and price changes for all ma-
jor grocerywholesalers frommajormarkets. The data are reported from 12 grocerywhole-
saler organizations that provided products to the entirety of the United States from 2006
to 2011. Despite a smaller number of observations, using these data, I still find that firms
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Table A.4: Robustness: Manufacturer Price
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
 ln ~Pfg: 2006q4-2007q2 to 2008q4-2009q2
OLS (-Lf ) instrumented using
Lehman ABX BankItem All
(-Lf ) -14.24** -112.88 -37.16*** -46.77 -40.07***
(6.47) (267.90) (12.64) (38.64) (13.46)
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product group FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F statistics 0.2 49.5 2.9 28.0
J-statstics p-value 0.51
E[lnP] 13.3 13.3 13.3 13.3 13.3
E[lnP:(-Lp90)-(-Lp10)] -30.9 -245.1 -80.7 -101.5 -87
Observations 112 112 112 112 112
Note. * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01; heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors;
firm-level controls are the firm’s age, number of loans, amount of loans, loan spread, and
loan maturity; and ln ~Pfg is the conventional part of the price index that excludes the
variety-quality correction.
that face a negative credit supply shock decrease their output prices, as reported in Ta-
ble A.4. The magnitude of the coefficient is again larger than that in Table 1.4, suggesting
that there exists incomplete pass-through. Using ABX securities as instruments generates
large and statistically significant estimates, suggesting that firms that face this particular
shock decrease their prices even more. Using Lehman or ABX securities exposure as in-
struments generates negative but statistically insignificant results likely as a result of the
weak instrument problem.
The discussion and three additional empirical analyses in this section suggest that the
qualitative results in this article are robust to retail-level variations. In fact, these results
suggest that the main estimated coefficients reported in Table 1.4 are likely to be the most
conservative estimates because of incomplete pass-through. The 90th-10th percentile ra-
tio is approximately 30% based on Tables A.3 and A.4, suggesting that the effect should be
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even larger once we control for retail-level variation. The extendedmodel proposed in sec-
tion 4.2 incorporates this dimension by allowing price rigidity and featuring incomplete
pass-through at the retail level. Overall, I conclude that retail-level output price variation
does not alter the main findings.
Demand Shocks
I implement two additional empirical analyses to show that the results are not driven by
product demand shock. Given that an output price is an equilibrium object determined by
demand and supply, one might be worried about the effect of a demand shock that could
potentially confound the effect of the credit supply shock. In particular, the financial panic
of 2008 is known to have originated in the housing market, which affects different parts of
the economy. Influential papers such as Mian, Rao, and Sufi, 2013 use regional variation
to document the strong effect of housing net worth on household consumption during
this period, which would likely change output prices. If this type of local housing market
disruption simultaneously affects local firms’ credit conditions through local banks and
makes firms decrease their output prices, then the estimated coefficients could be biased.
Although a product demand shock could be worrisome, I believe this factor plays a
minor role in the main regression analysis. In fact, the presence of confounding factors,
such as demand shock, is precisely why I use micro-level data, bank shock, and three
different instruments. The general equilibrium effect arising from the housing market is
apparent in the time series data, but the micro-level data allowme to avoid it by exploiting
the differential effect of credit supply shock. Rather than using the conventional measures
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of financial constraint, I carefully construct and choose the bank shock and three different
instruments to ensure that these credit supply shock measures are uncorrelated with the
product demand shock. Empirically, I find that firms that face a negative credit supply
shock increase their market share, as shown in Table 1.6. Because a negative product
demand shock leads to a decrease in market share, these results show that the variation
in the measure of the credit supply shock is not driven by the product demand shock.
To further demonstrate that the empirical results are not driven by the product de-
mand shock, I allow detailed purchaser characteristics in the regression analyses as con-
trol variables and confirm the validity of the results. ACNielsen Homescan Panel data
collect detailed household information such as income, education, employment, age, race,
and household size. For example, once again consider Smucker’s jam. I observe not only
Smucker’s price and quantity, its balance sheet, and its banking relationships but also its
customer characteristics, including income and employment. I further combine zip-code-
level housing price data from Zillow and country-level homeownership data from the cen-
sus. To construct firm-group-specific household characteristics, I first take a weighted av-
erage across households for a UPC by taking the sample weight of households as a weight.
I then take a sales-weighted average across UPCs within the product group and the firm.
Table A.5 reports the results with purchaser information. I include purchasers’ income,
employment, race, age, education, housing price, and home ownership—characteristics
that are most likely to be affected by or sensitive to shocks during this period. The first
three columns report the results with pre-Lehman purchaser characteristics, and the last
three columns report the results with a change in purchaser characteristics. Regardless of
the specifications, the estimated coefficients are negative and statistically significant with
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Table A.5: Effect of the Credit Crunch on the Output Price: Purchaser Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lnPfg: 2006q4-2007q2 to 2008q4-2009q2
OLS IV OLS IV
All All
(-Lf ) -8.6*** -6.6*** -7.9*** -6.8***
(1.0) (1.9) (1.0) (1.9)
Initial purchaser char. Yes Yes No No
Change in purchasers’ char. No No Yes Yes
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product group FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F statistics 207.8 205.2
J-statistics p-value 0.16 0.65
E[lnP] 11.3 11.3 11.3 11.3
E[lnP:(-Lp90)-(-Lp10)] -18.7 -14.3 -17.1 -14.8
Observations 1673 1673 1673 1673
Note. * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01; standard errors are clustered by firm and
product group; the regression is weighted by initial sales; and firm-level controls are the
firm’s listed status, four-digit NAICS FE, age, size, bond rating, number of loans, amount
of loans, loan type, loan-year FE, multi-lead FE, number of loans due in the post-Lehman
FE, loan spread, loan maturity, and lagged lnPfg; purchaser characteristics are income,
education, head of household employment, member of household employment, age,
household size, housing price, home ownership, and Hispanic. All household
characteristics are projection-factor-weighted averaged across households within a UPC,
and sales-weighted averaged across UPCs within a firm-group; and Cragg-Donaldson
F-stat is used for the first-stage F statistics.
the purchaser characteristics. While the estimated coefficients of the household charac-
teristics are not reported, most are not statistically significant. This result suggests that
household characteristics are not key factors in explaining price dynamics if we use vari-
ation across firms and across product-groups instead of local variation.
I also confirm my results by allowing the state dimension in the data with state fixed
effects.⁶ A concern in the main regression analysis is that some firms in the data operate
⁶Allowing state-group fixed effects, which absorb all state-group-level variation, does not alter the
results.
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Table A.6: Effect of the Credit Crunch on the Output Price: State Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln ~Pfgs: 2006q4-2007q2 to 2008q4-2009q2
OLS (-Lf ) instrumented using
Lehman ABX BankItem All
(-Lf ) -4.4*** -3.7** -9.2*** -4.1* -5.3***
(0.9) (1.9) (3.5) (2.4) (1.8)
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product group FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F statistics 23.90 13.30 13.30 12.70
J-statistics p-value 0.14
E[lnP] 10.9 10.9 10.9 10.9 10.9
E[lnP:(-Lp90)-(-Lp10)] -10.1 -8.5 -21.2 -9.4 -12.3
Observations 26894 26894 26894 26894 26894
Note. * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01; standard errors are clustered by firm and
product group; the regression is weighted by initial sales; and firm-level controls are the
firm’s listed status, four-digit NAICS FE, age, size, bond rating, number of loans, amount
of loans, loan type, loan-year FE, multi-lead FE, number of loans due in the post-Lehman
FE, loan spread, loan maturity, and a lagged dependent variable.
only in particular regions that likely have different demand conditions. To address this
concern, I compare products within the state by allowing and absorbing all state-level
variation in the data. As shown in Table A.6, I still find that firms that face a negative
credit supply shock decrease their output prices. These results suggest that the main
results in this article are robust to local factors, such as region-specific demand shocks.
Foreign Exposure
One concern regarding the regression analysis is a large change in the overall interna-
tional exposure in this period. If those firms facing a large negative credit supply shock
are the ones that particularly sell more to foreign countries or can hedge the risk by ac-
cessing foreign financial resources, the estimate might be biased. I proxy the foreign
189
Table A.7: Effect of the Credit Crunch on Output Price: Foreign Exposure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln ~Pfgs: 2006q4-2007q2 to 2008q4-2009q2
OLS (-Lf ) instrumented using
Lehman ABX BankItem All
(-Lf ) -7.92*** -6.28* -6.46** -7.45** -6.81***
(1.61) (3.76) (3.01) (3.60) (2.33)
# of foreign subsidiaries -6.16 -7.91 -7.72 -6.66 -7.34
(4.61) (5.62) (5.59) (6.10) (5.11)
# of foreign branches 6.86 9.82 9.49 7.71 8.85
(23.87) (24.06) (23.58) (24.13) (23.45)
firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
product group FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F statistics 23.10 8.50 9.60 13.00
J-statstics p-value 0.96
E[lnP] 11.4 11.4 11.4 11.4 11.4
E[lnP:(-Lp90)-(-Lp10)] -17.3 -13.7 -14.1 -16.2 -14.9
Observations 1658 1658 1658 1658 1658
Note. * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01; standard errors are clustered by firm and
product group; weighted by initial sales; Firm-level controls: listed, 4-digit NAICS FE,
age, size indicator, bond rating, number of loans, amount of loans, loan type, loan-year
FE, multi-lead FE, number of loans due in post-Lehman FE, spread, maturity, lagged
dependent variable
exposure of each company using their information on foreign subsidiaries and branches.
Orbis records a number of subsidiaries and branches, and how many of them are in for-
eign countries. I measure foreign exposure by dividing a number of foreign subsidiaries
by total subsidiaries and number of foreign branches by total branches and include these
measures in the regression. As shown in Table A.7, these variables do not seem to cor-
relate with output price change, and the effect of credit supply shock on output price is
robust to adding these control variables.
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Table A.8: Effect of the Credit Crunch on Output Price: Different Weightings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lnPfg: 2006q4-2007q2 to 2008q4-2009q2
weight Number of buyers Number of UPCs
OLS IV OLS IV
Lehman Lehman
(-Lf ) -2.44*** -9.68*** -7.63** -2.24*** -5.59*** -6.59*
(0.69) (1.62) (3.03) (0.74) (1.30) (3.58)
firm-level controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
product group FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
First-stage F statistics 205.2 205.2
E[lnP] 12.5 12.5 12.5 12 12 12
E[lnP:(-Lp90)-(-Lp10)] -5 -19.7 -15.5 -5.1 -12.7 -14.9
Observations 1658 1658 1658 1658 1658 1658
Note. * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01; standard errors are clustered by firm and
product group; weighted by initial sales; firm-level controls are listed status, 4-digit
NAICS FE, age, size indicator, bond rating, number of loans, amount of loans, loan type,
loan-year FE, multi-lead FE, number of loans due in post-Lehman FE, spread, maturity,
and a lagged dependent variable
Different Regression Weightings
In my main regression analysis, I used initial sales as a weight to give a larger weight to
the firm-group that has larger sales. This regressionmatches the sales-weighted aggregate
price index (Amiti andWeinstein, forthcoming). Additionally, I used a different regression
weight as a robustness and report the result in Table A.8. First three columns use number
of buyers as a weight, giving larger weight to the firm and group that matters the most
for consumers. I also used the number of products in each bin as a weight, replicating
the UPC-level regression. Regardless of the weighting, I find that firms facing a negative
credit supply shock decrease their output prices relative to their counterparts.
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Variants of Lf
For my main regression analysis, I make a conservative choice in measuring credit supply
shock by following Chodorow-Reich, 2014 carefully. In this section, I conduct additional
robustness checks using two variants of the measure of credit supply shock, Lf .
First, in constructing a change in bank health at the bank level (leave-one-out), I use
the change in a number of loans per bank to measure the credit supply shock, rather than
the change in the amount of loans. Using number of loans helps to minimize the potential
measurement error, but this choice might not capture the change in bank health properly
if themajority of banks change their lending by decreasing the sizes of the loans (intensive
margin), rather than the number of loans (extensive margin). While previous literature
(Darmouni 2016) and Figure 1.2 show that the majority of the decrease in lending in this
period is due to the extensive margin, I also confirm my results by using the amount of
loans, which incorporates both intensive and extensive margins.
Second, to construct a firm-specific credit supply shock from a bank-specific change in
bank health, I need a weight that measures the importance of each bank to a firm as firms
typically deal with multiple banks in the syndicated loan market. In my main regression
analysis, I used the last pre-Lehman loan—loans borrowed by firms from banks just before
the Lehman failure—to maximize the effect of bank shock on firms. One concern of using
the last pre-Lehman loan as a weight is that the measure relies on one particular loan.
While this concern is not a first-order problem given the long-run bank-firm relationships
that are prevalent in the United States, I reassure my results using the whole pre-Lehman
period to construct the weight. I take an average across loans within firm and bank in
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Table A.9: Effect of the Credit Crunch on Output Price: Variant of Lf
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lnPfg: 2006q4-2007q2 to 2008q4-2009q2
(-Lf ): Amount of Loans (-Lf ): Average Bank Share
OLS IV OLS IV
Lehman Lehman
(-Lf ) -5.2*** -21.5*** -22.7** -6.9*** -18.3*** -44.7***
(1.8) (4.9) (10.9) (2.5) (4.7) (11.6)
firm-level controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
product group FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
First-stage F statistics 18.0 13.5
E[lnP] 11.4 11.4 11.4 11.5 11.5 11.5
E[lnP:(-Lp90)-(-Lp10)] -11.3 -47 -49.5 -15 -40 -97.5
Observations 1658 1658 1658 1417 1417 1417
Note. * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01; standard errors are clustered by firm and
product group; weighted by initial sales; firm-level controls are listed status, 4-digit
NAICS FE, age, size indicator, bond rating, number of loans, amount of loans, loan type,
loan-year FE, multi-lead FE, number of loans due in post-Lehman FE, spread, maturity,
and lagged lnPfg; average bank share is the average bank share in the pre-Lehman
period
measuring the weight.
Table A.9 shows the results. The first three columns show the results based on the
credit supply shock that utilize the amount of loans, and last three columns show the
results based on the average bank share in the whole pre-Lehman period. Regardless of
the measure of credit supply shock used, I still find that companies facing a negative credit
supply shock decrease their output prices.
Different Price Indexes
In my main regression analysis, I follow Hottman, Redding, and Weinstein, 2016 and uti-
lize the nested CES demand system to construct price index at the firm-group level. This
formulation allows me to explicitly incorporate the change in product variety and quality
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Table A.10: Effect of the Credit Crunch on Output Price: Different Price Indexes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lnPfg: 2007q4-2008q2 to 2008q4-2009q2
(-Lf ): 2006q4-2007q2, 2007q4-2008q2 to 2008q4-2009q2
price index Laspeyres Paasche Tornqvist
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Lehman Lehman Lehman
(-Lf ) -5.32*** -13.78** -4.41*** -9.31** -1.58** -6.53**
(1.69) (5.77) (1.26) (4.60) (0.79) (3.27)
firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
product group FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F statistics 7.7 7.7 7.7
E[lnP] 3.18 3.18 2.6 2.6 1.52 1.52
E[lnP:(-Lp90)-(-Lp10)] -11.6 -30.1 -9.6 -20.3 -3.5 -14.3
Observations 1617 1617 1617 1617 1617 1617
Note. * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01; standard errors are clustered by firm and
product group; weighted by initial sales; firm-level controls are listed status, 3-digit
NAICS FE, age, size indicator, bond rating, loan type, loan-year FE, multi-lead FE,
number of loans due in post-Lehman FE, spread, and maturity; Using Lehman failure
instrument directly as a measure of credit supply shock does not change the results.
and nests the model in Section 4 that uses the CES demand system.
In this section, I use more conventional price indexes to confirm that the main results
do not depend on how the price indexes are constructed. I use three different indexes:
Laspeyres, Paasche, and Tornqvist. To minimize the effect of entry and exit in products,
I deliberately choose the period from 2007:Q4-2008:Q2 to 2008:Q4-2009:Q2 in measuring
a dependent variable. Table A.10 shows the results. Regardless of which index is used in
the regression analysis, I still find that companies facing a negative credit supply shock
decrease their output prices. While the first-stage F-statistics is smaller than 10, using the
instrument directly as a measure of the credit supply shock does not change the result.
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Testing the Selection of Unobserved Variables
In this section, I additionally support my identification assumption by conducting a test
originated from Khwaja and Mian, 2008 and implemented in Chodorow-Reich, 2014. This
test is to check whether there is an unobserved variable that might bias the estimate in
the main regression. Consider the following regression analysis:
 ln(Loansfb) = f + (Bank Health)-f;b + "fb (A.3.1)
where f is firm, b is bank, Loansfb is the amount of loans received by firm f from bank b,
(Bank Health)-f;b is the leave-one-out change in bank health I measured in section 3.1,
and f is a firm fixed effect. In this regression, the coefficient  refers to how the amount
of loans received by firm f from bank b changes when their bank health deteriorates.
The test is to look at the stability of the coefficient () by including and excluding the
firm fixed effect (f ). Including the firm fixed effect implies that I look at the effect of bank
shock on loan amount within the firm. That is, for a given firm, how do loans received
by this firm change when its banks can no longer lend to it. Since there is no variation
across firms, this regression analysis is not subject to concern arises from the fact that
different firms might demand credit differently. On the other hand, excluding firm fixed
effect implies that I use variation across firms in estimating the coefficient . In this case,
if it is true that different firms demand credit differentially, the coefficient would be biased
and different from the estimates with firm fixed effect.
Table A.11 shows the estimated coefficient with and without firm fixed effects. Col-
umn (1) reports the estimated coefficient when I allow firm fixed effects, and column (2)
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Table A.11: Testing the Selection of Unobserved Variables
(1) (2)
 ln(Loans)
Bank Health f; b 9.76** 9.53**
(4.43) (4.72)
firm-level controls No Yes
naics 3-digit FE No Yes
Borrower FE Yes No
Observations 402 402
R2 0.695 0.599
Note. * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01; standard errors are clustered by borrower and
lender; firm-level controls are listed status, 4-digit NAICS FE, bond rating, number of
loans, amount of loans, loan type, loan-year FE, multi-lead FE, number of loans due in
post-Lehman FE, spread, and maturity
reports the estimated coefficient when I do not allow firm fixed effects but instead allow
firm-level control variables. As one can see, the estimated coefficient is stable across two
different specifications; a decrease in one standard deviation of a change in bank health
leads to a decrease in the amount of loan received by the firm by about 9.5 9.8 percent. This
result suggests that the unobserved characteristics of firms are not likely to be correlated
with the credit supply shock measure I constructed conditioning on observed character-
istics.
A.4 Liquidity Position
In the main text, I discuss how previous works in corporate finance, such as Almeida et al.,
2014, Kahle and Stulz, 2013, and Bates, Kahle, and Stulz, 2009 raise concerns about using
liquidity position as a measure of financial constraint. I already report and confirm the
results of Kahle and Stulz, 2013 in Table 1.6 by showing that companies facing a negative
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credit supply shock increase their liquidity.
In this section, I present three additional analyses to confirm the results in Bates, Kahle,
and Stulz, 2009 and to understand why different measures of financial constraint—bank
shock and liquidity—lead to different pricing behaviors of firms. First, I replicate the
regression in Bates, Kahle, and Stulz, 2009 by using the Compustat database. In particular,
I used only the year 2006 to compare how those firms that had a large amount of cash
holdings are different compared to those firms that had a small amount of cash holdings
before the financial panic. Consider the following regression analysis:
liquidityi;t = 0 + Xi;2006 + i;2006 (A.4.1)
where t = {2006, 2008}. Liquidity is cash + cash equivalent assetstotal assets that is used in Bates, Kahle, and
Stulz, 2009 and Gilchrist et al., 2017, and Xi is a vector of firm-level characteristics. The
firm-level characteristics used in this regression are cash flow volatility,⁷, debt to assets,
capital expenditure to assets, acquisition to assets, firm size, market to book ratio, net-
working capital to assets, cash flow volatility, dividend dummy, and R&D to sales.
Figure A.2 graphically shows the regression results when I compare firms based on
their 2006 liquidity position. Standard errors are omitted for visibility, but all the coeffi-
cients are statistically significant at the 5% level.⁸ The results show that firms that had a
large amount of liquidity in 2006 had higher cash flow volatility, and borrowed more, in-
vested more, and spent more money to acquire more firms in 2006. These characteristics
⁷Following Bates, Kahle, and Stulz, 2009, cash flow volatility is measured by taking the standard devia-
tion of cash flow for the previous 10 years, requiring at least three observations per firm.
⁸Regression table is available upon request.
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Fitted Value (slope: -.54)
Note. There are a total of 1707 firms; the dependent variable is liquidity (cash to assets),
and independent variables are cash flow volatility, debt to assets, capital expenditure to
assets, acquisition to assets, firm size, market to book ratio, networking capital to assets,
cash flow volatility, dividend dummy, and R&D to sales. The plots report the estimated
coefficients of the selected firm-level characteristics, which are cash flow volatility, debt
to assets, capital expenditure (capex) to assets, and acquisition to assets. These plots
represent the correlation between liquidity (cash to assets) and firm characteristics after
partialling out other characteristics based on the Frisch-Waugh-Lovell theorem.
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are likely to reflect financially constrained firms, rather than financially unconstrained
firms. This analysis, which is a replication of Bates, Kahle, and Stulz, 2009 using the year
2006, is consistent with the survey paper by Almeida et al., 2014, who argue that compa-
nies hold more cash when they are more likely to be financially constrained.
Additionally, I regress 2008 firm-level characteristics on 2006 liquidity to see how
those firms that had high initial liquidity reacted during the financial panic of 2008. Un-
der the assumption that the financial shock that directly hits companies is the dominant
shock in the U.S. economy during the 2007-09 recession, weak liquidity position might be
a good measure of financial constraint as those firms that initially had a small amount of
liquidity are likely to suffer more from the financial shock. In this case, those firms with
a small amount of liquidity would react as if they are financially constrained. In fact, this
idea is very similar to what I did with the bank shock. I argue that those companies with
a small amount of initial liquidity are likely to be more sensitive to the bank shock, and
I show the empirical support for this in Table 1.7. If the Great Recession is characterized
by only the bank shock, I should also observe that those firms that had a small amount of
liquidity in 2006 look more financially constrained.
As shown in Table A.12, however, I still find that those firms that had a small amount
of initial liquidity in 2006 have a stable cash flow, invest more, borrow more, and spend
more money to acquire firms than firms that had a large amount of initial liquidity in 2006.
These results are true regardless of whether I allow 2-digit SIC fixed effects as reported in
columns (5)-(8). These results suggest that the Great Recession itself does not capture the
bank shock, or “financial shock” in general, and liquidity position is not a good measure
of financial constraint even we interact it with the Great Recession. In this period, there
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Table A.12: Firm Characteristics in 2008 and Cash Holdings in 2006
(1) (2) (3) (4)
cash flow volatility capex to assets acquisition to assets debt to assets
cash to assets (2006) 0.25*** -0.04*** -0.01** -0.32***
(0.03) (0.01) (0.00) (0.05)
2-digit sic No No No No
R2 0.12 0.02 0.00 0.12
obs 2638 3062 2962 2920
(5) (6) (7) (8)
cash flow volatility capex to assets acquisition to assets debt to assets
cash to assets (2006) 0.21*** -0.02** -0.01*** -0.28***
(0.04) (0.01) (0.00) (0.04)
2-digit sic Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.17 0.30 0.04 0.22
obs 2635 3059 2959 2917
Note. * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01; standard errors are clustered by sic 2-digit
code.
are many other events happening at the same time, such as decreases in the housing price
(Mian and Sufi, 2014), oil price (Hamilton, 2009), and international trade (Eaton et al.,
2016), making it difficult to utilize the Great Recession as an aggregate financial shock.
Lastly, I re-estimate Equation 1.3.9 by controlling for the initial liquidity position and
report the results in Table A.13. Columns (1)-(3) use the average liquidity across 2006-07,
and columns (4)-(6) use the liquidity position in 2006. Without allowing the firm-level
initial and lagged characteristics as in column (1) and (4), it seems that both bank shock
and initial liquidity position independently explain output price dynamics. After adding
other firm-level control variables, however, the coefficient of bank shock becomes larger
and statistically significant, whereas the coefficient of initial liquidity position changes
sign and becomes statistically non-significant. These results suggest that the initial liq-
uidity is highly correlated with other characteristics of firms, and that it is difficult to use
initial liquidity as a measure of financial constraint.
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Table A.13: Firm Characteristics in 2008 and Cash Holdings in 2006
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lnPfg: 2006q4-2007q2 to 2008q4-2009q2
OLS IV (-Lf ) OLS IV (-Lf )
All All
(-Lf ) -2.26*** -4.54*** -5.83** -2.21*** -4.12*** -5.75**
(0.85) (1.52) (2.46) (0.83) (1.26) (2.31)  cash
total asset







firm-level controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
product group FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
First-stage F statistics 5.2 6.2
J-statstics p-value 0.27 0.12
E[lnP] 11.53 11.53 11.53 11.53 11.53 11.53
E[lnP:(-Lp90)-(-Lp10)] -4.78 -9.61 -12.35 -4.68 -8.72 -12.17
Observations 1318 1318 1318 1318 1318 1318
Note. * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01; standard errors are clustered by firm and
product group; weighted by initial sales; firm-level controls are listed status, 4-digit
NAICS FE, age, size indicator, bond rating, number of loans, amount of loans, loan type,
loan-year FE, multi-lead FE, number of loans due in post-Lehman FE, spread, maturity,
and lagged lnPfg
A.5 Calibration: Regression with a Dummy Variable
In this section, I show the regression results I used to calibrate the magnitude of the shock
parameter. I cannot directly usemy estimated coefficient in Table 1.4, as I use a continuous
measure of credit supply shock, whereas my model features two identical representative
entrepreneurs with different degrees of credit supply shock. To match the model with the
data, I define a dummy variable that equals 1 if the credit supply shock measure is greater
than its median value and 0 otherwise:
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Table A.14: Main Result: With Dummy Variable
(1) (2) (3)
lnPfg: 2006q4-2007q2 to 2008q4-2009q2
OLS (-Lf ) instrumented using
Lehman All
Df -13.81*** -15.09** -14.74***
(2.78) (7.03) (4.24)
firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes
product group FE Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F statistics 10.20 8.10
J-statstics p-value 0.58
E[lnP] 11.4 11.4 11.4
Observations 1658 1658 1658
Note. * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01; standard errors are clustered by firm and
product group; weighted by initial sales; firm-level controls are listed status, 4-digit
NAICS FE, age, size indicator, bond rating, number of loans, amount of loans, loan type,




1; if Lf  median(Lf )
0; otherwise
I rerun the main regression analysis (Equation 1.3.9) by replacing the credit supply
shock measure with the dummy variable above:
 lnPfg = g + Df + Xf + "fg (A.5.1)
In this way, I can directly match my model where half of the producers face a nega-
tive credit supply shock, and the other half does not. Table A.14 shows the results. The
estimated coefficient is about -15%. I calibrate the magnitude of the credit supply shock
to the representative entrepreneur 1 so that the decrease in relative price is 15%.
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Appendix B
Appendix for Chapter 2
B.1 Recover Markups in Different Setups
Simple Setup
Suppose firms are using only labor and capital to produce output in the economy. Assume
a Cobb-Douglas production function with Hicks-neutral productivity: Qjt = Ajtljtkjt.
Qjt is output, Ajt is productivity, ljt is labor and kjt is capital for firm j at time t. All firms




s.t. Ajtljtkjt = Q
Forming Lagrangian and taking derivative lead to the following first order condition:
f.o.c. w1jt = jt(Ajtl 1jt kjt)
where jt is a Lagrangian multiplier, or marginal cost. Multiplying ljtPjtQjt on both
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sides of equation to get:
wjtljt








) jt = 
sljt
Markups, jt, are constant  over labor share, sljt. Only the inverse of labor share is
needed to recover the detrended markups and assess cyclicality.
Overhead Components
Suppose we allow aggregate time-varying overhead components in all inputs. Under
the assumptions 1-4 in section 2.1, all firms in the economy solve the following cost-








s.t. F (V 1jt/ V 1t ; :::) = Q
where V kt is the overhead components of input V kjt. Solving for the first order condi-












With an assumption 5 and the first-order approximation on ln(ejt), the equation (2.3)
becomes:




 ln(V kjt)  ln( V kt )  ln(jt)
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Double demeaning the above equation leads to the equation (2.4). Markups recovered
from this equation will have aggregate time-varying overhead components, but this will
not change any results in the main text because of time fixed effects included in all of the
regression analysis.
Labor Hoarding
Assume V 2jt is labor input and there is a labor hoarding, so that not all employees on a







jt   V hjt   V 2; :::; V Kjt   V K ; Ajt)
sejt
where V hjt captures labor hoarding. In this case, markup cyclicality depends on the cycli-
cality of V hjt . Suppose V hjt is countercyclical (or V 2jt   V hjt is procyclical) following Rotem-
berg and Woodford (1999). If labor and energy are complements as shown in section 5.1,¹
countercyclical V hjt makes markups even more procyclical. Similarly, allowing procyclical
labor effort leads to more procyclical markups, rather than countercyclical markups. No-
tice that if we measure markups as a ratio of the marginal product of labor and real wages
as in previous literature, a decrease in labor hoarding in boom is likely to decrease the
marginal product of labor and markups, hence make the markups more countercyclical.
¹Section 5.1. shows the complementarity between energy and production worker only, not with non-
production worker. However, using all labor input, instead of production worker and non-production
worker separately, results in a strong complementarity between labor and energy.
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B.2 Summary Statistics and First-Stage Regressions
Summary Statistics
Table B.1 reports summary statistics in NBER-CES database.
Table B.1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
NAICS 6-digit Codes 327009.662 8889.717 311111 339999 24596
Year ranges from 58 to 09 1983.5 15.009 1958 2009 24596
Total employment in 1000s 34.814 45.053 0.2 559.9 24167
Total payroll in $1m 735.896 1252.867 2.9 16162.9 24167
Production workers in 1000s 25.423 33.651 0.2 459.9 24167
Production worker hours in 1m 50.64 66.823 0.3 904.1 24167
Production worker wages in $1m 443.796 736.828 1.8 10475.2 24167
Total value of shipments in $1m 4799.495 13196.309 19.3 732728.4 24167
Total cost of materials in $1m 2620.97 9721.219 8.800 648048.4 24167
Total value added in $1m 2190.409 4710.187 9.700 111187.9 24167
Total capital expendture in $1m 156.655 462.108 0.1 17601.6 24167
End-of-year inventories in $1m 585.429 1433.618 1.3 40084.9 24162
Cost of electric & fuels in $1m 97.69 360.53 0.1 14201.5 24167
Total real capital stock in $1m 2757.95 6388.03 4.1 120110.3 24167
Real capital: equipment in $1m 1664.517 4145.339 1.9 88454.600 24167
Real capital: structures in $1m 1093.433 2418.355 2.2 38874.4 24167
Deflator for VSHIP 1997=1.000 0.799 1.552 0.044 47.409 24167
Deflator for MATCOST 1997=1.000 0.718 0.357 0.127 2.777 24167
Deflator for INVEST 1997=1.000 0.694 0.309 0.183 1.581 24167
Deflator for ENERGY 1997=1.000 0.695 0.402 0.087 2.233 24167
5-factor TFP annual growth rate 0.003 0.066 -0.642 1.387 23694
5-factor TFP index 1997=1.000 0.937 0.257 0.012 13.192 24167
4-factor TFP annual growth rate 0.003 0.066 -0.642 1.387 23694
4-factor TFP index 1997=1.000 0.936 0.257 0.011 13.193 24167
Note. NBER-CES database summary statistics. This table reports all variables in the
database, with mean, standard deviation, min and max value. There are about 24,000
total observations in the database. The variables in this database include gross output
(value of shipment), value added, 5-factor inputs as production worker, non-production
worker, capital, material and energy for each industry over time. This data also records
deflators for output, material, energy, investment and wage bill for production worker
and total employees.
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Table B.2: First-stage regression based on equation (2.4)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
energy material capital labor (p) labor (np)
energy price(t 1) -0.52 0.16 -0.17 -0.05 -0.13
(0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
energy price(t 2) -0.54 -0.20 -0.22 -0.29 -0.24
(0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07)
material price(t 1) 0.16 -0.70 -0.34 0.08 -0.03
(0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06)
material price(t 2) -0.18 -0.03 0.02 0.08 0.11
(0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07)
investment price(t 1) -1.90 -2.00 -1.57 -0.62 -2.13
(0.32) (0.32) (0.23) (0.29) (0.29)
investment price(t 2) 2.33 1.60 1.26 1.09 2.26
(0.33) (0.33) (0.23) (0.30) (0.29)
worker wage(t 1) 0.58 0.38 0.12 0.38 0.05
(0.09) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08)
worker wage(t 2) 0.31 0.03 0.07 0.10 -0.44
(0.09) (0.09) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08)
payroll(t 1) -0.07 0.44 0.26 -0.53 0.22
(0.10) (0.10) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09)
payroll(t 2) -0.06 0.11 0.42 -0.19 0.42
(0.10) (0.10) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09)
F-stat 183.0 344.8 319.5 90.67 38.13
obs 23221 23221 23221 23221 23220
Note. The first-stage regression result based on the equation (2.4):….












ln(W kj;t 2) + jt, for all k. Each input is
regressed on all 10 instruments.
First-Stage Regression based on Equation (2.4)
Table B.2 presents the first-stage regression result based on equation (2.4). Each input
is regressed on all 10 instruments. First-stage F-statistics are well above 10. This result
holds when each input is regressed on one lagged input price only.
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Table B.3: First-stage regression based on equation (2.6)
(1) (2)
output energy
energy price(t 1) -0.17 -1.03
(0.03) (0.03)






Note. The first-stage regression result based on the equation (2.6):….






ln(W kj;t 1) + jt and
….






ln(W kj;t 1) + jt.
Both output and energy are regressed on the three instruments used in the main
regression.
First-Stage Regression based on Equation (2.6)
Table B.3 presents the first-stage regression result based on equation (2.6). First-stage F-
statistics are well above 10. This result holds when each input is regressed on one lagged
input price only.
B.3 Markups based on Other Inputs
This section presents markup estimation based on other inputs with different production
functional form assumptions, discusses problems of the analysis based on other inputs,
and assesses its cyclicality. Section C.1 estimates markups with labor input and section
C.2 estimates markups with material input. Section C.3 assesses markup cyclicality with
estimated markups in section C.1 and C.2, and finds that markups are procyclical based on
labor and acyclical (or weakly countercyclical) based on material. Section C.4 discusses
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why markups based on material input are likely to be misleading.
Markup Estimation: Labor Input
As shown in equation (3.1), markups are the ratio of output elasticities with respect to
input V kjt and the inverse of input shares for V kjt if we make assumptions 1-5 on V kjt. Fol-











where skjt is double-demeaned input share for V kjt. As in section 2.3, I estimate 0s using
the double-demeaned lagged input prices as instruments.²
A table B.4 presents the estimated output elasticity with respect to labor (ln(ljt)) based
on the equation (C.1). Column (1) and (3) use labor, capital and material only, whereas
column (2) and (4) use four inputs by breaking down material into energy and material
that excludes energy.
The output elasticity with respect to labor (ljt) cannot be estimated consistently with
either OLS regression or IV regression. OLS regression suffers from the same problem
mentioned in section 2.3. IV regression has three different problems based on the result
shown in Table B.4. First, Hansen’s J-test rejects the exogeneity of instrumental variables,
implying that the five assumptions on labor input are problematic. For example, if firms
have to pay adjustment cost to change labor input, this cost will appear as an error term
²I assess first-stage F-statistics for all IV regression in section C and they are all well above 10.
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Table B.4: Elasticity (ljt) estimation based on equation (C.1)







labor 0:23??? 0:61??? 0:33??? 0:34???
(0.08) (0.14) (0.02) (0.02)
capital  0:12 0:20 0:07??? 0:07???




(- energy) (0.08) (0.02)
energy  0:30???  0:03???
(0.09) (0.01)
obs 23,221 23,221 24,167 24,167
J-test 33.86 19.43
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00)







ln(jt). Column (1) and (2) show the regression result with
instrumental variables, and column (3) and (4) show the OLS result. Five different inputs
are used in this regression: labor, capital, material, material that excludes energy, and
energy. All inputs and lagged input prices are logged and double-demeaned across
industries and across time. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the NAICS
industry code. J-test refers to Hansen’s J-statistics for the overidentifying restriction. *,
**, and *** indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
along with markups. If adjustment costs are higher with high input usage and firms
use more inputs with low input prices, the exogeneity of instruments will be violated.
Violation of other assumptions, such as homogenous labor quality or no monoposony
effect on labor input, can also lead to violation of the exogeneity condition. Second, there
is no law of diminishing labor. The coefficient in front of labor is positive even in the IV
regression, which is counter-intuitive. Third, the coefficients of material and capital are
not precisely estimated. It is quite unlikely that material or capital are separable from the
labor input, and this casts doubt on the result based on this regression.
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Furthermore, I assess the same regression analysis under the CES production form









where skjt is double-demeaned input share for V kjt. As before, I estimate 0s using double-
demeaned lagged input prices as instruments.
Table B.5 presents the estimated output elasticity with respect to material (ln(mjt ))
based on the equation (C.2). Column (1) and (2) present the result based on unconstrained
regression, and column (3) and (4) present the result based on constrained regression such
that the coefficient of labor input is equal to the negative coefficient of output.
Again, ljt cannot be consistently estimated with either OLS regression or IV regres-
sion. OLS regression suffers from the same problem as in section (2.3), and IV regression
rejects the CES production functional form assumption with 2 = 4:25 (p-value = 0.04)
by testing the hypothesis that the coefficient of labor equals the negative coefficient of
output.
Despite these problems, I construct markups by subtracting the input share (ln(skjt))




^k ln(V kjt)  ln(skjt) + C (B.3.3)
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Table B.5: Elasticity (ljt) estimation based on equation (C.2)
(1) (2) (3) (4)….
ln(sejt)
Unconstrained (e 6=  q) Constrained (e =  q)





labor 0:68??? 0:23??? 0:20??? 0:22???
(0.23) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
output  0:09  0:21???  0:20???  0:22???
(0.09) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
obs 23,694 24,167 23,694 24,167
J-test 1.60
(p-value) (0.21)







ln(jt). Column (1) and (2) present the result based on
unconstrained regression, and column (3) and (4) present the result based on constrained
regression such that the coefficient of labor input is equal to the negative coefficient of
output. Column (1) and (3) show the regression result with instrumental variables, and
column (2) and (4) show the OLS result. Output, labor and lagged input prices are logged
and double-demeaned across industries and across time. Energy price deflator, total
payroll, and price of investment are used to instrument endogenous variables. Standard
errors in parentheses are clustered on the NAICS industry code. J-test refers to Hansen’s
J-statistics for the overidentifying restriction. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.1,
0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively
Markup Estimation: Material Input
This section resembles section (C.1), but conducts analysis with material input instead of
labor input. Table B.6 presents the estimated output elasticity with respect to material
(ln(mjt )) based on the equation (C.1). Column (1) and (3) use material, capital and labor
only, whereas column (2) and (4) use four inputs by breaking down labor into production
worker and non-production worker.
The estimation of output elasticity with respect to material (mjt ) has similar problems
as in the estimation of ljt in section (C.1). First, although Hansen’s J-test cannot reject the
exogeneity of instrumental variables at 10% significance level, p-value is not large enough
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Table B.6: Elasticity (mjt ) estimation based on equation (C.1)







material  0:08  0:09? 0:22??? 0:22???
(0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02)
capital 0:05 0:02  0:10???  0:10???
(0.08) (0.08) (0.01) (0.01)
labor  0:16???  0:15???
(0.05) (0.02)
labor (p)  0:17???  0:08???
(0.06) (0.02)
labor (np) 0:04  0:07???
(0.07) (0.01)
obs 23,221 23,221 24,167 24,166
J-test 11.85 10.53
(p-value) (0.11) (0.10)







ln(jt). Column (1) and (2) show the regression result with
instrumental variables, and column (3) and (4) show the OLS result. Five different inputs
are used in this regression: labor, capital, material, material that excludes energy, and
energy. All inputs and lagged input prices are logged and double-demeaned across
industries and across time. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the NAICS
industry code. J-test refers to Hansen’s J-statistics for the overidentifying restriction. *,
**, and *** indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
to draw a concrete conclusion. Second, although there is a law of diminishing material
due to the negative coefficient in front of material, the coefficient is not statistically and
economically significant. Third, the coefficient of capital is not precisely estimated, and it
is questionable that capital is separable from the material input given that the coefficient
of capital is statistically significant in the OLS regression.
As in section (C.1), I assess the same regression analysis under the CES production
form assumption based on equation (C.2). Table B.7 presents the estimated output elas-
ticity with respect to material (ln(mjt )) based on the equation (C.2). Column (1) and (2)
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Table B.7: Elasticity (mjt ) estimation based on equation (C.2)
(1) (2) (3) (4)….
ln(sejt)
Unconstrained (e 6=  q) Constrained (e =  q)





material 0:86??? 0:26??? 0:21??? 0:20???
(0.32) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00)
output  0:84???  0:20???  0:21???  0:20???
(0.31) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00)
obs 23,694 24,167 23,694 24,167
J-test 7.38
(p-value) (0.01)







ln(jt). Column (1) and (2) present the result based on
unconstrained regression, and column (3) and (4) present the result based on constrained
regression such that the coefficient of material input is equal to the negative coefficient
of output. Column (1) and (3) show the regression result with instrumental variables,
and column (2) and (4) show the OLS result. Output, material and lagged input prices
are logged and double-demeaned across industries and across time. Material price
deflator, total payroll, and price of investment are used to instrument endogenous
variables. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the NAICS industry code.
J-test refers to Hansen’s J-statistics for the overidentifying restriction. *, **, and ***
indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively
present the result based on unconstrained regression, and column (3) and (4) present the
result based on constrained regression such that the coefficient of material input is equal
to the negative coefficient of output.
mjt cannot be consistently estimated with IV regression as Hansen’s J-test strongly
rejects the exogeneity of instruments with p-value = 0.01.³ Testing the hypothesis that
the coefficient of material equals the coefficient of output leads to 2 = 0:84 (p-value =
0.51). OLS regression suffers from the same problem as in section (2.3) and section (C.1).
Despite these problems, I construct markups by subtracting input share (ln(skjt)) from
³Using some other inputs prices as instruments passes Hansen’s J-test to some extent, but the estimated
coefficients are not statistically significant.
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Table B.8: Unconditional Markup Cyclicality: Other Inputs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
\ln(jt)
ln(jt) 1st order poly CES 1st order poly CES
V 1jt labor labor material material
 ln(vshipjt) 0:49 0:32  0:18 0:002
[0.47, 0.51] [0.30, 0.35] [-0.20, -0.16] [-0.015, 0.018]
industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 .6033 .3807 .1698 .0731
obs 23,694 23,694 23,694 23,694
Note. The regression result based on the equation (6.1):
 ln(jt) = j + t + 1 ln(vshipjt) + jt. Column (1) and (3) show the regression
result based on estimated markups constructed with first order approximation on kjt.
Column (2) and (4) show the result based on estimated markup by assuming a CES
production function. The markups for the CES production function is estimated using
constrained regression. The 95% confidence intervals are constructed with the standard
errors that are cluster bootstrapped based on industry with 5000 repetitions.
output elasticity with respect to material input (\ln(kjt)) as in equation (C.3).
Markup Cyclicality: Labor Input and Material Input
In this section, I present the results on markup cyclicality based on labor and material
input. I conduct the regression analysis based on equation (6.1), and table B.8 presents the
result. Each column reports markups based on different production function and different
inputs. The 95% confidence interval is reported to assess statistical significance.
Markups based on labor are procyclical andmarkups based onmaterial are acyclical or
weakly countercyclical, same as a Cobb-Douglas production functional form assumption
case shown in section (6.1).
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Comments on material input
This section discusses two reasons why the inverse of material share is more countercycli-
cal compared to markups or the inverse of energy share. One main difference between
material input and energy input is amonopsony power, relating to network literature (Ace-
moglu et al. 2012). Since material input is output of upstream firm and input of down-
stream firm, when a downstream firm demands more material, material price is likely to
increase. In other words, there is likely to be a monopsony power on material input: an
individual firm can affect material input price by demanding more material. Energy price,
on the other hand, is more likely to be regulated and supplied by government agency or
a large organization, and would not be much affected by individual firm’s demand.
Consider a firm’s cost minimization problem in section 2, and assume V 1jt is a material
input. Under the assumptions 1-5 on material input except the assumption 4, which states
no monoposony power, all firms in the economy solve the following cost-minimization















s.t. F (V 1jt; :::) = Q








V 1jt = jtF1(V
1
jt; :::)
) W 1jt(V 1jt)[1 + jt] = jtF1(V 1jt; :::)
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on both sides, we have:

















. Here, the markup jt depends
not only smjt and mjt , but also (1+jt). In this case, the inverse material share can be coun-
tercyclical (or acyclical) with procyclical jt if jt is countercyclical or mjt is procyclical.
mjt is likely to be procyclical if there exists complementarity across material and other
inputs, just as energy input. In fact, I find that material and energy are complements in
section 5.
The new term, jt, is likely to be countercyclical because there is a greater desired
price changes during the times of high volatility, and this volatility is countercyclical
(Vavra 2013). That is, prices are more flexible in recession and more rigid in boom. Thus,
when firms demandmore material in the period of recession, material price would change
more compared to the period of expansion.
In addition, material input is likely to have a more heterogeneous quality compared
to energy input.⁴ Without homogeneous quality assumption on material, one needs to
find separate data on material inputs for each quality and specify functional form on the
material quality aggregator. However, these types of database are typically unavailable
⁴International trade literature discusses heterogeneous material input quality. Please see, for example,
Kugler and Verhoogen, 2012 and Bastos, Silva, and Verhoogen, 2014.
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and a functional form assumption is likely to be misspecified. Using aggregated material
input to recover markups without taking account heterogenous input quality is likely
to generate bias in measuring markups and potentially change the direction of markup
cyclicality.
B.4 Robustness
Second-Order Approximation on Elasticity
Assume further that there are no overhead components for all inputs. Allow-
ing second-order terms on ln(ejt), we have: ln(ejt) = 0 +
PK
k=1 k ln(V kjt) +PK
n=1
PK
m=1 nm ln(V njt) ln(V mjt ). Under this specification, equation (2.2) becomes the fol-
lowing equation:
ln(sejt) = 0 +
KX
k=1





nm ln(V njt) ln(V mjt )  ln(jt) (B.4.1)
Same as in section 2.3., I double-demean equation (D.1) and use the lagged input prices
to instrument double-demeaned inputs to estimate ln(ejt).⁵ Table B.9 presents the esti-
mated ln(ejt) based on equation (D.1).
Column (1) and (2) show the regression result with instrumental variables, and column
(3) and (4) show the OLS result. Three different inputs are used in this regression: energy,
material that excludes energy, and labor. Capital input is not used because the result in
section 5 finds that it is neither substitute nor complement to energy input. With the
⁵I used the interacted double-demeaned lagged input prices as instruments for interacted inputs.
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Table B.9: Elasticity (ejt) estimation based on equation (D.1)







energy -4.44** -0.33* 0.62*** 0.85***
(1.40) (0.15) (0.08) (0.03)
material 3.23** 0.11 -0.06 -0.41***
(1.09) (0.12) (0.09) (0.03)
labor 2.37 1.06*** -0.67*** -0.46***













obs 23,221 23,221 24,167 24,167
J-test 7.78 9.66
(p-value) (0.56) (0.21)
Note. The regression result based on the equation (D.1):
ln(sejt) = 0 +
PK




m=1 nm ln(V njt) ln(V mjt )  ln(jt). Column (1)
and (2) show the regression result with instrumental variables, and column (3) and (4)
show the OLS result. Three different inputs are used in this regression: energy, material
that excludes energy, and labor. All inputs and lagged input prices are logged and
double-demeaned across industries and across time. For column (1), only one-year
lagged input prices are used for the second-order terms, and both one-year and two-year
lagged input prices are used for the first-order terms. Standard errors in parentheses are
clustered on the NAICS industry code. J-test refers to Hansen’s J-statistics for the
overidentifying restriction. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01
levels, respectively.
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second-order approximation on ln(ejt), energy has law of diminishing returns, material
and labor are complements to energy input, and Hansen’s J-test cannot reject the validity
of instruments, same as the case with the first-order approximation on ln(ejt).
Based on Column (4), I assess unconditional markup cyclicality with equation (6.1)
and conditional markup cyclicality with equation (6.3), and report the estimation results
in table B.10. All markup cyclicality results are same as the result with the first-order
approximation specification on ln(ejt). In fact, the magnitude becomes larger compared
to the results with the first-order approximation specification as there is more variation
in markups due to more input variation. For example, column (4) shows that an increase
in one percentage change in GDP leads to twenty-eight percentage increase in average
markups. This is more intuitive compared to the result with the first-order specification
on ln(ejt) as an increase in one percentage GDP is likely to be very influential in changing
average markups. In addition, R2 becomes larger compared to the result with the first-
order specification on ln(ejt).
Estimating Elasticity with Controls
The time-persistency in markups due to price rigidity, product durability, and consumer
habits can violate the exogeneity assumption. To address this concern, I control NAICS
3-digit industry-specific price-rigidity index, durability index and necessity index (slope
of engel curve) available from Bils, Klenow, and Malin, 2013. If it is true that these forces
violate the assumption, the coefficients must change when I control these variables.⁶ All
⁶For example, if there is an increase in government spending in period t-1 that affects different indus-
tries’ markups and input prices differentially, and if markups are persistence over time due to price rigidity,
the exogeneity assumption would be violated. Estimated coefficients should be different with controls if
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Table B.10: Unconditional and Conditional Markup Cyclicality: Second-Order
Approximation on ln(ejt)
\ln(jt)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gt  j 51:04
[28.69, 73.38]
 ln(GDPt) Xdurj 11:03
[9.45, 12.61]




industry FE Yes Yes Yes No
year FE Yes Yes Yes No
R2 .2172 .2206 .2096 .0980
obs 14,829 18,570 18,570 23,694
(5) (6) (7) (8)
 ln(GDPt) Xentryj  3:09
[-7.03, 0.85]
 ln(GDPt) Xexitj 8:97
[4.26, 13.67]
 ln(GDPt) Xfinj  3:65
[-5.78, -1.52]




industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 .2184 .2120 .2055 .5718
obs 23,493 23,694 18,570 23,694
Note. The regression result based on the equation (6.1)
\ln(jt) = j + t + 1 ln(vshipjt) + jt in column (8), and (6.3):
\ln(jt) = j + t + (Zt Xj) + jt in all other columns. Each column uses
different Zt Xj to assesses conditional markup cyclicality. Column (4) reports the
overall relationship between GDP and average markups, and Column (8) assess
unconditional markup cyclicality. The 95% confidence intervals are constructed with the
standard errors that are cluster bootstrapped based on industry with 5000 repetitions.
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Table B.11: Elasticity (ejt) estimation based on equation (2.4) with controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)….









energy -0.25 -0.25 -0.25 -0.25
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
material 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.20
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
labor (p) 1:10??? 1:10??? 1:10??? 1:10???
(0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26)
labor (np) -0.35 -0.35 -0.34 -0.34
(0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24)
control none p-rigidity durability necessity
obs 18,198 18,198 18,198 18,198
J-test 8.87 8.94 8.76 8.83
(p-value) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.18)







ln(jt). Column (1) shows the benchmark result without the
control based on industries that have available indexes. Column (2) controls for price
rigidity index, column (3) controls for durability index, and column (4) controls for
necessity index. Four different inputs are used in this regression: energy, material that
excludes energy, non-production worker, and production worker. All inputs and lagged
input prices are logged and double-demeaned across industries and across time.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the NAICS industry code. J-test refers to
Hansen’s J-statistics for the overidentifying restriction. *, **, and *** indicate significance
at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
the coefficients are robust to these controls as shown in table B.11.
The inventory adjustment behavior and investment decision of firms can potentially
violate the exogeneity assumption. To address these concerns, I control for the double-
demeaned inventory and investment for both the previous year and the current year in the
regression. The coefficients are robust as shown in table B.12 and B.13. In particular, the
coefficients in front of lagged inventory, current inventory, lagged investment and cur-
rent investment are negligible and not statistically significant, implying that inventory
price rigidity effect violates exogeneity assumption and it is different across industries.
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Table B.12: Elasticity (ejt) estimation based on equation (2.4) with inventory
(1) (2) (3) (4)….









energy -0.40* -0.40* -0.41* -0.41**
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
material 0.32* 0.26 0.32* 0.27*
(0.15) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14)
labor (p) 1.41*** 1.30*** 1.37*** 1.27***
(0.31) (0.29) (0.30) (0.28)
labor (np) -0.45 -0.38 -0.35 -0.28
(0.26) (0.24) (0.27) (0.25)
inventory (lagged) 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
inventory (current) 0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
obs 23,220 22,707 22,709 22,219
J-test 6.76 9.27 5.49 7.81
(p-value) (0.34) (0.16) (0.48) (0.25)







ln(jt). Column (1) shows the benchmark result without
inventory. Column (2) controls for lagged inventory, column (3) controls for current
year inventory, and column (4) controls for both. Four different inputs are used in this
regression: energy, material that excludes energy, non-production worker, and
production worker. All inputs, lagged input prices, current and lagged inventory are
logged and double-demeaned across industries and across time. Inventory is deflated
with deflator for the value of shipment. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on
the NAICS industry code. J-test refers to Hansen’s J-statistics for the overidentifying
restriction. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
adjustment or investment decision is not likely to cause inconsistency in my estimates. I
treat lagged and current inventory as control in my regression, but making these endoge-
nous and using lagged input prices as instruments do not change the result.
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Table B.13: Elasticity (ejt) estimation based on equation (2.4) with investment
(1) (2) (3) (4)….









energy -0.40* -0.45* -0.42* -0.39*
(0.16) (0.19) (0.18) (0.20)
material 0.32* 0.28 0.30 0.30
(0.15) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
labor (np) -0.45 -0.41 -0.44 -0.39
(0.26) (0.28) (0.27) (0.29)
labor (p) 1.41*** 1.53*** 1.44*** 1.48***
(0.31) (0.37) (0.34) (0.39)
investment (lagged) 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
investment (current) 0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
obs 23,220 23,220 23,220 23,220
J-test 6.76 6.70 7.39 5.59
(p-value) (0.34) (0.24) (0.19) (0.23)







ln(jt). Column (1) shows the benchmark result without
investment. Column (2) controls for lagged investment, column (3) controls for current
year investment, and column (4) controls for both. Four different inputs are used in this
regression: energy, material that excludes energy, non-production worker, and
production worker. All inputs, lagged input prices, current and lagged investment are
logged and double-demeaned across industries and across time. Both current and lagged
investment are treated as endogenous variables and instrumented with lagged input
prices (investment deflator). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the NAICS
industry code. J-test refers to Hansen’s J-statistics for the overidentifying restriction. *,
**, and *** indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
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Table B.14: Elasticity (ejt) estimation based on equation (2.4) with 2-year and 3-year
lagged input prices as instruments















energy -0.33* -0.29 -0.40* -0.56*
(0.16) (0.19) (0.16) (0.23)
material 0.39* 0.40 0.32* 0.17
(0.17) (0.23) (0.15) (0.22)
labor (p) 1.34*** 1.25*** 1.41*** 1.69***
(0.31) (0.36) (0.31) (0.45)
labor (np) -0.51* -0.47 -0.45 -0.59
(0.24) (0.25) (0.26) (0.33)
capital -0.07 0.51
(0.40) (0.44)
obs 23,220 23,220 23,220 23,220
J-test 3.86 6.42 6.76 6.04
(p-value) (0.7) (0.27) (0.34) (0.3)
Note. The regression result based on the equation (2.4) with 2-year and 3-year lagged








ln(jt). Column (1) and (2)
show the regression result with the two-year and three-year lagged input prices as
instrumental variables, and column (3) and (4) show the regression result with the
one-year and two-year lagged input prices as instrumental variables. Five different
inputs are used in this regression: energy, material that excludes energy, non-production
worker, production worker, and capital. All inputs and lagged input prices are logged
and double-demeaned across industries and across time. Standard errors in parentheses
are clustered on the NAICS industry code. J-test refers to Hansen’s J-statistics for the
overidentifying restriction. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01
levels, respectively.
Two-Year Lagged Input Prices as Instruments
Instead of using one-year and two-year lagged input prices, I use two-year and three-
year lagged input prices to instrument inputs in estimating ln(ejt). Table B.14 shows the
regression result based on the equation (2.4) with two-year and three-year lagged input
prices as instruments. The coefficients are robust to different instruments.
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Production Function Estimation
ln(ejt) can be recovered with a production function estimation technique. Since assum-
ing Cobb-Douglas with respect to energy input will not recover the time-varying ln(ejt),
we need to assume a more general production function on energy input to assess markup
cyclicality. Assume that there is no overhead components for all inputs, and further as-
sume a restricted Translog production function that allows input complementarity across




1k ln(V kjt) ln(V 1jt) +
X
k
k ln(V kjt) + Ajt (B.4.2)
where V 1jt is an energy input. If we assume 1k = 0 8k, we recover the Cobb-Douglas
production function. In this case, the output elasticity with respect to energy is ejt =P
k 1k ln(V kjt).
Running regression to estimate (D.2) suffers from a well-known simultaneity problem
(Olley and Pakes 1996). To estimate the equation (D.2), I control the productivityAjt using
flexible 4th-order polynomial of investment and capital, following Olley and Pakes, 1996.





  ln(V kjt) ln(V 1jt)+X
k
k ln(V kjt) + F (Kjt; Ijt) + jt (B.4.3)
where F (Kjt; Ijt) is a flexible fourth-order polynomial of capital and investment.
Then I further instrument inputs with the lagged input prices to avoid a possible endo-
geniety problem that could arise if the function of investment and capital cannot per-
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Table B.15: Production function estimation based on equation (D.3)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Qjt)
IV & OP Control IV OP Control OLS
energy2 0.14* -0.05 0.01 0.01*
(0.07) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01)
material*energy -0.19* -0.17** -0.04* -0.02
(0.09) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02)
labor(p)*energy 0.34** -0.11 -0.02 -0.03*
(0.10) (0.10) (0.01) (0.01)
labor(np)*energy -0.28* 0.25 0.01 0.02
(0.13) (0.13) (0.02) (0.02)
energy -0.67 0.59* 0.29*** 0.14***
(0.34) (0.27) (0.06) (0.04)
material 1.45*** 1.42*** 0.83*** 0.77***
(0.30) (0.23) (0.10) (0.09)
labor(p) -1.28*** 0.32 0.10* 0.13**
(0.38) (0.38) (0.05) (0.05)
labor(np) 1.22* -0.88 0.08 0.06
(0.53) (0.52) (0.08) (0.09)
obs 23,220 23,220 24,166 24,166
J-test 11.00 12.63
(p-value) (0.20) (0.13)




  ln(V kjt) ln(V 1jt)+Pk k ln(V kjt) + F (Kjt; Ijt) + jt. Column (1) uses
OLS regression, column (2) uses OLS regression with Olley-Pakes (1996) control
function. Column (3) uses lagged input prices to instrument inputs, and column (4) uses
lagged input prices to instrument inputs with Olley-Pakes (1996) control function. Five
different inputs are used in this regression: energy, material that excludes energy,
non-production worker, production worker, and capital. Capital input is not interacted
with energy input, but all other inputs are interacted with energy input. All inputs and
lagged input prices are logged, and standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the
NAICS industry code. J-test refers to Hansen’s J-statistics for the overidentifying
restriction. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
fectly proxy the productivity. Given that the lagged input prices are correlated with
current inputs (relevance), we can form the following moment conditions (exogeneity):
E[jt ln(W kj;t 1)] = 0; E[jt ln(W kj;t 2)] = 0 8k. Table B.15 shows the result based on the
equation (D.3).
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Column (1) is the main regression result that utilizes both instruments and control
function. There are three main observations. First, production worker is still comple-
mentary to energy input. Notice, however, that this complementarity is weaker than the
estimated ejt in themain result. It is likely due to a Hicks-netrual productivity assumption
that does not allow labor-augmenting technology change. If there is a labor-augmenting
technology in this economy, labor complementarity would be much larger. Second, in-
struments seem to fix attenuation bias that arise from the measurement error. Compared
to column (1) and (2), the magnitude of coefficients in column (3) and (4) is much larger.
Based on column (1) of the result in table B.15, I also assess markup cyclicality as a
robustness check and report these results in table B.16. There are two main observations.
First, all the coefficients regarding conditional markup cyclicality are not precisely esti-
mated. R2 is very low and markups seem acyclical with respect to various shocks. It
is primarily due to a small variation in markups that arise from the restrictive produc-
tion functional form assumption with Hicks-neutral technology assumption. Even the
restricted Translog production function that nests a Cobb-Douglas production function
cannot be fully general to capture variation in output elasticity with respect to energy.
Second, despite its imprecision, markups are still unconditionally procyclical, and pro-
cyclical or acyclical conditional on demand shock.
Different Filters
In addition to the graph of linear-detrended variables, I use both Hodrick-Prescott (HP)
filter and Baxter-King filter to assess cyclicality of average markups for robustness check.
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Table B.16: Unconditional and Conditional Markup Cyclicality: Production Function
Estimation to Recover ln(ejt)
\ln(jt)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gt  j 1:68
[-1.06, 4.43]
 ln(GDPt) Xdurj  0:01
[-0.44, 0.41]




industry FE Yes Yes Yes No
year FE Yes Yes Yes No
R2 .0212 .0182 .0182 .0014
obs 14,170 17,768 17,768 22,637
(5) (6) (7) (8)
 ln(GDPt) Xentryj 0:32
[-0.37, 1.01]
 ln(GDPt) Xexitj  0:41
[-1.22, .40]
 ln(GDPt) Xfinj  0:06
[-0.41, 0.28]




industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 .0181 .0182 .0182 .0266
obs 23,446 22,637 17,768 22,637
Note. The regression result based on the equation (6.1)
\ln(jt) = j + t + 1 ln(vshipjt) + jt in column (8), and (6.3):
\ln(jt) = j + t + (Zt Xj) + jt in all other columns. Each column uses
different Zt Xj to assess conditional markup cyclicality. Column (4) reports the
overall relationship between GDP and average markups, and Column (8) assess
unconditional markup cyclicality. 95% confidence intervals are constructed with the
standard errors that are cluster bootstrapped based on industry with 5000 repetitions.
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ln(GDP), ln(Markup) & -ln(energy share)
Note. Y-axis is HP filtered variable, and x-axis is year from 1958 to 2009. Estimated
markups, ln(jt), are constructed by assuming the 1st-order polynomial specification on
ln(ejt). Estimated markups and   ln(sejt) are averaged across industries within each
time period, and also HP filtered. Both measures are then divided by 5 to compare with
the HP filtered GDP on the graph. GDP database is supplemented from Bureau of
Economic Analysis.
Figure B.1 plots HP filtered average markups, negative log of energy share, and ln(GDPt),
and figure B.2 plots Baxter-King filtered average markups, negative log of energy share,
and ln(GDPt). The result robustly supports that markups are strongly procyclical, and
ln(ejt) derives the procyclicality of markups.
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ln(GDP), ln(Markup) & -ln(energy share)
Note. Y-axis is Baxter-King filtered variable, and x-axis is year from 1958 to 2009.
Estimated markups, ln(jt), are constructed by assuming 1st-order polynomial
specification on ln(ejt). Estimated markups and   ln(sejt) are averaged across industries
within each time period, and also Baxter-King filtered. Both measures are then divided
by 5 to compare with the Baxter-King filtered GDP on the graph. Baxter-King
correlations exclude 3 years from the start and the end of the sample. GDP database is
supplemented from Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Weighted Regression
I conduct the regression analysis based on equation (6.1) again, but weight each industry
by the share of its value of shipment in total value of shipment of all industries, averaging
across time. The result is shown in Table B.17, and robustly supports that markups are
strongly procyclical. Similarly, I weight each industry by the share of its value added
in total value added of all industries, averaging across time. Again, the result robustly
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Table B.17: Unconditional Markup Cyclicality: Weighted Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
\ln(jt)   ln(sljt)   ln(smjt)   ln(sejt) \ln(CESjt )
ln(jt) 1st order poly constant constant constant CES
V 1jt energy labor material energy energy
 ln(vshipjt) 1:14 0:39  0:01 0:48 0:39
[1.08, 1.21] [0.37, 0.42] [-0.03, 0.01] [0.45, 0.52] [0.37, 0.42]
industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 .3486 .4019 .0580 .2194 .2592
obs 23,693 23,694 23,694 23,694 23,694
Note. The weight least square regression result based on the equation (6.1):
 ln(jt) = j + t + 1 ln(vshipjt) + jt. Industries are weighted by the share of its
value of shipment in total value of shipment of all industries, averaging across time.
Column (1) shows the regression result based on the estimated markups. Column (2)
shows the result based on the inverse labor share. Column (3) shows the result based on
the inverse material share. Column (4) shows the result based on the inverse energy
share and column (5) shows the result based on the estimated markup by assuming a
CES production function. The markups with the CES production function is estimated
using constrained regression and double-demeaning techniques with the lagged
double-demeaned input prices as instruments. The 95% confidence intervals are
constructed with industry-clustered standard errors.
supports that markups are strongly procyclical as shown in Table B.18.
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Table B.18: Unconditional Markup Cyclicality: Weighted Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
\ln(jt)   ln(sljt)   ln(smjt)   ln(sejt) \ln(CESjt )
ln(jt) 1st order poly constant constant constant CES
V 1jt energy labor material energy energy
 ln(vshipjt) 0:98 0:41 0:01 0:39 0:33
[0.91, 1.04] [0.38, 0.44] [-0.02, 0.04] [0.35, 0.44] [0.29, 0.36]
industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 .2665 .4113 .0654 .1636 .2021
obs 23,693 23,694 23,694 23,694 23,694
Note. The weight least square regression result based on the equation (6.1):
 ln(jt) = j + t + 1 ln(vshipjt) + jt. Industries are weighted by the share of its
value added in total value added of all industries, averaging across time. Column (1)
shows the regression result based on the estimated markups. Column (2) shows the
result based on the inverse labor share. Column (3) shows the result based on the
inverse material share. Column (4) shows the result based on the inverse energy share
and column (5) shows the result based on the estimated markup by assuming a CES
production function. The markups with the CES production function is estimated using
constrained regression and double-demeaning techniques with the lagged
double-demeaned input prices as instruments. The 95% confidence intervals are
constructed with industry-clustered standard errors.
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Appendix C
Appendix for Chapter 3
C.1 Equilibrium Conditions : Benchmark Model
The equilibrium is defined by sequence of 10 endogenous variables





and that of 3 exogenous variables f"at ; gt; P et g satisfying


























= P et (C.1.4)
It = Kt  
 
1  Kt 1 (C.1.5)










Yt = Ct +Kt   (1  )Kt 1 + Y  gt (C.1.10)
log("at ) = a log("at 1) + at ; at  i:i:d: N(0; 2a) (C.1.11)
log(gt) = (1  g) log(gss) + g log(gt 1) + gt ; gt  i:i:d: N(0; 2g) (C.1.12)
log(P et ) = (1  e) log(P ess) + e log(P et 1) + et ; et  i:i:d: N(0; 2e) (C.1.13)
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C.2 Additional Figures
• Translog vs. Cobb-Douglas (both with Frisch= 3:31)
– Increase in productivity by 1 % : Figure C.1
Figure C.1: Impulse response w.r.t. 1% productivity shock : Cobb-Douglas vs. Translog
Note. Y-axis represents a percent deviation from steady state. The solid black line
represents the model with a normalized Translog production function. The red dashed
line represents the model with a Cobb-Douglas production function. The solid green line
represents the model with a Cobb-Douglas production function and no energy input (i.e.,
standard RBC without energy).
• Translog vs. Cobb-Douglas (both with Frisch= 3:31)
– Increase in government spending by 1 % : Figure C.2
• Cobb-Douglas (Frisch= 3:31) vs. Translog (Frisch= 0:86)
236
Figure C.2: Impulse response w.r.t. 1% government spending shock : Cobb-Douglas vs.
Translog
Note. Y-axis represents a percent deviation from steady state. The solid black line
represents model with normalized Translog production function. The red dashed line
represents model with a Cobb-Douglas production function. The solid green line
represents model with a Cobb-Douglas production function and no energy input (i.e.,
standard RBC without energy).
– Increase in productivity by 1 % : Figure C.3
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Figure C.3: Frisch elasticity : Increase in productivity by 1 %
Note. Y-axis represents a percent deviation from steady state. The blue solid line
represents the model with a normalized Translog with micro-consistent Frisch elasticity
of 0.86. The green dashed line represents model with Cobb-Douglas with
micro-consistent Frisch elasticity of 0.86. The red dotted-dashed line represents the
model with a Cobb-Douglas with macro-consistent Frisch elasticity of 3.31.
C.3 Additional Tables
• Posterior Distribution of Structural Parameters of HK model : Table C.1
• Posterior Distribution of Shock Processes of HK model : Table C.2
• Conditional Variance Decomposition : 10 Quarters
– HK model : Table C.3
– SW model : Table C.4
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Table C.1: Posterior Distribution of Structural Parameters
Mode Mean 5 Percent 95 Percent

i 6.08 6.31 4.60 7.98
c 1.51 1.47 1.25 1.69
 0.71 0.71 0.65 0.78
w 0.90 0.89 0.84 0.93
l 2.46 2.45 1.60 3.30
p 0.90 0.89 0.85 0.92
w 0.57 0.57 0.36 0.79
p 0.21 0.23 0.09 0.36
 0.53 0.53 0.36 0.71
p + 1 1.57 1.57 1.44 1.70
 1 1.93 1.95 1.66 2.26
R 0.83 0.82 0.78 0.87
 2 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.12
 3 0.23 0.23 0.19 0.28
 0.79 0.80 0.63 0.96
~ 0.13 0.16 0.06 0.24
l 0.53 0.34 -1.32 2.04
 0.44 0.44 0.41 0.46
 0.19 0.19 0.16 0.22
• Conditional Variance Decomposition : 4 Quarters
– HK model : Table C.5
– SW model : Table C.6
• Unconditional Variance Decomposition
– HK model : Table C.7
– SW model : Table C.8
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Table C.2: Posterior Distribution of Shock Processes
Mode Mean 5 Percent 95 Percent
a 0.47 0.47 0.43 0.53
b 0.24 0.24 0.20 0.28
g 0.53 0.53 0.49 0.59
i 0.43 0.43 0.34 0.50
r 0.24 0.24 0.22 0.27
p 0.14 0.14 0.11 0.17
w 0.24 0.24 0.19 0.27
a 0.96 0.96 0.94 0.97
b 0.17 0.21 0.07 0.35
g 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.99
i 0.73 0.75 0.65 0.84
r 0.11 0.13 0.04 0.22
p 0.83 0.81 0.69 0.94
w 0.95 0.94 0.91 0.97
p 0.68 0.63 0.43 0.84
w 0.87 0.80 0.69 0.92
ga 0.47 0.47 0.32 0.62
C.4 A Simple Model with Endogenous Energy Price
In this section, we provide a simple model that features the endogenous energy produc-
ing sector. Importantly, the energy price is no longer exogenous but endogenously deter-
mined (see Kilian, 2008 for discussion). We focus on industrial energy usage by abstract-
ing energy consumption by household as in Finn, 2000 and Kormilitsina, 2011. The model
provided in this appendix differs from that in Finn, 2000 and Kormilitsina, 2011, however,
in two dimensions. First, to be consistent with the empirical specification in section 2,
we assume that firms directly choose energy as a factor input (instead of assuming that
households provide energy to firms by choosing amounts of capital utilization). Letting
firms choose the energy input (instead of households providing it) is necessary in this
paper, because the empirical specification assumes energy as a factor input is directly
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Table C.3: Conditional Variance Decomposition : 10 Quarters, HK model
Prod. Risk P. Gov. Invest. Monetary P. Mark W. Mark
Output 28.97 3.93 9.82 28.00 9.05 8.70 11.52
Cons. 17.79 11.03 3.29 9.15 15.76 10.40 32.58
Invest. 12.32 0.48 0.65 73.90 4.00 5.60 3.05
Hours 4.06 6.05 16.27 25.84 11.60 8.02 28.17
Wages 11.53 1.25 1.73 16.27 7.58 28.33 33.31
Infla. 4.12 0.17 0.21 0.30 1.82 39.96 53.42
Interest 14.85 8.78 1.73 17.07 24.46 9.16 23.95
Table C.4: Conditional Variance Decomposition : 10 Quarters, SW model
Prod. Risk P. Gov. Invest. Monetary P. Mark W. Mark
Output 32.87 3.08 7.96 14.64 3.15 10.81 27.48
Cons. 16.33 7.54 4.57 0.77 5.34 9.86 55.60
Invest. 14.55 0.24 2.16 65.62 0.96 7.86 8.62
Hours 3.44 4.76 13.95 13.37 4.39 11.61 48.48
Wages 22.31 0.93 0.04 6.49 2.66 46.78 20.79
Infla. 4.42 1.17 0.69 5.63 6.90 28.66 52.53
Interest 9.92 9.68 2.45 23.59 17.07 9.88 27.40
chosen by firms. Second, we accommodate the important discussion by Kilian, 2008 and
make the energy price endogenous, whereas Finn, 2000 and Kormilitsina, 2011 assume in
exogenous energy price (oil price).
The Model
Households
The economy is populated by a large number of identical infinitely lived households. The
representative household chooses sequence of consumption Ct, labor supplied Lht , invest-










Table C.5: Conditional Variance Decomposition : 4 Quarters, HK model
Prod. Risk P. Gov. Invest. Monetary P. Mark W. Mark
Output 23.53 8.86 16.36 31.62 10.94 5.86 2.84
Cons. 14.35 32.09 2.54 3.62 25.13 7.90 14.38
Invest. 6.65 0.80 0.34 84.81 3.71 3.28 0.41
Hours 7.73 11.68 22.63 31.21 12.91 4.40 9.46
Wages 5.00 1.35 1.25 9.67 5.15 25.87 51.71
Infla. 3.97 0.09 0.05 0.11 1.15 52.65 41.97
Interest 15.80 12.30 1.50 11.23 35.18 11.23 12.76
Table C.6: Conditional Variance Decomposition : 4 Quarters, SW model
Prod. Risk P. Gov. Invest. Monetary P. Mark W. Mark
Output 28.98 7.80 15.00 22.16 6.16 8.41 11.49
Cons. 15.21 24.78 3.75 0.09 13.61 9.33 33.22
Invest. 8.30 0.49 1.10 80.90 1.49 4.83 2.89
Hours 7.13 10.58 22.18 23.00 7.86 8.30 20.95
Wages 13.35 1.85 0.05 4.27 3.46 39.37 37.65
Infla. 5.21 1.32 0.65 5.48 6.72 34.26 46.36
Interest 11.85 13.26 2.37 17.50 24.02 12.32 18.67
subject to the budget constraint
Ct + It +
Bt
Rt







and the law of motion of capital
Kt = It + (1  )Kt 1 (C.4.1)
where R is the (gross) risk-free rate, Rk is the real rental rate of capital, W is the real
wage, T is the tax paid by the household in terms of consumption unit,  is the dividend
paid to the households by the intermediate goods firms, and e is the dividend paid by
the energy firms. We assume UC;t > 0, UCC;t  0, UL;t  0, ULL;t  0.
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Table C.7: Unconditional Variance Decomposition, HK model
Prod. Risk P. Gov. Invest. Monetary P. Mark W. Mark
Output 33.42 1.62 6.32 14.44 4.40 5.66 34.13
Cons. 17.25 2.71 7.18 10.51 4.73 4.69 52.92
Invest. 20.89 0.31 2.44 49.87 3.04 5.47 17.97
Hours 2.65 2.81 14.05 14.21 5.95 5.26 55.06
Wages 31.85 0.76 1.91 15.37 6.01 22.45 21.66
Infla. 4.18 0.18 0.85 0.84 2.03 34.92 57.00
Interest 14.31 6.89 3.59 17.12 19.38 7.47 31.24
Table C.8: Unconditional Variance Decomposition, SW model
Prod. Risk P. Gov. Invest. Monetary P. Mark W. Mark
Output 27.05 1.02 3.84 5.33 1.05 6.34 55.36
Cons. 10.79 1.39 4.64 2.51 1.00 4.19 75.49
Invest. 20.25 0.15 4.28 41.82 0.58 8.07 24.84
Hours 1.48 1.67 9.50 5.83 1.55 5.80 74.16
Wages 37.65 0.42 0.86 6.48 1.27 42.91 10.41
Infla. 3.68 0.89 0.84 4.71 5.25 21.91 62.74
Interest 8.28 6.69 3.02 18.30 11.86 7.24 44.61
The FOCs are given by
UC(Ct; L
h






Rkt+1 + 1  
	 (C.4.2)













The Final Goods Firm
Thefinal goods producers purchase differentiated intermediate goods and aggregate them
using the Dixit-Stiglitz CES technology. We assume that the final goods sector is perfectly
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where Yt, Yt(i) are the final and intermediate goods, respectively, and Pt(i) is the price of
intermediate goods.  is the inverse of markup.
The optimality implies
Yt(i) = Yt  Pt(i)1/( 1) (C.4.5)
Intermediate Goods Producers
We assume a monopolistic competitive intermediate goods sector. Following (3:3:1), I
assume intermediate goods producer i’s technology is characterized by the following nor-














ellog( LtLss )# (C.4.6)
Here, Yt(i) is intermediate goods producer i’s output,Kst (i) is the capital services used in
production, Lt(i) is labor input, and Et(i) is energy input. Lt and Et are aggregate labor
and energy, which individual firms take as given. Total factor productivity "at follows
log "at = a log "at 1 + at ; at  N(0; 2a) (C.4.7)
244
Each intermediate goods producer’s periodic profit is given by
t(i) = Pt(i)Yt(i) WtLt(i) RktKst (i)  P et Et(i) (C.4.8)
whereWt, Rkt , and P et are the aggregate real wage, the real rental rate of capital, and the
real energy price, respectively. Note that because there is no price rigidity, the final good
is used as a numeraire.
Each intermediate goods producer maximizes (C:4:8) subject to the demand for its































= P et (C.4.11)
Energy Producer
We introduce an energy producer that combines labor, capital and rawmaterial to produce
energy that is used by intermediate goods producers. We assume that the energy sector
operates in a perfectly competitive market. The energy production function is given by















where Kest , Let , M et are capital service, labor, and a raw material (e.g. fossil fuel) used in
energy production. "et is the energy production technology shock following
log "et = e log "et 1 + et ; et  N(0; 2e) (C.4.13)
We assume constant returns to scale in energy production : k + l + m = 1.













 WtLet  RktKset   Pmt M et
where Pmt follows the exogenous process
logPmt = m logPmt 1 + (1  m) logPm + mt ; mt  N(0; 2m) (C.4.14)





















The government budget constraint is given by




where Gt is government spending, and Tt is lump-sum taxes (or subsidies). Following
\cite{smetsandwouters2007}, we denote gt = GtYss , where Yss is the steady state value of
output, and assume gt follows exogenous process
log gt = (1  g) log gss + g log gt 1 + gt ; gt  N(0; 2g) (C.4.19)
Resource Constraint
Market clearing implies
Kt 1 = Kst +K
es
t
Lht = Lt + L
e
t
The social resource constraint can be written as
Yt = Ct +Kt   (1  )Kt 1 +Gt
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Functional Form
To simulate the model we impose the following functional form of utility function, which













t ; Lt; L
e












and that of 4 exogenous variables f"at ; gt; "et ; Pmt g satisfying
Yt = F (K
s
































= P et (C.4.24)







Rkt+1 + 1  
	 (C.4.26)
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t = RtEt [t+1] (C.4.28)
Yt = Ct +Kt   (1  )Kt 1 +Gt (C.4.29)
Kt 1 = Kst +K
es
t (C.4.30)






























log "at = a log "at 1 + at ; at  N(0; 2a) (C.4.36)
log gt = (1  g) log gss + g log gt 1 + gt ; gt  N(0; 2g) (C.4.37)
log "et = e log "et 1 + et ; et  N(0; 2e) (C.4.38)
logPmt = m logPmt 1 + (1  m) logPm + mt ; mt  N(0; 2m) (C.4.39)
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Dynamics of the Economy
In this section, we replicate our results in Section 4 using the model provided in this ap-
pendix. All the main results remain robust, even if we endogenize the energy market.
In other words, using Translog technology with procyclical RTS (i) generates procyclical
real wage, capital, and investment with respect to demand shock, (ii) amplifies shocks re-
gardless of the sources, and (iii) has the potential to reconcile the micro- vs. macro-Frisch
elasticity debate. In addition, we show that explicitly considering the energy production
sector and endogenizing the energy price render the economy less sensitive to raw mate-
rial price shocks.
ProcyclicalW , K, I w.r.t. Government Spending Shock
• Procyclicality : Increase in government spending by 1 % : Figure C.4
Strong Propagation
• Amplification : Increase in productivity by 1 % : Figure C.5
• Amplification : Increase in government spending by 1 % : Figure C.6
Using Micro-consistent Frisch Elasticity
• Frisch elasticity : Increase in productivity by 1 % : Figure C.7
Impulse Response w.r.t. Raw material Price shock
• Impulse Response : Increase in raw material price (Pm) by 1 % : Figure C.8
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Figure C.4: Procyclicality : Increase in government spending by 1 %
Note. Y-axis represents a percent deviation from steady state. The dashed line represents
the model with a Cobb-Douglas production function, and the solid line represents the
model with a normalized Translog production function.
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Figure C.5: Amplification : Increase in productivity by 1 %
Note. Y-axis represents a percent deviation from steady state. The dashed line represents
the model with a Cobb-Douglas production function, and the solid line represents the
model with a normalized Translog production function.
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Figure C.6: Amplification : Increase in government spending by 1 %
Note. Y-axis represents a percent deviation from steady state. The dashed line represents
the model with a Cobb-Douglas production function, and the solid line represents the
model with a normalized Translog production function.
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Figure C.7: Frisch elasticity : Increase in productivity by 1 %
Note. Y-axis represents a percent deviation from steady state. The blue solid line
represents the model with a normalized Translog with micro-consistent Frisch elasticity
of 0.86. The green dashed line represents the model with a Cobb-Douglas with
micro-consistent Frisch elasticity of 0.86. The red dotted-dashed line represents the
model with a Cobb-Douglas with macro-consistent Frisch elasticity of 3.31.
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Figure C.8: Impulse Response : Increase in raw material price (Pm) by 1 %
Note. Y-axis represents a percent deviation from steady state. The dashed blue line
represents the model with a normalized Translog production function with exogenous
energy price (Section 4 model), and the solid black line represents the model with a
normalized Translog production function with endogenous energy price (Appendix D
model). For the dashed blue line (Section 4 model), energy price is identical to the raw
material price (i.e., Pe = Pm).
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